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Figure 1: Global Risks Landscape 2013 versus 2012i
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Figure 2: Global Risks Landscape 2013
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Figure 3: Global Risks Map 2013ii
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As we strive to restore confidence and 
growth globally, leaders cannot continue 
with a “risk-off” mindset if our collective 
goal remains to seize transformational 
opportunities that can improve the state 
of the world. Dynamism in our 
hyperconnected world requires 
increasing our resilience to the many 
global risks that loom before us. 
By their nature, global risks do not 
respect national borders, as highlighted in 
this report. And we now know that 
extreme weather events exacerbated by 
climate change will not limit their effects to 
countries that are major greenhouse gas 
emitters; false information posted on 
social networks can spread like wildfire to 
the other side of the globe in a matter of 
milliseconds; and genes that make 
bacteria resistant to our strongest 
antibiotics can hitch a ride with patients 
on an intercontinental flight. 
I, therefore, invite you to read the case 
studies in this report of the three 
examples cited above to understand 
better the international and 
interdependent nature of such 
constellations of risks. I think you will 
agree that each one makes a compelling 
case for stronger cross-border 
collaboration among stakeholders from 
governments, business and civil society 
– a partnership with the purpose of 
building resilience to global risks. They 
also highlight the need for strengthening 
existing mechanisms to mitigate and 
manage risks, which today primarily exist 
at the national level. This means that while 
we can map and describe global risks, 
we cannot predict when and how they will 
manifest; therefore, building national 
resilience to global risks is of paramount 
importance.
Preface Resilient Dynamism is the theme for this year’s World Economic Forum Annual 
Meeting in Davos-Klosters, and I am 
pleased to introduce the Global Risks 
2013 report in the same spirit. Based on 
an extensive survey of over 1,000 experts 
worldwide, the report – now in its eighth 
edition – serves to orient and inform 
decision-makers as they seek to make 
sense of an increasingly complex and 
fast-changing world. I hope this report 
challenges, provokes and inspires you, 
and I invite you to engage – if you have not 
already done so – with the World 
Economic Forum’s Risk Response 
Network, which provides private and 
public sector leaders with a collaborative 
platform to build national resilience to 
global risks.
Klaus Schwab 
Founder and Executive Chairman 
World Economic Forum
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Foreword
Resilience is the theme that runs through 
the eighth edition of this report. It seems an 
obvious one when contemplating the 
external nature of global risks because they 
are beyond any organization’s or nation’s 
capacity to manage or mitigate on their 
own. And yet global risks are often 
diminished, or even ignored, in current 
enterprise risk management. One reason 
for this is that global risks do not fit neatly 
into existing conceptual frameworks. 
Fortunately, this is changing. The Harvard 
Business Review recently published a 
concise and practical taxonomy that may 
also be used to consider global risks.1 
There are three types of risks as catego-
rized by Professors Kaplan and Mikes.
 
First are “preventable” risks, such as 
breakdowns in processes and mistakes by 
employees. Second are “strategic” risks, 
which a company undertakes voluntarily, 
having weighed them against the potential 
rewards. Third are “external” risks, which 
this report calls “global risks”; they are 
complex and go beyond a company’s 
scope to manage and mitigate (i.e. they are 
exogenous in nature). This differentiation 
will, we hope, not only improve strategic 
planning and decision-making but also 
increase the utility of our report in private 
and public sector institutions. 
The concept of resilience also influenced 
this year’s Global Risks Perception 
Survey, on which this report is built. The 
annual survey of experts worldwide 
added a new question asking respond-
ents to rate their country’s resilience – or, 
precisely, its ability to adapt and recover 
– in the face of each of the 50 risks 
covered in the survey. More than 1,000 
experts responded to our survey, making 
the dataset explored in this report more 
textured and robust than ever. 
Per the revamped methodology intro-
duced in 2012, the 2013 report presents 
three in-depth “risk cases” exploring 
themes based on analysis of survey data, 
as well as detailed follow-up expert 
interviews and partner workshops. This 
eighth edition increased its geographic 
breadth and disciplinary depth by 
bringing on two new report partners from 
academia: the National University of 
Singapore (NUS) and the Oxford Martin 
School at the University of Oxford. We 
also entered into an exciting editorial 
partnership with Nature, a leading 
science journal, to push the boundaries 
of the imagination further with a re-
vamped “X Factors” section of the report. 
We have introduced unique content and 
data online, including an interactive 
website through which you can explore 
the risks landscape and a one-year-on 
follow-up of the three risk cases 
presented in the 2012 report from a 
perspective of how to promote resilience. 
Our Special Report this year takes the first 
steps towards developing a national 
resilience measurement with regard to 
global risks. It explores the use of qualitative 
and quantitative indicators to assess overall 
national resilience to global risks by looking 
at five national-level subsystems 
(economic, environmental, governance, 
infrastructure and social) through the lens 
of five components: robustness, 
redundancy, resourcefulness, response 
and recovery. The aim is to develop a new 
diagnostic report to enable decision-
makers to track progress in building 
national resilience and possibly identify 
where further investments are needed. The 
interim study will be published this summer. 
Linked to this research effort is the launch 
of an online “Resilience Practices 
Exchange”, where leaders can learn and 
contribute to building resilience using the 
latest social enterprise technology. These 
new efforts will enable the World Economic 
Forum’s Risk Response Network (RRN) to 
become the foremost international platform 
to enable leaders to map, mitigate, monitor 
and enhance resilience to global risks. 
Therefore, I invite you to get in touch with 
the RRN and share your ideas and 
initiatives to assess and to improve national 
resilience to global risks. 
Lee Howell 
Managing Director 
Risk Response Network
1 Kaplan, R.S., and Mikes, A. Managing Risks: A New 
Framework. In Harvard Business Review, 2012.
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Executive Summary
The global risk that respondents rated most likely to manifest 
over the next 10 years is severe income disparity, while the risk 
rated as having the highest impact if it were to manifest is major 
systemic financial failure. There are also two risks appearing in 
the top five of both impact and likelihood – chronic fiscal 
imbalances and water supply crisis (see Figure 4).
Unforeseen consequences of life science technologies was the 
biggest mover among global risks when assessing likelihood, 
while unforeseen negative consequences of regulation moved 
the most on the impact scale when comparing the result with 
last year’s (see Figure 5).
Figure 4: Top Five Risks by Likelihood and Impact
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Average Impact
Major systemic nancial failure
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Source: World Economic Forum 
This graph has been updated to correct an error in the version from 8 January 2013.
The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 
2013 report is developed from an annual 
survey of over 1,000 experts from industry, 
government, academia and civil society who 
were asked to review a landscape of 50 
global risks. 
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Three Risk Cases
The report introduces three risk cases, based on an analysis of 
survey results, consultation with experts and further research. 
Each case represents an interesting constellation of global risks 
and explores their impact at the global and national levels. The 
three risk cases are:
Testing Economic and Environmental Resilience
Continued stress on the global economic system is positioned 
to absorb the attention of leaders for the foreseeable future. 
Meanwhile, the Earth’s environmental system is simultaneously 
coming under increasing stress. Future simultaneous shocks to 
both systems could trigger the “perfect global storm”, with 
potentially insurmountable consequences. On the economic 
front, global resilience is being tested by bold monetary and 
austere fiscal policies. On the environmental front, the Earth’s 
resilience is being tested by rising global temperatures and 
extreme weather events that are likely to become more frequent 
and severe. A sudden and massive collapse on one front is 
certain to doom the other’s chance of developing an effective, 
long-term solution. Given the likelihood of future financial crises 
and natural catastrophes, are there ways to build resilience in 
our economic and environmental systems at the same time? 
Figure 5: Top Five Changes by Likelihood and Impact
Average Impact Score [Rank]
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1 2
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5
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Source: World Economic Forum 
This graph has been updated to correct an error in the version from 8 January 2013.
Digital Wildfires in a Hyperconnected World
In 1938, thousands of Americans confused a radio adaptation of 
the H.G. Wells novel The War of the Worlds with an official news 
broadcast and panicked, in the belief that the United States had 
been invaded by Martians. Is it possible that the Internet could 
be the source of a comparable wave of panic, but with severe 
geopolitical consequences? Social media allows information to 
spread around the world at breakneck speed in an open system 
where norms and rules are starting to emerge but have not yet 
been defined. While the benefits of our hyperconnected 
communication systems are undisputed, they could potentially 
enable the viral spread of information that is either intentionally or 
unintentionally misleading or provocative. Imagine a real-world 
example of shouting “fire!” in a crowded theatre. In a virtual 
equivalent, damage can be done by rapid spread of 
misinformation even when correct information follows quickly. 
Are there ways for generators and consumers of social media to 
develop an ethos of responsibility and healthy scepticism to 
mitigate the risk of digital wildfires?
The Dangers of Hubris on Human Health
Health is a critical system that is constantly being challenged, be 
it by emerging pandemics or chronic illnesses. Scientific 
discoveries and emerging technologies allow us to face such 
challenges, but the medical successes of the past century may 
also be creating a false sense of security. Arguably, one of the 
most effective and common means to protect human life – the 
use of antibacterial and antimicrobial compounds (antibiotics) 
– may no longer be readily available in the near future. Every dose 
of antibiotics creates selective evolutionary pressures, as some 
bacteria survive to pass on the genetic mutations that enabled 
them to do so. Until now, new antibiotics have been developed to 
replace older, increasingly ineffective ones. However, human 
innovation may no longer be outpacing bacterial mutation. None 
of the new drugs currently in the development pipeline may be 
effective against certain new mutations of killer bacteria that 
could turn into a pandemic. Are there ways to stimulate the 
development of new antibiotics as well as align incentives to 
prevent their overuse, or are we in danger of returning to a 
pre-antibiotic era in which a scratch could be potentially fatal?
Special Report: National Resilience to 
Global Risks
This year’s Special Report examines the difficult issue of how a 
country should prepare for a global risk that is seemingly beyond 
its control or influence. One possible approach rests with 
“systems thinking” and applying the concept of resilience to 
countries. The report introduces five components of resilience 
– robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, response and 
recovery – that can be applied to five country subsystems: the 
economic, environmental, governance, infrastructure and social. 
The result is a diagnostic tool for decision-makers to assess and 
monitor national resilience to global risks.
Global Risks 201312
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X Factors from Nature
Developed in partnership with the editors of Nature, a leading 
science journal, the chapter on “X Factors” looks beyond the 
landscape of 50 global risks to alert decision-makers to five 
emerging game-changers:
 - Runaway climate change: Is it possible that we have already 
passed a point of no return and that Earth’s atmosphere is 
tipping rapidly into an inhospitable state?
 - Significant cognitive enhancement: Ethical dilemmas akin 
to doping in sports could start to extend into daily working life; 
an arms race in the neural “enhancement” of combat troops 
could also ensue.
 - Rogue deployment of geoengineering: Technology is now 
being developed to manipulate the climate; a state or private 
individual could use it unilaterally.
 - Costs of living longer: Medical advances are prolonging life, 
but long-term palliative care is expensive. Covering the costs 
associated with old age could be a struggle.
 - Discovery of alien life: Proof of life’s existence elsewhere in 
the universe could have profound psychological implications 
for human belief systems.
The Global Risks report is the flagship research publication of 
the World Economic Forum’s Risk Response Network, which 
provides an independent platform for stakeholders to explore 
ways to collaborate on building resilience to global risks. Further 
information can be found at www.weforum.org/risk. 
13Global Risks 2013
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Box 1: The Evolving Risk Landscape
How do the top risks as identified by the annual Global Risks Perception Survey change over time? Figure 6 shows how this list 
changed over the past seven years. The average ratings of the risks have changed slightly, as described in detail in Section 4 of the 
report, but the relative ranking of the risks according to their impact or their likelihood is less affected. Interestingly, the diffusion of 
weapons of mass destruction has moved into the top five risks in terms of impact.iii 
Figure 6: Top Five Global Risks in Terms of Impact and Likelihood, 2007-2013
iii *The survey methodology changed significantly after the 2011 report. In contrast to the years 2007 to 2011, the list of 50 risks that was assessed by the survey did not change in 2012 and 2013.
Source: World Economic Forum
This graph has been updated to correct an error in the version from 8 January 2013.
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Introduction
The nature of global risks is constantly 
changing. Thirty years ago, chlorofluorocar-
bons (CFCs) were seen as a planetary risk, 
while threat from a massive cyber attack 
was treated by many as science fiction. In 
the same period, the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons occupied the minds of scientists 
and politicians, while the proliferation of 
orbital debris did not. We see a similar story 
with asbestos then and carbon nanotubes 
today, and the list goes on. 
With new information, the perceptions and 
realities of risks change, and often in 
unforeseen directions. Consider that in 
some circles the threat from greenhouse 
gas emissions made nuclear energy seem 
less hazardous than fossil fuels over the long 
run. Yet the nuclear catastrophe in 
Fukushima, Japan, not only changed public 
perceptions there but also energy policy, 
almost overnight, in some parts of Europe.
The World Economic Forum is now in its eighth year of 
publishing the Global Risks report. The purpose of the current 
edition is twofold. First, it aims to show how experts from around 
the world, from different backgrounds, currently perceive the 
risks that the world is likely to face over the next decade. To 
capture these opinions, a survey was carried out, interviews 
were conducted with specialists in different fields, and a series 
of workshops and conference sessions were held with expert 
groups to interpret the research findings and to work out the 
three risk cases developed in the report. Second, with this 
report the World Economic Forum aims to continue to raise 
awareness about global risks, to stimulate thinking about how 
risks can be factored into strategy development, and to 
challenge global leaders to improve how they approach global 
risks. 
Annual Survey – Assessing Global Risks
The Global Risks Perception Survey was conducted in 
September 2012. Over 1,000 experts responded to evaluate 50 
global risks from five categories – economic, environmental, 
geopolitical, societal and technological. For each global risk, 
survey respondents were asked, “On a scale from 1 to 5, how 
likely is this risk to occur over the next 10 years?”, and “If it were 
to occur, how big would you rate the impact of this risk?” The 
aggregated responses to these two questions are depicted in 
the Global Risks Landscape scatterplot in Figure 2.
The evaluation of the 50 risks also focused on their linkages, 
given their interdependent nature. Survey respondents were 
asked to nominate pairs of risks that they believe to be strongly 
connected. They were also asked to nominate a “Centre of 
Gravity” – the systemically most important risk for each of the 
five categories of global risks. Putting all paired connections 
together results in a network diagram presented in Figure 37 in 
Section 4 – the Survey Findings. 
The survey data was also analyzed to examine how the 
background of the respondents affects their perceptions. Are 
the views of people based in Europe similar to those in Asia? Do 
younger people perceive the world differently from older people? 
And how does specialist knowledge in a field affect how risks 
are perceived? These questions are explored in Section 4 of this 
report.
15Global Risks 2013
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The Cases – Making Sense of Complex 
Systems
The 50 global risks in this report are interdependent and 
correlated with each other. The permutations of two, three, four 
or more risks are too many for the human mind to comprehend. 
Therefore, an analysis of the network of connections has been 
undertaken to highlight some interesting constellations of global 
risks seen in Figure 3.
In Section 2, these constellations of global risks are presented as 
three important cases for leaders: “Testing Economic and 
Environmental Resilience” on the challenges of responding to 
climate change, “Digital Wildfires in a Hyperconnected World” 
on misinformation spreading via the Internet, and “The Dangers 
of Hubris on Human Health” on the existential threat posed by 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
Each case was inspired by the findings from an initial network 
analysis and further developed through extensive research into 
current trends, potential causal effects, levels of awareness and 
possible solutions. Unlike traditional scenario methodologies, 
the risk cases do not attempt to develop a full range of all 
possible outcomes. They are instead an exercise in sense-
making as well as a collective attempt to develop a compelling 
narrative around risks that warrant urgent attention and action 
by global leaders. Readers are encouraged to refine these cases 
further and to develop their own scenarios based on the data 
presented.iv
X Factors from Nature – Looking Even 
Further Ahead
The section on X Factors invites the reader to consider emerging 
concerns that are not yet on the radar of decision-makers. If the 
50 global risks represent “known-knowns”, then these X factors 
could be considered as “known unknowns”. They were co-
developed with the editors of Nature and benefit from their 
contributors’ deep knowledge of cutting-edge scientific re-
search that has not yet crossed over into mainstream discourse.
Resilience – Preparing for Future Shocks
This year’s Special Report examines the increasingly important 
issue of building national resilience to global risks. It introduces 
qualitative and quantitative indicators to assess overall national 
resilience to global risks by looking at five national-level 
subsystems (economic, environmental, governance, 
infrastructure and social) through the lens of five components: 
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, response and 
recovery. The aim is to develop a future diagnostic report to 
enable decision-makers to track progress in building national 
resilience and possibly identify where further investments are 
needed. The interim study will be published this summer, and 
we invite readers to review the proposed framework and to 
share ideas and suggestions with the Risk Response Network.v 
iv See also the World Economic Forum’s series of “What-If” interviews for more case studies 
on a variety of topics: http://forumblog.org/tag/what-if/. 
v For further details please refer to http://www.weforum.org/risk or contact us at rrn@
weforum.org. 
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Testing Economic and 
Environmental Resilience
Economic and environmental systems are 
simultaneously under stress worldwide, and 
this is testing resilience at the global and 
national levels. Economic difficulties 
worldwide are continuing to make greater 
demands on political attention and financial 
resources. Meanwhile, the impact of climate 
change is more evident as temperature rises 
and more frequent extreme weather events 
loom on the horizon. The economic and 
environmental challenges require both 
structural changes and strategic investments, 
but are countries prepared to manage both 
fronts, conceivably at the same time? 
Five years after the financial crisis, macroeconomic worries 
continue to weigh heavily on leaders’ minds. This is confirmed 
by data from the World Economic Forum’s quarterly confidence 
indexvi as well as the Global Risks Perception Survey, in which 
respondents rated major systemic financial failure as the 
economic risk of greatest systemic importance for the next 10 
years. 
The very same survey respondents also identified the failure of 
climate change adaptation and rising greenhouse gas emissions 
as among those global risks considered to be the most likely to 
materialize within a decade. Compared to last year’s survey, the 
failure to adapt to climate change replaced rising greenhouse 
gas emissions as the most systemically critical. This change in 
our data mirrors a wider shift in the conversation on the 
environment from the question of whether our climate is 
changing to the questions of “by how much” and “how quickly”.
Figure 7: Testing Economic and Environmental Resilience Constellation
Global
governance
failure
Chronic labour market imbalances
Severe income disparity
Chronic fiscal 
imbalances
Unmanageable inflation or deflation
Major systemic financial failure
  
Failure of climate change adaptation
Persistent extreme weather
Rising greenhouse gas emissions
Food shortage crises
Water supply crises
The Economic System
The Environmental System
Source: World Economic Forum vi The Global Confidence Index is an index developed by the World Economic Forum that 
represents confidence among decision-makers in three areas: global economy, global 
governance and global cooperation. For greater detail, please consult: http://www.
weforum.org/ConfidenceIndex
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The narrative emerging from the survey is clear: like a super 
storm, two major systems are on a collision course. The 
resulting interplay between stresses on the economic and 
environmental systems will present unprecedented challenges 
to global and national resilience. 
Will countries be able to address complex challenges unfolding 
on very different time scales simultaneously? A cynic may argue 
that any future environmental loss could actually have a 
stimulative economic effect – this is the same rationale used to 
criticise GDP-driven growth policies, whereby the reconstruction 
following a massive earthquake can boost overall GDP over the 
long term. However, this view ignores two realities. First, more 
people reside and work in urban areas than ever before in 
human history – this concentration will continue and is likely to 
drive environment-related losses to even greater historic highs. 
Second, the existing debt levels of many major economies can 
be unsustainable. Given this fiscal constraint, we are witnessing 
the use of extraordinary monetary policies to stimulate global 
growth, which some argue are essentially experimental.
The fact remains that today’s massive socio-economic 
challenges demand immediate attention, yet availability of public 
resources is limited – especially to finance efforts to avert the 
long-term effects of climate change, which, in turn, could 
severely disrupt the global economy. We face a daunting 
negative feedback loop. The logic of risk management 
prescribes that countries should invest today to safeguard 
critical infrastructure and centres of economic activity against 
future climate-related losses that could be of much greater 
magnitude. And there is an even more compelling political logic 
to do this in order to generate new employment and to revive 
economic growth as soon as possible. But investment in 
strategic infrastructure is more easily said than done, despite the 
short- and long-term benefits.1 New approaches are needed 
that are based on a meeting of minds across varied professions, 
sectors and geographies; a capacity to act decisively is also 
needed, despite considerable uncertainty about what the best 
plan of action might be. Hesitating to act now will only add to the 
burdens of the next generation.
Persistent Global Economic Fragility 
The global economic situation remains fragile. The International 
Monetary Fund projects slow growth in the advanced 
economies, an annual rate of between 1.3% and 2.6% between 
2012 and 2017.2 Combined with fiscal fragility, this will continue 
to strain government spending. Given the current levels of 
government debts and deficits in these economies, “it will take 
years of concerted political and economic effort before debt to 
GDP levels of the United States, Japan and many Euro Area 
countries are brought down” to stabilize at lower levels.3 Also, 
the economic growth of emerging markets and developing 
economies is projected to be slower than at its peak in 2010.4
The current eurozone instability will continue to shape global 
prospects in the coming years.5 The associated risk of systemic 
financial failure, although limited, cannot be completely 
discarded. Given the anti-austerity protests across the eurozone, 
the election of “rejectionist” governments could lead to further 
economic paralysis and bring the eurozone crisis to a head,6 
potentially destabilizing the global financial system in which 
confidence is already waning.7 
This persistent global economic fragility continues to divert our 
attention from longer-term solutions by limiting the availability of 
public resources and generating greater caution in use of scarce 
funds for strategic investment projects. There are other looming 
issues related to ongoing prescriptions to counter economic 
malaise. Will the massive quantitative easing undertaken by key 
central banks to stave off deflation inevitably lead to destabilizing 
hyper-inflation? Will structural economic reforms deliver the 
necessary employment gains over the long run? 
Figure 8: Further Required Deficit Reductions for Fiscal 
Sustainability (2011)
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Source: Adapted from IMF Fiscal Monitor, 2012 as cited in Global Economic Prospects: Managing 
Growth in a Volatile World. June, 2012. Washington DC: World Bank.
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The Changing Debate on the Global 
Climate
Mitigation efforts have made significant progress at country level 
in the past 15 years in areas such as emissions regulations and 
financial incentives – for example, the US$ 3.4 billion made 
available to match private sector investment funds in the US 
Smart Grid Investment Grant program.8 Nonetheless, in today’s 
increasingly multi-polar geopolitics, it has become harder to 
reach and effectively implement international agreements on 
climate change mitigation. Pledges made in the run-up to the 
2009 Copenhagen climate change negotiations, which were 
intended to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius, now 
appear collectively insufficient to meet this target of 2 degrees.9 
Recent scenario projections based on existing government 
policies and declared policy intentions predict that a long-term 
increase of more than 3.5 degrees Celsius is probable. The 
more pessimistic scenario assuming no change in government 
policies and measures beyond those adopted or enacted by 
mid-2011 talks of a conceivable increase of 6 degrees Celsius or 
more.10 
If the current mitigation commitments remain unmet, a global 
mean temperature increase of 4 degrees Celsius could occur as 
early as the 2060s. This would likely lead to negative impacts 
including an increase in the frequency of high-intensity tropical 
cyclones, inundation of coastal cities as sea levels rise, and 
increased drought severity in several regions. Together, the 
effects would not only mean significant economic losses but 
also mass displacement of populations, rising food insecurity 
and aggravated water scarcity11 (also see Figure 9).
Recent climate and weather events, some of which are 
visualized in Figure 10, have reminded us of the economic and 
human cost of the kind of natural disasters that we know are 
likely to become more frequent and severe as climate continues 
to change. The estimated economic loss of the 2011 Thailand 
floods, for example, was US$ 30 billion,12 and of Hurricane 
Katrina US$ 125 billion; meanwhile, the 2003 European heat 
wave resulted in more than 35,000 fatalities13 and the Horn of 
Africa droughts in 2011 claimed tens of thousands of lives and 
threatened the livelihoods of 9.5 million people.14 More recently, 
Hurricane Sandy left a heavy bill, estimated today at over US$ 
70 billion for New York and New Jersey alone.15 Such events 
remind us that many economies remain vulnerable to damages 
arising from climatic events today, let alone those of the future.16
While there is no consensus on how fast and how much our 
climate is changing, the growing realization that some degree of 
climate change is inevitable is reflected in a shifting of the debate 
to how to adapt. Advocating for greater attention to be paid to 
adaptation is controversial in some quarters as it is interpreted 
as a tacit admission that mitigation efforts are no longer worth 
pursuing. However, the less effective mitigation efforts are, the 
more pronounced adaptation challenges will become; therefore, 
mitigation and adaptation need to be addressed in concert while 
taking advantage of all possible synergies. 
Figure 9: Possible Impact of Global Warming on Different Sectors
Weather
Water
Food
Ecosystem
Social
Threat to local water 
supply as glaciers melt
Major cities around the world 
threatened by sea level rise
Changes in water availability, threatening up to a billion 
people
Falling crop yields in many developing regions Falling yields in many developed regions
Ecosystems extensively 
and irreversibly damaged
Many more species 
face extinction
More than a billion people may have to migrate - increasing the risk of conicts
Temperature above preindustrial - IPCC scenario A1B
Year of impact:                2030              2050          2080
1°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C
More intense storms, forest res, droughts, ooding and heat waves
Source: Adapted from Shaping Climate-Resilient Development: A Framework for Decision-Making. 2009. Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group. 
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A number of climate adaptation related initiatives and reports 
have been emerging.vii While poorer countries will need help 
from the international community to finance adaptation 
investments, adaptation efforts are by their nature local, with 
countries, companies and individuals being largely responsible 
for their own adaptation costs.
While it is possible to make various different underlying 
assumptions in modelling the effects of climate change, it is 
clear that the economic costs are likely to be considerable. A 
report by Mercer,17 which considers the cumulative economic 
cost of changes to the physical environment, health and food 
security due to climate change, quotes a possible range of US$ 
2 trillion to US$ 4 trillion by 2030 across different climate 
scenarios.18 The EU Climate Change Expert Group suggests 
that the costs of climate change impacts, increasing in 
magnitude with the rises in global temperature, may amount to 
5% to 20% of GDP (or higher) in the long term.19 
Some people affected by climate change may seek to recover 
costs from past emitters of greenhouse gases. Although the 
Alaskan village of Kivalina – which faces being “wiped out” by 
the changing climate – was unsuccessful in its attempts to file a 
US$ 400 million lawsuit against oil and coal companies,20,21 
future plaintiffs may be more successful. Five decades ago, the 
US tobacco industry would not have suspected that in 1997 it 
would agree to pay US$ 368 billion in health-related damages.22 
For some businesses, investing in climate change mitigation 
now could be as much about enterprise risk management as 
about mitigating a global risk.
Decisive Action in a Climate of 
Uncertainty
As the consensus that the climate change is becoming more 
evident grows, data across many disciplines (including 
forestry, water and land management, for example) remains 
limited, not readily available or communicated in a format that 
might not facilitate actionable decisions on climate adaptation. 
Yet, future climate risks may require human judgement today 
or in the coming years, while the full scientific data may not 
come until it is too late. Complex systems such as the climate 
are non-linear by nature – chain reactions through the system 
are unpredictable and not directly proportional to the size of 
the triggers. A limited amount of data and constraints on 
computational power have been strong impediments to 
bringing greater clarity into predicting future climatic 
developments at a local level.23,24 For instance, there have 
been inconclusive predictions regarding the likely impacts of 
global warming on rainfall patterns in Guyana: possibilities 
ranged from a 5% rainfall decline by 2030, lessening the risk of 
flooding, to a 10% rainfall increase, worsening this risk 
significantly.25  
Faced with uncertainty about the likely effectiveness and risk 
of unintended consequences of a proposed intervention, 
policy-makers can be paralyzed by a desire to wait for more 
detailed analyses and data regarding the precise timing, 
manifestation or impact of future climatic changes in their local 
environments. Greater support for scientific research, better 
computational power and data are needed to shed greater 
clarity into predicting future climatic developments, especially 
the climate and weather extremes.
vii For examples please see “Shaping Climate-Resilient Development: A Framework for 
Decision-Making” by the Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group, “Managing the 
Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation” Special 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and Private Sector Initiative of 
the UNFCCC’s Nairobi Work Programme featuring good practices and climate change 
adaptation activities undertaken by the private sector (some of which have been carried 
out in partnership with NGOs or the public sector) across different regions and sectors.39
Figure 10: 2011 Economic Losses Related to Selected Natural Catastrophes 
>US$25,000m
US$5,000m - US$25,000m 
US$1,000m - US$5,000m 
US$250m - US$1,000m 
US$100m - US$250m 
US$50m - US$100m 
< US$50m
Earthquake, Tsunami, Volcano
Extreme Weather
Flood
Storm, Hail
Source: Adapted from sigma natural catastrophe data base of Swiss Reinsurance Company.
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While this will come, can leaders embrace the need to make a 
decision without the complete assurance that they are making 
the best decision? This is more easily said than done, especially 
when there are competing demands for attention and 
resources. For example, the 2008 financial crisis shows how 
urgent macroeconomic difficulties can divert attention from 
other significant global governance challenges, from climate 
change negotiations to the Millennium Development Goals. Yet 
the actions of the G20 during the crisis also demonstrate the 
potential for bold, coordinated international action. 
As global risks ultimately require a national response, much 
more attention must be given to how decisions are made in the 
face of such overwhelming economic and environmental 
challenges. Perception is typically regarded as a passive 
process, in which people view an objective reality. Yet 
perception is actually an active process of understanding, 
through which people construct their own version of reality.26 
Research in cognitive psychology and decision-making 
suggests that people use “rules of thumb” to make judgements 
in the face of ambiguity and complexity.viii This approach usually 
serves well but can lead to predictably faulty judgements under 
some circumstances. Psychologists call such predictably faulty 
judgements cognitive biases,27 and these biases influence how 
we respond to the best information at our disposal and 
integrate it in decision-making structures. 
Cognitive biases become important when addressing the 
slow-moving future threat of climate change in the context of 
an ongoing unstable economic outlook. Some examples are:
 - We tend to place too much emphasis on recent personal 
experience when estimating the likelihood of a risk 
occurring. For example, experience in the United States 
shows that many more people buy flood insurance 
immediately after a major flood. On average, those people 
hold flood insurance for only two to four years before letting 
it lapse if they have not suffered a claim because they are 
likely to view insurance as a bad investment rather than 
seeing it as a form of protection.28 
 - Through a process known as hyperbolic discounting, we 
tend to give disproportionately more weight to immediate 
costs and benefits than to delayed ones. Individuals, for 
instance, may often be reluctant to incur the upfront costs 
of measures such as investing in climate change adaptation 
measures when the benefits will not be felt for several 
years.29,30  
 - We fail to take protective measures if the perceived 
likelihood of the risk in question is below our threshold level 
of concern – for example, discounting entirely the possibility 
of a natural catastrophe that has a low chance of occurring. 
This bias is exacerbated by a tendency to underestimate 
the likelihood of a negative event occurring due to 
misperceptions of the risk.31,32 
The cumulative effect of such cognitive biases is that we may 
not pay due attention to, or act effectively on, risks that are 
perceived to be long-term and relatively uncertain. The 
impossibility of fully eradicating ambiguity, along with the 
relatively lengthy time scales involved, mean that cognitive 
biases are likely to remain significant hurdles to be 
acknowledged and overcome on the path towards effective 
action on climate change and related risks. 
Exploring New Approaches with 
Climate-Smart Mindsets
Acknowledging the effect of our cognitive biases may be the 
first step towards building resilience against a future perfect 
storm of economic and environmental challenges. Only then 
can we start weighing the various demands equally, in the near 
and the long term, on scarce public resources and dwindling 
risk-mitigation budgets. 
To reconcile the challenge of building environmental resilience 
amid economic stress, current policies and strategies may 
need to be re-evaluated. For instance, in several countries, 
government insurance schemes and building-permit policies 
continue to encourage further urbanization in coastal or high 
flood risk areas rather than preventing it.33 In doing so, they may 
be creating large pockets of vulnerability to climate risks. A 
2007 OECD study analysing 136 port cities around the world 
concluded that the population exposed to coastal flooding 
could triple by the 2070s due to the combined effects of climate 
change and urbanization, among others.34  
In light of the increased certainty that global temperatures will 
rise to some extent, a “climate-smart” mindset needs to 
permeate all levels of decision-making. “Climate-smart” is a 
term that originated in agriculture, to describe such agriculture 
that not only increases resilience in light of climate adaptation 
but also reduces greenhouse gas emissions.35 A climate-smart 
mindset incorporates climate change analysis into strategic and 
operational decision-making. It entails a search for synergies 
across climate change mitigation- and adaptation-related 
efforts where possible. Such a mindset needs to become an 
integral part of our urban planning, water- and food-security 
management, investment policy, and demographic policy 
development, among others. In 2006, during its term over the 
rotating European Union presidency, Finland introduced a 
policy innovation which encouraged ministers with other 
portfolios – from transport and urban planning, to agricultural 
and employment policies – to consider the effects of their 
decisions on the population’s health.36 Something similar may 
be needed to ensure that all ministers enact policies in their 
domains that are informed by a climate-smart mindset.
The current debt crisis of several leading economies will make it 
more difficult to finance climate-smart activities, such as the Smart 
Grid Investment Grant. That said, the private sector has a critical 
role here as well. In the United States, around 80% of critical 
infrastructure is owned or operated by the private sector, not 
governments.37 It is likely that many of the preparations to weather 
the colliding economic and environmental storm systems will be 
found in private-sector initiatives to reinforce critical assets and 
shield them from potential future risks and liability.
 
Given the pressure on public finances generally and their 
scarcity to address climate change-related challenges, new 
funding models will need to be found. Private funds can be 
unlocked through innovative public-private collaboration that 
ranges across disciplines as well as stakeholders. In order to 
enable scalable, effective partnerships, a variety of actors and 
professional disciplines will need to converge on mutually 
beneficial and economically sustainable solutions. This is no 
minor task since, in addition to the diversity of interests at stake, 
different professionals often have conflicting biases and have 
been trained to think in siloed ways. Yet such partnerships have 
started to emerge.viii The phrase “rule of thumb” means a quick and easy way of making estimates, based on 
experience that will not be precisely accurate but will nonetheless be adequate for most 
everyday situations.
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In order to address the current shortfall in green infrastructure in 
a number of emerging economies, more than 50 leading 
companies from finance, infrastructure, energy and agriculture 
sectors joined public institutions to form the Green Growth 
Action Alliance (G2A2). As described in greater detail in Box 2, 
the aim of this initiative is to unlock greater sums of private 
investment for green infrastructure.  
Other examples of innovative partnerships include a company in 
China which has partnered with government, industry 
associations and international NGOs to enable a sector-wide 
replication of green prefabrication production, currently saving 
360 hectares of forest and 314,000 tons of greenhouse gas 
emissions a year; and the Desertec Foundation for Clean Energy 
Generation, which assisted in founding an industrial initiative of 
55 industrial and financial companies and institutions working to 
enable large-scale generation of renewable power from deserts 
to serve markets in North Africa, Middle East and Europe.38   
As the world faces a squeeze in public funds at the same time 
as the effects of climate change are increasing, it is only through 
collaboration among governments (to further the public 
interest), businesses (to search for innovative products and 
solutions), legal experts (to mitigate fear of liability), science (to 
bring good quality supporting data and analyses) and the 
financial sector (to innovate and avoid future damaging costs) 
that the limits of environmental and economic resilience can be 
successfully navigated.
Questions for Stakeholders
 - How will we reconcile climate change mitigation and 
adaptation efforts with the desire for prosperity given current 
demographic trends?
 - How can like-minded municipalities, companies and 
communities drive forward a new set of climate-smart 
approaches that avoid cognitive biases?
 - How can we rethink cross-industry collaboration to find the 
right balance between competition and cooperation among 
companies in a resource-constrained and increasingly 
interconnected world?  
Box 2: The Green Growth Action Alliance 
(G2A2)
As emerging economies grapple with how to grow their 
economies without worsening their environments, many are 
developing “green growth” strategies designed to attract 
investment in sustainable water, energy, transport and 
agricultural infrastructure. Up to US$1 trillion a year of private 
sector investment is needed, according to the 2012 B20 Green 
Growth Task Force. However, due to the limited track record of 
some technologies, combined with the perception of investment 
risk, private capital providers are often reluctant to invest in 
green growth. 
To address the current shortfall in green infrastructure 
investment, more than 50 leading companies from finance, 
infrastructure, energy and agriculture sectors joined with public 
finance institutions to launch the Green Growth Action Alliance 
(G2A2) at the 2012 G20 Summit in Mexico. Chaired by the then 
Mexican President Felipe Calderón, the G2A2 will pursue four 
strategic activities over a two-year timeframe:
1. Highlight innovative models for public-private 
collaboration: The G2A2 will launch a report at the 2013 
World Economic Forum Annual Meeting identifying existing 
sources of finance and pinpointing innovative ways for public 
policy to unlock private funds.
2. Stimulate private investment at country level: The G2A2 is 
working with the governments of Kenya, Vietnam and Mexico 
to incubate innovative financing models with the domestic 
and international private sector. 
3. Provide new ideas and models to shape the policy 
agenda: The G2A2 has formed working groups on green 
free trade, end-user financing of renewable energy, 
institutional investors and energy efficiency. The energy 
efficiency working group is looking to pilot new financing 
structures for energy services companies; the green free-
trade group has led calls to establish free-trade regulations for 
clean technologies such as solar.
4. Help to scale up and replicate successful approaches: To 
help governments, development banks and finance 
institutions to ensure rapid replication and to scale up 
successful models, the G2A2 will document case studies in 
the Green Investment Report and engage with policy 
platforms and investor networks, such as the G20 
Development Working Group and Finance Track group on 
climate finance, the UNFCCC’s Momentum for Change 
Initiative and the International Development Finance Club. The 
G2A2 will also collaborate closely with the UN Sustainable 
Energy for All Initiative and the Global Investor Coalition on 
Climate Change.
The World Economic Forum is serving as the secretariat for the 
G2A2.
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Digital Wildfires in a 
Hyperconnected World
In 1938, when radio had become widespread, thousands of Americans 
confused an adaptation of the H.G. Wells novel War of the Worlds with a 
news broadcast and jammed police station phone lines in the panicked 
belief that the United States had been invaded by Martians.
It is difficult to imagine a radio broadcast causing comparably 
widespread misunderstanding today. In part this is because 
broadcasters have learned to be more cautious and responsible, 
in part because the media is a regulated industry, and in part 
because listeners have learned to be more savvy and sceptical. 
Moreover, the news industry itself is undergoing a transformation as 
the Internet offers multiple options to confirm or refute a breaking news 
story. But the Internet, like radio in 1938, is a relatively young 
medium. The notion that a tweet, blog or video posting could drive a 
similar public panic today is not at all far-fetched. 
The Internet remains an uncharted, fast-evolving territory. Current 
generations are able to communicate and share information 
instantaneously and at a scale larger than ever before. Social media 
increasingly allows information to spread around the world at 
breakneck speed. While the benefits of this are obvious and well 
documented, our hyperconnected world could also enable the rapid 
viral spread of information that is either intentionally or unintentionally 
misleading or provocative, with serious consequences. The chances 
of this happening are exponentially greater today than when the 
radio was introduced as a disruptive technology, despite our media 
sophistication. Radio was a communication channel of “one to 
many” while the Internet is that of “many to many”.
The global risk of massive digital 
misinformation sits at the centre of a 
constellation of technological and 
geopolitical risks ranging from terrorism to 
cyber attacks and the failure of global 
governance. This risk case examines how 
hyperconnectivity could enable “digital 
wildfires” to wreak havoc in the real world. It 
considers the challenge presented by the 
misuse of an open and easily accessible 
system and the greater danger of misguided 
attempts to prevent such outcomes. 
Figure 11: Digital Wildfires in a Hyperconnected World Constellation
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The Internet does have self-correcting mechanisms, as Wikipedia 
demonstrates. While anyone can upload false information, a 
community of Wikipedia volunteers usually finds and corrects errors 
speedily. The short-lived existence of false information on its site is 
generally unlikely to result in severe real-world consequences; 
however, it is conceivable that a false rumour spreading virally 
through social networks could have a devastating impact before 
being effectively corrected. It is just as conceivable that the offending 
content’s original author might not even be aware of its misuse or 
misrepresentation by others on the Internet, or that it was triggered 
by an error in translation from one language to another. We can think 
of such a scenario as an example of a digital wildfire.
How might digital wildfires be prevented? Legal restrictions on 
online anonymity and freedom of speech are a possible route, 
but one which may also have undesirable consequences. And 
what if the source of a digital wildfire is a nation state or an 
international institution? Ultimately, generators and consumers of 
social media will need to evolve an ethos of responsibility and 
healthy scepticism similar to that which evolved among radio 
broadcasters and listeners since the infamous War of the Worlds 
broadcast in 1938. This risk case asks if explicitly recognizing 
the potential problem and drawing attention to possible solutions 
could facilitate and expedite the evolution of such an ethos.
Benefits and Risks of Social Media
From cuneiform to the printing press, it has always been hard to 
predict the ways in which new communication technologies will 
shape society. The scale and speed of information creation and 
transfer in today’s hyperconnected world are, however, historically 
unparalleled. Facebook has reached more than 1 billion active 
users in less than a decade of existence, while Twitter has 
attracted over 500 million active users in seven years. Sina-Weibo, 
China’s dominant micro-blogging platform, passed 400 million 
active accounts in summer 2012.1 Every minute, 48 hours’ worth of 
content is uploaded to YouTube. The world of social media is 
multicultural and young. Figure 12 shows the preferences across 
the world for different social networking platforms, and Figure 13 
illustrates the trends of social media use by age group in the United 
States.
Figure 12: The World of Social Media
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Figure 13: Users Timeline
US Internet users who use social networks sites, by age,
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The other dangerous situation is when information circulates 
within a bubble of likeminded people who may be resistant to 
attempts to correct it. In the case of the Sandy NYSE tweet, 
other Twitter users rapidly posted accurate information, and 
nobody had a vested interest in continuing to believe the original, 
false information.16 Cases in which false information feeds into an 
existing worldview, making it harder to dislodge, are far from 
unimaginable. This may be more of a problem with social 
networks where information is less publicly visible, for example, 
through friend networks on Facebook or more “opaque” social 
networks such as e-mail or text messaging.17 The spread of 
misinformation in such “trusted networks” can be especially 
difficult to detect and correct since recipients are more likely to 
trust any information originating from within the network.
We should, therefore, not underestimate the risk of conflicting 
false rumours, circulating within two online bubbles of 
likeminded individuals, creating an explosive situation. The 
extensive use of Twitter by both sides during the November 2012 
clashes between Israel and Hamas in Gaza18 points to the 
possibility of future situations in which competing versions of 
events are propagated in self-reinforcing loops among groups of 
people who are predisposed to believe one side or the other and 
do not share a common information source that might help to 
dissipate some of the self-amplified information loops.
“Astroturfing”, Satire, “Trolling” and 
Attribution Difficulties
While it is certainly possible for a digital wildfire to start 
accidentally, it is also possible for misinformation to be 
deliberately propagated by those who stand to reap some kind 
of benefit. Some examples:
 - In politics, the practice of creating the false impression of a 
grassroots movement reaching a group consensus on an 
issue is called “astroturfing”. During the 2009 Massachusetts 
special election for the US Senate, a network of fake Twitter 
accounts successfully spread links to a website smearing one 
of the candidates.19 
 - Fake tweets have moved markets, offering the potential to 
profit from digital wildfires. A Twitter user impersonating the 
Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev in July 2012 
tweeted that Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad “has been 
killed or injured”, causing crude oil prices to rise by over 
US$ 1 before traders realized the news was false.20 
 - Thirty thousand people of Assam origin fled the tech centre 
Bangalore in panic in 2012 after receiving text messages 
warning that they would be attacked in retaliation for 
communal violence in their home state.21,22
Executives interviewed by Forbes and Deloitte placed social 
media among the greatest risks that their corporations face.23 
For example, after the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, a parody 
Twitter account quoting the chief executive Tony Hayward as 
saying such things as “Black sand beaches are very trendy in 
some places” attracted 12 times more followers than BP’s 
corporate Twitter account.24 While this example might have been 
intended to be humorous, it is possible for satire to be mistaken 
for fact. In October 2012, Iran’s official news agency ran a story 
that originated on the satirical website The Onion, claiming that 
opinion polls showed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was more 
popular than Barack Obama among rural white Americans.25 
This phenomenon has many transformative effects. Studies of 
Twitter and Facebook activity in Egypt and Tunisia leave no doubt 
about the role social media played in facilitating the Arab Spring.2,3 
The social networking site Patientslikeme.com connects 
individuals with others who have the same conditions and is 
helping to expedite the development of new treatments. Analysis of 
Twitter messages and networks has successfully predicted 
election results,4 movie box office success5 and consumer 
reactions to specific brands, among other things.6,7 
However, some individuals and organizations have suffered losses 
due to the capacity for information to spread virally and globally 
through social media. Some examples:
 - When a musician travelling on United Airlines had his claim for 
damages denied on a guitar that baggage handlers had 
allegedly broken, he wrote and performed a song – “United 
Breaks Guitars” – and uploaded it to YouTube, where it has 
been viewed more than 12 million times. As the video went 
viral, United Airlines stock dropped by about 10%, costing 
shareholders about US$ 180 million.8,9 
 - In November 2012, the BBC broadcast an allegation that a 
senior politician had been involved in child abuse, which 
transpired to have been a case of mistaken identity on the 
part of the victim. Although the BBC did not name the 
politician, his identity was easily discovered on Twitter, where 
he was named in about 10,000 tweets or re-tweets.10  On top 
of pursuing legal action against all the people who spread this 
false information on Twitter, the injured politician settled on 
£185,000 in damages with the BBC.11 
 - The existence on YouTube of a video entitled “Innocence of 
Muslims”, uploaded by a private individual in the United 
States, sparked riots across the Middle East. These riots are 
estimated to have claimed over 50 lives.12
These are very different cases – a humorous response from a 
disgruntled customer, a defamation of character and an affront to 
religious sensitivities. What unites them is that hyperconnectivity 
amplified their impacts to a degree that would have been 
unthinkable in a pre-Internet age, when only a small number of 
large organizations had the capacity to broadcast information 
widely. This new reality has some challenging implications.
When Digital Wildfires Are Most Dangerous
As Hurricane Sandy battered New York in October 2012, an 
anonymous Twitter user tweeted that the New York Stock 
Exchange trading floor was flooded by three feet of water. Other 
Twitter users quickly corrected the false rumour, though not 
before it was reported on CNN.13 In Mexico, there have been 
cases of mothers needlessly keeping their children from school 
and shops closing due to false rumours of shootouts spreading 
through social networks.14 In the UK, the video imagery related 
to a low level tactical incident of the British Army in Basra, 
spread through Reuters agency feed, YouTube and Blinkx, led to 
a misleading impression of a significant military failure among the 
British public which was never fully eradicated.15
These cases indicate one of the two situations in which digital 
wildfires are most dangerous: in situations of high tension, when 
false information or inaccurately presented imagery can cause 
damage before it is possible to propagate accurate information. 
The real-world equivalent is shouting “fire!” in a crowded theatre 
– even if it takes only a minute or two for realization to spread 
that there is no fire, in that time people may already have been 
crushed to death in a scramble for the exit.
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More worrying for businesses may be misinformation that 
circulates at a time when markets are already anticipating an 
important announcement. On 18 October 2012, NASDAQ halted 
trading on Google shares as a leaked earnings report (coupled 
with weak results it entailed) triggered a US$ 22 billion plunge in 
Google’s market capitalization.26 In this case, the information was 
from a credible source, but it demonstrates impacts that could also 
be achieved by unfortunately timed misinformation or rumours.
It is not always easy to trace the source of a digital wildfire. It would 
be possible for careful cyber attackers to cover their tracks, raising 
the possibility of an organization or country being falsely blamed for 
propagating inaccurate or provocative information. Depending on 
existing tensions, the consequences of the false attribution could 
be exponentially worse than if no attribution had been made. 
Towards a Global Digital Ethos
Around the world, governments are grappling with the question 
of how existing laws which limit freedom of speech, for reasons 
such as incitement of violence or panic, might also be applied to 
online activities. Such issues can be highly controversial: in the 
United Kingdom, courts initially convicted a man for making a 
joke on Twitter in which he threatened to blow up an airport in 
frustration at the cancellation of his flight – a conviction later 
overturned on appeal.27 
Establishing reasonable limits to legal freedoms of online speech 
is difficult because social media is a recent phenomenon, and 
digital social norms are not yet well established. The question 
raises thorny issues of the extent to which it would be possible to 
impose limits on the ability to maintain online anonymity, without 
seriously compromising the usefulness of the Internet as a tool for 
whistle-blowers and political dissidents in repressive regimes. 
Even if the imposition of such limits were enforceable, what 
authority would we trust to do it? The World Conference on 
International Telecommunications in Dubai aiming to revise the 
1988 treaty governing the International Telecommunications 
Union28 sparked controversy in December 2012 when critics 
argued that seemingly innocuous technical regulations could have 
unintended negative consequences. Rules “ostensibly designed to 
do everything from fight spam to ensure ‘quality of service’ of 
Internet traffic could be used by individual governments to either 
throttle back incoming communications or weed out specific 
content they want to block”.29 As some revised treaty provisions 
were believed to “give a U.N. stamp of approval to state censorship 
and regulation of the Internet and private networks”,30 the United 
States refused to sign the amended treaty; a decision seconded 
by Canada and several European countries.31
When the incentives behind installing “quality” checks are 
questionable, who can be trusted? And how do you create an 
established and recognized authority that can intervene or 
disrupt misinformation flows when they happen?
There are also profound questions of education and incentives. 
Users of social media are typically much less knowledgeable than 
editors of traditional media outlets about laws relating to issues such 
as libel and defamation. Many also have less to lose than traditional 
media outlets from spreading information that has not been properly 
fact-checked. But there are signs that new norms may be emerging. 
Figure 14 plots misinformation and correction tweets during 
Hurricane Sandy in October 2012. The misinforming tweet @
ComfortablySmug’s about the NYSE floor flooding received 
substantially fewer re-tweets than the tweets that circulated fake 
photos depicting sharks swimming in New Jersey streets and the 
Statue of Liberty with monstrous looming storm clouds. Social 
media analysts say this is not surprising, as visual content tends to 
spread further than text alone. In addition, the actual misinforming 
tweets posted by @ComfortablySmug and @CNNweather peaked 
at significantly fewer re-tweets compared to the correction posted 
by @BreakingNews, even though the corrected information was 
posted within an hour of the misinforming tweet.32  
One can speculate that people may have been more willing to 
re-tweet the photos of sharks and the Statue of Liberty because 
they were harmless and surprising and, most important, had 
significant entertainment value. The entertainment value may also 
explain the lack of interest in circulating the correction tweets from 
@BreakingNews. People may have been less prepared to re-tweet 
information that could be tied to serious consequences, such as 
NYSE flooding, before verifying. This suggests that norms may be 
emerging, and also re-emphasizes the fact-checking responsibility 
of trusted sources of information such as CNN. Slips like this could 
one day be a litigation risk for media corporations.
Figure 14: Re-Tweets Over Time
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In addition to seeking ways to inculcate an ethos of responsibility 
among social-media users, it will be necessary for consumers of 
social media to become more literate in assessing the reliability and 
bias of sources. Technical solutions could help here. Researchers 
and developers are working on programmes and browser 
extensions, such as LazyTruth,33  Truthy34 or TEASE35, that aim to 
help people assess the credibility of information and sources 
circulating online. It is possible to imagine the development of more 
broad and sophisticated automated flags for disputed information, 
which could become as ubiquitous as programmes that protect 
Internet users against spam and malware.
Feedback ratings on eBay, which enable users to assess the 
reliability of vendors, offer a potential template for the development 
of such a service. Until now, most rating systems are limited to 
specific websites – users do not carry their rating with them as a 
record of credibility wherever they go online. It remains still to be 
seen if that would be a desirable or feasible model. Information 
disputed for ideological reasons or deliberate misattribution will 
continue to pose a number of challenges; however, a system could 
be developed that would trace information to its source and 
provide information on whether the source was considered by a 
broader community to be official. The system could also reveal 
how widely the source was trusted by a spectrum of other Internet 
users – all while protecting the identity of the source.
It is not yet clear what a global digital ethos would look like, or how 
it could best be helped to develop. But given the risks posed by 
digital wildfires in our hyperconnected world, leadership is needed 
to pose these difficult questions and start the discussion. 
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Questions for Stakeholders
 - Controlling the spread of false information online, either 
through national laws or sophisticated technologies, raises 
sensitive questions on the limits to the freedom of speech – a 
human value that is not regarded or celebrated equally across 
different societies. How can constructive international 
discussions be started to define a global digital ethos without 
further polarizing societies on issues of civil liberties?
 - What actions can be taken to promote a new and critical 
media- or information-literacy among the general public that 
raises individuals’ capacities to assess the credibility of 
information and its sources?
 - Where should different groups of stakeholders look to verify 
the source of information online? How can different markers 
of trust and information quality be promulgated to facilitate 
greater user clarity?
Box 3: Hyperconnected World
Shaping Culture and Governance in Digital Media  
Across the globe, the rules of digital content are being formed: 
laws and policies written, cultural norms emerging, industry 
coalitions forming. In this dynamic environment, the disparate 
expectations and interests of the primary stakeholder groups 
– government, industry, and citizens – are intertwined, and often 
at odds. Any government policy or business strategy will need to 
take into account numerous interlinked factors to achieve 
desired outcomes and avoid unintended consequences. 
In a series of workshops held in Mexico City, Istanbul, Brussels, 
New York and New Delhi, and supported by a survey on Internet 
usage in 15 countries conducted in collaboration with comScore 
and Oxford University, the project aims to achieve the following 
over 2012 and 2013:
1. Develop an alternative framework to think about issues 
relating to digital media that start with intentions of 
stakeholders (e.g. reward innovation and make content 
accessible) rather than the actions taken (e.g. protect 
intellectual property) to arrive at a shared understanding and 
framework concerning issues such as freedom of expression, 
intellectual property and privacy in the digital universe. 
2. Account for differences in regional values and cultures and 
how they are reflected in the digital world, which is 
borderless.
3. Explore the context and conditions needed for any 
government or business intervention to be effective and 
sustainable, showcasing some regulatory policies on 
intellectual property that may have seemed effective in the 
short term but too costly in the long term.
4. Highlight cases of collaborative efforts among stakeholders or 
leadership of a specific group of organizations that can prove 
most successful, especially relating to technological 
innovation.
The project is being led by media, entertainment and information 
industry partners from the publishing, social media, and 
advertising industries joined by regulatory bodies such as the 
Federal Communications Commission and the European 
Commission. 
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The Dangers of Hubris on 
Human Health
Challenges to human health never cease to evolve. Vaccines 
and antibiotics have helped us to survive leading causes of 
death from bygone eras, but we face rising rates of chronic 
illnesses such as heart disease, cancers and diabetes. Although 
recent pandemics, such as SARS, avian flu and swine flu, have 
been contained, they also show how easily deadly viruses can 
mutate and hop from other species to us.1  For all our 
successes, we are never far from the edge of catastrophe, as 
new biological mutations will eventually overcome a prior human 
innovation. 
While viruses may capture more headlines, arguably the greatest 
risk of hubris to human health comes in the form of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria. We live in a bacterial world where we will never 
be able to stay ahead of the mutation curve. A test of our 
resilience is how far behind the curve we allow ourselves to fall.
Our survey respondents connected this global risk to others 
including vulnerability to pandemics, failure of the international 
Intellectual Property (IP) regime, rising rates of chronic disease 
and unforeseen consequences of new life science technology. 
Like storm systems colliding in unpredictable ways, the 
unexpected interactions of these risks could overwhelm our 
health systems in the coming decade and unpredictably 
damage our social and economic systems.
Humanity has always been under constant 
threat from infectious disease. Globally, we 
are getting better at monitoring signs of a 
health-related crisis and alerting each other 
– there are far fewer deaths from pandemics 
today than a century ago. And modern 
medicine is consistently meeting new 
diseases with new treatements, as shown 
by the progress on HIV since the 1980s. But 
have such modern medical successes bred 
a sense of hubris – excessive confidence 
that science will always come to the rescue? 
Figure 15: The Dangers of Hubris on Human Health Constellation
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria
Rising rates of chronic disease
Vulnerability to pandemics
Failure of intellectual property regime
Unforeseen consequences of new life science technologies
Source: World Economic Forum
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As a consequence, experts are starting to take seriously a 
scenario in which all antibiotics are rendered ineffective for 
treating even common infections.
A post-antibiotic era means, in 
effect, an end to modern medicine 
as we know it. Things as common as 
strep throat or a child’s scratched 
knee could once again kill. 
Dr Margaret Chan,
Director-General, World Health Organization. March 20122
Many people take for granted that antibiotics will always be 
available when we need them, but soon this may no longer be 
the case. Every dose of antibiotics gives an advantage for those 
small numbers in a bacterial population that are resistant to the 
drug. The more a particular antibiotic is used, the more quickly 
bacteria resistant to that antibiotic will be selected and increase 
in numbers. Until now, leaders have been able to turn a blind eye 
to this problem, as new antibiotics have always emerged to 
replace older, increasingly ineffective ones. This is changing. 
Although several new compounds for fighting bacteria are in 
development, experts caution that we are decades behind in 
comparison with the historical rate at which we have discovered 
and developed new antibiotics. More worryingly, none of the 
drugs currently in the development pipeline would be effective 
against certain killer bacteria, which have newly emerging 
resistance to our strongest antibiotics (carbapenems) and fatality 
rates of up to 50%.3 As shown by the death of six patients – from 
18 infected – at the US National Institutes of Health in 2011, 
antibiotic-resistant infections can kill, even at the world’s most 
advanced medical centres.4  
While predicting the spread of bacteria is notoriously difficult and 
complicated by a general lack of good global data, troubling 
projections are emerging in regions where many efforts have 
been made to better monitor the situation. Figure 16 shows the 
most recent data for two resistant pathogens, as well as the 
trends between 2008 and 2011. A well-known antibiotic-
resistant bacteria – meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, 
better known as MRSA – is stabilizing and possibly decreasing, 
but not as sharply as had previously been projected.5 For 
K. pneumoniae, there is a widespread increasing trend.ix
Figure 16: Percentage of Bloodstream Infections Showing Multi-Drug Resistance, EU/EEA, 2011 and Trends for 2008-2011
Percentage Resistance
< 1%
1 to < 5%
5 to < 10%
10 to < 25%
25 to < 50%
≥ 50%
No data reported 
or less than 10 isolates
Not included
A. Staphylococcus aureus, resistance to meticillin 
(MRSA)
The symbols     and      indicate a significant increasing or decreasing trend for the period 2008-2011, respectively. These trends 
were calculated on laboratories that consistently reported during 2008-2011.
B. Klebsiella pneumoniae, combined resistance to 
three classes of antibiotics (3rd generation cephalo-
sporins, fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides)
Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, EARS-Net, 2012
ix Based on the latest data (published November 2012) from the European Centres for 
Disease Prevention and Control’s European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
Network (EARS-Net) interactive database.  http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/
surveillance/EARS-net/database/Pages/database.aspx 
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Figure 17: Spread of Antibiotic-Resistance Bacteria (ARB)x
North America
• USA: ARB causes majority of 
99,000 deaths/yr from infections 
acquired in hospitals.56
• USA: Health care costs of ARB are 
US$21-34 bn/yr.56
South America
• Peru, Bolivia: >51% of hospital 
infections caused by ARB.57
• Brazil: Rates of ARB are up >60%.58
Europe
• EU: ARB costs society ~ €1.5 bn/yr55 
& 600 million days of lost 
productivity.59
• Russia: ARB a major concern60 with 
83.6% of families imprudently use 
antibiotics at home.61
Asia
• Thailand: >140,000 ARB 
infections/yr and >30,000/yr 
patients die; 2 bn in productivity 
losses/yr.49 
• Japan: Extensive levels of ARB found 
in Tokyo’s urban watershed.50
• China: Extreme over-prescription of 
antibiotics51 and rapid growth rate of 
ARB.52.
• India: Within 4 years (02-06) ARB 
went from being resistant to 7, to 21 
drugs.53
• Vietnam: Farming practices 
contributing to spread of ARB 
through environmental 
contamination.54
• Pakistan: 71% of infections in 
newborns are from ARB.55
Sub-Saharan Africa
• Tanzania: Death rate of ARB infected 
children are double that of malaria.55 
• Nigeria: Rapid spread of ARB that 
came to Africa from Asia.62
Antarctica
• ARB found in Antarctic animals & 
water samples.64
Middle East 
& North Africa
• Egypt: 38% of blood infections 
contracted by young cancer patients 
are from ARB.55 
• Israel: ARB found fatal in ~ 50% 
cases when resistant to our strongest 
antibiotics.63
The Costs of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
The spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria has implications for 
everyone. The impacts on human health are likely to be highest in 
poorer countries, as the spread of pathogens is facilitated by 
poor hygiene, polluted water supplies, overcrowding in urban 
areas, civil conflicts and concentrations of people who are 
immuno-compromised due to malnutrition or HIV.6 But even in 
the highest-income countries, few people go through life without 
needing antibiotics. 
The numbers of lives now being lost due to antibiotic-resistant 
infections may seem small in comparison to heart disease and 
cancer – for example, currently just under 100,000 Americans, 
80,000 Chinese and 25,000 Europeans a year die from hospital-
acquired antibiotic-resistant infections.7,8,9 However, experts believe 
these figures from only a few years ago may be worse today. The 
Global Risks report covers a 10-year time horizon, over which 
timescale it is far from unrealistic to project a significant spread of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria with high mortality rates.10 
It is important to remember that antibiotics are not used only to 
treat infections. They also, by guarding against infection, make 
possible medical procedures such as heart surgery, organ 
transplantation, the survival of pre-term babies, and aggressive 
immune-modulating therapy for auto-immune diseases such as 
rheumatoid arthritis, as well as for cancers of the blood, bone 
marrow and lymph nodes. With demographic and lifestyle 
trends such as ageing populations, changes in diet and 
declining rates of physical activity, we can expect rising rates of 
chronic diseases which are currently treated through surgery 
that would be impossible without effective antibiotics. 
On top of destabilizing our health systems, there are profound 
cost implications for economic systems and for the stability of 
social systems. The annual cost to the US health care system of 
antibiotic-resistant infections is already estimated at between 
US$ 21 billion to US$ 34 billion.11 Elsewhere, losses to GDP have 
already been estimated at 0.4% to 1.6%.12 The consequences of 
a pandemic spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria could also 
include shortages of food due to untreatable infections in 
livestock, and as leaders seek to slow the spread of pathogens, 
restrictions on trade in foodstuffs, and even on travel and 
migration.13  Figure 17 provides a global snapshot of the costs, 
impacts and burden of antibiotic-resistant bacteria across the 
globe.
x For more specific and detailed information regarding the simplified key messages outlined 
in the figure, please consult the referenced papers in the chapter end notes.
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Why Antibiotics Are Overused
If we want to minimize the rate at which antibiotics become 
obsolete, we should use them as sparingly as possible. 
However, a combination of misaligned incentives and lack of 
information has led antibiotics to be used where they are not 
truly needed. 
Even in systems which restrict the use of antibiotics by making 
them available by prescription only, doctors can come under 
pressure from patients who mistakenly believe antibiotics kill 
viruses – for example, in a pan-European survey, more than 50% 
of French respondents expected an antibiotic for an influenza-
like illness.14 Diagnostic methods that are inadequate to 
distinguish bacterial from viral infection or to specify the kind of 
bacterial infection, allied with fear of medical malpractice 
lawsuits, also mean that doctors tend to prescribe a cocktail of 
whatever antibiotics are available in the hope that one will be 
effective, especially in cases of severe infection. This imprecision 
promotes further spread of resistance in bacteria.
Some medical systems incorporate perverse incentives for 
antibiotics to be overprescribed. In China, for example, drug 
sales form a significant part of hospitals’ income and, until 2010, 
physicians’ pay was linked to profits from the sale of prescription 
drugs. One study found that 98% of patients in a Beijing 
children’s hospital were given antibiotics for a common cold.15 
Figures from 2009 suggest that 74% of all hospital admissions in 
China will receive antibiotics to treat their illness or as a 
preventive measure.16 
In many medical systems, antibiotics are not prescription-only. 
They can be purchased over the counter in pharmacies or in 
local marketplaces, and inappropriate self-medication is 
furthering the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. In India, for 
example, pharmacy sales of strong antibiotics which should be a 
last line of defence increased nearly sixfold from 2005 to 2010.17 
Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to the question of how to 
prevent excess use of antibiotics without unfairly restricting 
access to antibiotics in cases of genuine need. A national task 
force in India recommended the end of over-the-counter sales of 
antibiotics, but India’s Health Minister responded with concern 
that such a move would effectively deny access to antibiotics to 
patients in rural areas where there are no physicians to prescribe 
the drug.18,19 Inadequate and unreliable access to a full range of 
antibiotics in low- to middle-income countries is also part of the 
problem. The spread of resistance in these areas is further 
facilitated by illicit trade in counterfeit drugs of substandard 
quality. 
Meanwhile, antibiotics are over-used around the world in 
livestock and fish farming (e.g. as growth promoters). Resistant 
bacteria can be transferred to humans through contact with 
livestock, through the food chain, and through wastewater from 
these operations, as well as wastewater from hospitals and 
pharmaceutical plants.20,21 One study found 45 kg of 
ciprofloxacin (an antibiotic commonly used to treat bladder and 
sinus infections) – the equivalent of 45,000 doses – leaking daily 
from factories into a nearby river.22,23 Environmental 
contamination like this has led to an antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
being detected as far afield as Antarctica.24,25 
Why the Development of New Antibiotics 
Has Slowed
Until recently, as older antibiotics have become less useful due 
to the spread of resistant bacteria, new antibiotics have come 
along to take their place. But the drug development pipeline for 
new antibiotics has been drying out. New antibiotics have come 
to market in recent years, but any sense of progress this 
provides is false. Our newest antibiotics are the result of scientific 
discoveries that happened decades ago. A timeline of dates of 
discovery of distinct classes of antibiotics (as opposed to dates 
of market introduction) illustrates that there have been no (as yet) 
successful discoveries of new classes of antibiotics since 1987 
(Figure 18).26 There are several competing and overlapping 
explanations why. 
Figure 18: The Antibiotic Discovery Void27
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Firstly, drugs to treat chronic illnesses such as diabetes and 
hypertension increasingly offer a greater potential return on 
investment for pharmaceutical companies. Unlike with 
antibiotics, resistance is not an issue with these drugs. They 
have the potential to rapidly achieve wide market penetration, 
whereas any new antibiotic is likely to be kept as a last-resort 
treatment, which will be used only for a few weeks even in that 
setting, resulting in low sales for companies.28,xi 
Interestingly, respondents to the Global Risks Perception Survey 
connected antibiotic-resistant bacteria to failure of the 
international intellectual property regime. This global risk is 
defined in the survey as “the loss of the international intellectual 
property regime as an effective system for stimulating innovation 
and investment” – that is, going beyond the mechanisms of 
protecting IP to encompass the idea that the ultimate purpose of 
the IP system is to stimulate worthwhile innovation. The 
connection highlights a global market failure to incentivize 
front-end investment in antibiotic development through the 
promise of longer-term commercial reward, a failure which also 
applies to drugs to fight malaria and vaccines for pandemic 
influenza.29
Secondly, regulatory burdens have also impeded development 
of new antibiotics.30 Many smaller pharmaceutical companies 
cannot afford the cost of meeting complex requirements for 
clinical trials, and these burdens risk compromising the 
development of many promising new agents.31 
Thirdly, an increasing amount of effort has been invested in 
exploring the potential of new life science technologies such as 
genomics, nano-scale engineering and synthetic biology, 
without yet yielding new approaches in the treatment of bacterial 
disease. One unintended consequence of this has been to divert 
researchers’ attention from the traditional approach of 
discovering natural compounds to kill bacteria, which may be 
getting harder.32,33 
Hubris on health not only means taking for granted that the 
technologies we have will continue to work, but also assuming 
that bigger and better scientific breakthroughs are just around 
the corner. There is no guarantee that putative alternatives to 
antibiotics will be developed before existing antibiotics become 
ineffective.
What Can Be Done?
Numerous reports, workshops and conferences have proposed 
policies and strategies to address the spread of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
launched a global strategy for containment of antimicrobial 
resistance in 2001.34 However, a hubristic assumption that the 
medical industry would continue to find solutions has 
contributed to decision-makers regarding the issue as a 
relatively low priority. The challenge is complicated by the fact 
that antibiotic-resistant bacteria do not respect borders, so there 
are limits on what can be done without strong international and 
multistakeholder collaboration. An effective response to the 
pandemic spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria would involve 
tackling failures of both markets and global governance.
To address market failure, incentives have been suggested to 
encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop more new 
antibiotics.35 For example, through advance purchase 
commitments, governments or philanthropists can promise to 
purchase a given amount of a new drug that meets stated 
criteria of effectiveness. This incentivizes private companies to 
develop new antibiotics, while enabling the sales and marketing 
of those new antibiotics to be restricted in the public interest.xii 
Public-private partnerships have also shown promise in 
incentivizing the development of new antibiotics. One example is 
part of the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), a €2 billion 
initiative of the EU Commission and the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, which earmarks 
funds for antibiotics discovery and development.36 The IMI acts 
as a neutral third party that supports collaborative research 
projects and builds networks between experts from industry 
and academia.
There is also potential to use public or philanthropic funding to 
incentivize academic collaboration with pharmaceutical industry 
researchers, and more inter-company collaboration as well. 
Breakthroughs in antibiotic innovation will require pooling and 
sharing of knowledge among academia, private companies and 
government regulators.37 Companies and foundations like 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation are pioneering an “open-lab” approach to research 
which refutes the idea that secrecy and patented monopolies 
are the bedrock of innovation. GSK has opened its Tres Cantos 
research facilities to outside academic, government and biotech 
scientists in order to collaborate on finding antibiotics, and the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has “organized a tuberculosis 
Drug Accelerator program that brings together research teams 
from Abbott Laboratories, AstraZeneca, Bayer, Eli Lilly, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Merck and Sanofi with scientists from four 
academic and government institutions”.38
International efforts would be required to address licensing and 
regulatory barriers to the development of new antibiotics, such 
as lack of clarity and stability within the regulatory framework 
and lack of harmonization in processes of clinical trials between 
countries.39
Similarly, international collaboration would be required to 
facilitate improvements in data gathering, to enable more 
accurate and continuous monitoring of the global spread of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.40 Experience from Europe over the 
past decade shows that if data on antibiotic use and resistance 
is publicly available, and national coordinated policies on 
prevention and control of antibiotic-resistant bacteria are 
implemented and enforced, significant reduction in antibiotic use 
can be achieved in human medicine.41 
xi For the time being, priorities for R&D into new drugs are still guided by potential returns on 
investments and R&D of drugs that will make peak annual worldwide sales of several billion 
US dollars (e.g. for treating chronic diseases). These are preferred to new antibiotics that will 
make peak annual worldwide sales of US$ 500 million to US$ 1 billion, as exemplified in 
recent years by the sales of antibiotics like linezolid or daptomycin. These sales levels would 
have been considered acceptable 15 years ago when a “blockbuster” was defined as a 
drug making peak sales of US$ 1 billion or more annually.  In 1997, the most-sold drug 
(overall) had sales of US$ 3.6 billion and 28 drugs had sales of US$ 1 billion or above 
(therefore considered a “blockbuster”). The most sold licensed antibiotic ranked ninth place 
with sales of US$ 1.5 billion. In 2011, the most sold drug had sales of US$ 10.7 billion, and 
119 drugs had sales of US$ 1 billion or above. The most-sold licensed antibiotic ranked 28 
with sales of US$ 1.4 billion. (Based on expert interviews)
xii For an overview of mechanisms to incentivize pharmaceutical R&D see Morel, C.M. and E. 
Mossialos. Stocking the Antibiotic Pipeline. In BMJ, 2010, 340.48
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More efforts, however, will be needed to slow the use of 
antibiotics in agriculture, aquaculture and animal husbandry. 
Research is needed to understand how Nordic countries have 
made significant progress – part of the answer may be small 
herd sizes – and to assess what works in awareness-raising 
campaigns, such as the Pew Charitable Trusts Campaign on 
Human Health and Industrial Farming.xiii Figure 19 shows that the 
amounts of antibiotics used to raise animals for food-production 
is still high, even in highly regulated markets like Europe.42 
As new antibiotics become available, international collaboration 
will be required to limit their use to cases of need. This implies 
considering access to antibiotics as a development aid issue for 
low- to middle-income countries, and finding international 
mechanisms to promote collaboration on governance issues. 
There are opportunities to learn from each others’ experience in 
controlling antibiotic use through aligning financial incentives in 
the health system to tackle over-prescription, through 
educational interventions to tackle the problem of unnecessary 
self-medication, and through improving technologies to 
diagnose the existence and nature of bacterial infectionsxiv and 
antibiotic stewardship.44
The late Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom has compared the issue 
of antibiotic-resistant bacteria to that of climate change, “in the 
sense that both phenomena involve non-renewable global 
resources, both are caused by human activity and are 
intrinsically linked to our behaviour. The problem can only be 
addressed through international cooperation”.65 A cause for 
optimism is that, unlike with climate change, we know what 
actions are required. The challenge is to create the will and 
mechanisms to take them.45
Questions for Stakeholders
 - How can the threat of antibiotic-resistant bacteria be 
addressed, considering that it crosses both national and 
species borders? How can we build visibility and political 
momentum to the levels currently surrounding climate change 
and pandemics?
 - How do we re-establish antibiotic discovery, research and 
development given the higher return on investment on R&D of 
drugs for chronic diseases? What incentives are feasible? 
What can facilitate the work of academia and small and 
medium enterprises on antibiotics?
 - How do we preserve current antibiotics until new agents are 
available? How can we align incentives to tackle overuse of 
antibiotics in farming of livestock and fish? What incentives 
work best in health financing systems? How can the 
international organizations be supported to take on a global 
leadership role to preserve the utility of current antibiotics? 
Figure 19: Sales of Antibiotics for Food-Producing Animals43
Sales of antibiotics for food-producing animals, including horses,
in milligrams of antibiotics per population correction unit
(PCU, i.e. 1 kilogram of animal), 2010
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xiii Like campaigns such as ReAct-Action on Antibiotic Resistance, Antibiotic Action, and the 
World Alliance against Antibiotic Resistance (WAAR), the Pew Campaign on Human Health 
and Industrial Farming is working to preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics by raising 
awareness and shaping international policies in all sectors. Their websites are rich in 
content and information resources. 
xiv   Molecular diagnostic technology available today can diagnose bacterial infections and the 
sensitivity of the bacteria to various antibiotics in a very cost-effective fashion.  These 
technologies need to be scaled to allow for more efficient and appropriate treatment and 
antibiotic usage in health systems in high-, middle- and low-income economies.
Source: Adapted from Sales of Veterinary Antimicrobial Agents in 19 EU/EEA Countries in 2010. 
2012. European Medicines Agency.
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Figure 20: Looking Deeper into Sea Ice
Box 4: Bringing Space Down to Earth
Damage to space-based infrastructure is one of the more 
esoteric global risks on which our experts are surveyed annually. 
Members of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda 
Council on Space Security believe that lack of broad awareness 
of the importance of satellites explains why this risk consistently 
ranks at the bottom of the global risk landscape. Few people 
appreciate how much we depend on satellites to support our 
most critical infrastructure and to live modern and mobile lives: 
 - The daily operations of telephony and Internet networks, 
financial markets, the banking industry, data centres and 
energy networks all rely on precise timing information 
conveyed by satellite. 
 - The €300 billion global TV industry would not be possible 
without satellites.46 Nor would accurate weather predictions, 
estimated to equal €60 billion in socio-economic benefits a 
year in the EU alone.47  
 - Rescuers in emergency situations depend on satellites for 
communication, when mobile networks are overloaded. 
Peacekeeping and military missions also rely on secure 
satellite communications. 
Satellites are at risk of three main “black swan” events which are 
captured in our global risk landscape: being targeted in a conflict 
between states; a strong geomagnetic storm; and collisions with 
space debris. These low-likelihood but high-impact risks are, 
however, not those that keep satellite operators awake at night. 
They worry far more about near-term risks on Earth. As society 
becomes increasingly dependent on invisible signals from 
space, the unforeseen long-term consequences of shortsighted 
management of the spectrum – the term for radio waves which 
satellites use to communicate – threaten essential satellite 
services. The desire to share scarce spectrum resources to 
deliver new-age digital services is taking regulators by storm, 
while invisible yet crucial services are squeezed into silence.
These global risks are not only physical risks to satellites but also 
are risks which would greatly weaken our ability to respond and 
prevent some of the most likely and high-impact global risks in 
the landscape.
 - Rising greenhouse gas emissions and Climate Change 
Adaptation: Satellite imaging, data and communications can 
be used to provide early warning systems for extreme 
weather events and to monitor floods, desertification, and 
rising sea levels and temperatures in real time.
 - Food and water crises: Satellite imagery allows food supplies 
to be tracked and the availability and quality of arable land 
and potable water resources to be assessed, as well as the 
locations and density of the populations that rely on them. 
Satellite communications allow effective and secure food 
distribution, as well as tracking for the personal safety of aid 
workers who distribute it.
 - Severe income disparity: Connecting the world via satellite 
broadband has fundamental and far-reaching effects on 
individual lives, whether by enabling universal primary 
education in the most remote areas, bringing healthcare and 
telemedicine to those who might otherwise die because their 
homes are too far away from healthcare facilities, or making 
critical solutions such as micro-finance possible in areas 
where no other communications infrastructure exists.
 - Critical Systems Failure: With virtually every network 
infrastructure using satellite for its timing reference – whether 
telephony, Internet, financial markets or banking, from data 
centres to energy networks – risks to satellite infrastructure 
could result in a global communications meltdown. 
 - Land and waterway use mismanagement: Governments have 
started to use satellite images in near real-time to monitor 
activities such as forest clearing in the Amazon rainforest and 
to identify illegal logging.
 - Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction and Failure of 
diplomatic conflict resolution: Satellites play a critical role in the 
control of weapons of mass destruction by monitoring disarma-
ment agreements. They can provide irreplaceable means for 
improving transparency and measures for building confidence.
Through their ability to see and speak to all corners of the world, 
land, air and sea, satellites are enablers that strengthen our 
resilience to a wide range of global risks. Broader awareness of 
this fact is needed to ensure that our critical space-based 
infrastructure is managed sustainably and that we do not 
underestimate the potential impacts if these critical systems fail.
Source: “ESA satellites looking deeper into sea ice”. European Space Agency (ESA), http://
spaceinimages.esa.int/Images/2012/10/ESA_satellites_looking_deeper_into_sea_ice, 2012 
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Special Report: 
Building National Resilience 
to Global Risks
As global risks can be expressed in many countries at the same 
time, they can spread through countries that share borders, 
have similar fundamentals or depend on the same critical 
systems. This special report is a pioneering effort to construct a 
diagnostic framework that applies the concept of “resilience” to 
assess national preparedness for global risks. 
The proposed resilience framework would function as the “MRI” for 
national decision-makers to reveal underlying weaknesses in global 
risk readiness that may not be apparent via more traditional risk 
assessment methods. It is a prototype featuring potential qualitativexv 
and quantitative indicators produced by the World Economic Forum 
and by other research institutions. The aim is to refine and improve 
this framework by soliciting feedback from readers of this Special 
Report and then to introduce an interim finding that provides more 
detail on national resilience to global risks during summer 2013.
Types of Risk
To assess and evaluate a nation’s resilience to global risks 
requires defining such risks in their most appropriate organiza-
tional context. Although this report does not differentiate be-
tween the views of a public or private sector organization, it does 
underscore the importance of understanding the qualitative 
distinctions among the types of risks that organizations face.1 
Harvard Business School Professors Robert Kaplan and Annette 
Mikes distinguish three types of risks: 
1. Preventable Risks, such as breakdowns in processes and 
human error 
2. Strategic Risks, which are undertaken voluntarily after 
weighing them against the potential rewards 
3. External Risks, which are beyond one’s capacity to influence 
or control 
In the case of business, Kaplan and Mikes suggest that the first 
two types can be approached through traditional risk manage-
ment methods, focusing mostly on organizational culture and 
strict compliance with regulatory, industry or institutional direc-
tives. Given the exogenous nature of external risks, cultivating 
resilience is the preferred approach for this last type of risk.2
Another way of categorizing risk is to ask two questions: How 
predictable is its likelihood and potential impact, and how much 
do we know about how to deal with it? If we can predict it and 
we know a lot about it, we can come up with specific strategies 
to anticipate the risk, mitigate its effects and minimize losses. As 
Figure 21 shows, resilience is most important for risks that are 
difficult to predict and/or where there is little knowledge on how 
to handle such risks.3
Global risks would meet with global 
responses in an ideal world, but the reality is 
that countries and their communities are on 
the frontline when it comes to systemic 
shocks and catastrophic events. In an 
increasingly interdependent and 
hyperconnected world, one nation’s failure to 
address a global risk can have a ripple effect 
on others. Resilience to global risks – 
incorporating the ability to withstand, adapt 
and recover from shocks – is, therefore, 
becoming more critical. This special report is 
organized around two axioms: 
- Global risks are expressed at the national 
level. 
- No country alone can prevent their 
occurrence. 
xv In this report, qualitative data refers to perception surveys.
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The majority of the 50 global risks, viewed with a 10 year time 
horizon, that feature annually in the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Risks report fall under this categorization of risks. The 50 include 
risks which could manifest either suddenly or through gradual shifts. 
Although they are known risks, mapped and monitored by the 
Forum’s Risk Response Network, there are varying degrees of 
uncertainty regarding how and when they might manifest, especially 
in this interconnected world, and regarding what primary and 
secondary consequences they would have for countries.
Resilience: A Working Definition  
In the wake of unprecedented disasters in recent years, “resilience” 
has become a popular buzzword across a wide range of disciplines, 
with each discipline attributing its own working definition to the term. 
A definition that has long been used in engineering4 is that resilience 
is the capacity for “bouncing back faster after stress, enduring 
greater stresses, and being disturbed less by a given amount of 
stress”.xvi This definition is commonly applied to objects, such as 
bridges or skyscrapers. However, most global risks are systemic in 
nature,xvii and a system – unlike an object – may show resilience not 
by returning exactly to its previous state, but instead by finding 
different ways to carry out essential functions; that is, by adapting.5 
For a system, an additional definition of resilience is “maintaining 
system functionxviii in the event of disturbance” (see Figure 22). 
The working definition of a resilient country for this report is, therefore, 
one that has the capability to 1) adapt to changing contexts, 2) 
withstand sudden shocks and 3) recover to a desired equilibrium, 
either the previous one or a new one, while preserving the continuity of 
its operations.xix The three elements in this definition encompass both 
recoverability (the capacity for speedy recovery after a crisis) and 
adaptability (timely adaptation in response to a changing environment).
Figure 21: Resilience is Most Applicable to Unpredictable 
Risks with Little Knowledge About Effective Measures
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Source: Adapted from Comfort, L. K., Boin, A., & Demchak, C. C. The Rise of Resilience, in Designing 
Resilience: Preparing for extreme events. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.
Systems Thinking
Resilience applies to different entities, ranging from communities to 
countries, but the critical point is to avoid examining any of them in 
isolation.6 We need to think of a country as a system that is 
comprised of smaller systems and a part of larger systems. A 
country’s resilience is affected by the resilience of those smaller and 
larger systems.7
What makes a system resilient?xx Unlike an object, such as the 
aforementioned bridge, systems are too complex for mathematical 
calculations to predict the stresses that might arise.8 Systems 
thinking provide a foundation to assess resilience through 
considering such components as the system’s robustness, 
redundancy, resourcefulness, response and/or recovery, all of which 
are defined in the following section.9
National Resilience: Five Subsystems and 
Five Components
This diagnostic tool is intended to measure the resilience of a country 
to global risks by treating it as a system composed of subsystems.xxi 
Several methods already exist to measure the resilience of such 
subsystems, mostly as they relate to the economy or ecosystem.xxii 
But what makes an economic system resilient is different from what 
makes an ecological system resilient (not only are the threats and 
risks different, but so are the interconnections with other systems). 
The aim of this report, therefore, is to present a prototype framework 
to measure a country’s overall resilience via a five-part initial 
framework, depicted in Figure 23. This framework considers the 
country as comprised of fivexxiii core subsystems:xxiv 
1. Economic subsystem: includes aspects such as the 
macroeconomic environment, goods and services market, 
financial market, labour market, sustainability and 
productivity.10 
2. Environmental subsystem: includes aspects such as 
natural resources, urbanization and the ecological system.
3. Governance subsystem: includes aspects such as 
institutions, government, leadership, policies and the rule of 
law.
4. Infrastructure subsystem: includes aspects such as critical 
infrastructure (namely communications, energy, transport, 
water and health).11 
5. Social subsystem: includes aspects such as human capital, 
health, the community and the individual. 
Figure 22: Resilient Systems
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Source: Adapted from Martin-Breen, P. & Anderies, J.M. “Resilience: A Literature Review”. 
Rockefeller Foundation, http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/news/publications/resilience-
literature-review, 2011.
xvi “Stress” can imply either chronic difficulty or an acute crisis. 
xvii Systemic means “relating to a system,” especially as opposed to a particular part. 
xviii This refers to the ability of a system to continue to meet its core functions.    
xix The current definition of resilience is a working definition. 
xx “Systems thinking” in this context focuses on the design of systems, the flexibility and 
adaptability of systems to be redesigned and their ability to redesign themselves organically in 
the face of a crisis.
xxi Many indices and studies break their topic, issue or subject into systems (terminology differs and 
words such as categories, dimensions, environments or spheres have been used interchangeably). 
For example: Sustainability, resilience and resource efficiency study by the Environment and Develop-
ment Division, UNESCAP; the Global Political Risk Index by Eurasia Group; the Failed States Index by 
The Fund of Peace; Understanding community resilience and program factors that strengthen them 
by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; the Sustainability Index by 
Zurich Cantonal Bank; Wealth of Nations Triangle Index by Money Matters Institute; and World 
Competitiveness Scoreboard by the International Institute for Management Development.
xxii Risk Management Index by Inter-American Development Bank assesses risk management 
performance; Prevalent Vulnerability Index by Inter-American Development Bank estimates 
countries’ predominant vulnerability conditions through three broad categories: (i) exposure and 
susceptibility; (ii) socio-economic fragility inequality; (iii) lack of social resilience; Economic Resilience 
Index by Commonwealth Secretariat/University of Malta measures countries’ resilience through four 
key indicators (i) macroeconomic stability; (ii) microeconomic market efficiency; (iii) governance; (iv) 
social development; Composite Vulnerability Index by Commonwealth Secretariat measures the 
vulnerability of countries through three key components (i) lack of expert diversification; (ii) export 
dependence; (iii) impact on natural disasters; and Environmental Sustainability Index by Yale 
University/ Columbia University measures the ability of countries to protect the environment through  
five core components: (i) environmental systems; (ii) environmental stresses; (iii) human vulnerability to 
environmental stresses; (iv) social and institutional capacity; (v) global stewardship.
xxiii Many aspects of competitiveness are taken into account in the five core subsystems.
xxiv During 2013, workshops and expert calls will be conducted to define, verify and validate 
the five core subsystems in this framework. 
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Resilience Characteristics (Robustness, Redundancy and 
Resourcefulness)
The following three components of resilience are used to describe a 
country’s state of resilience. These components should be designed 
into a system and, as such, will enable assessments of a country’s 
inherent resilience capabilities.12 Relevant perception data and 
potential hard data for the three resilience characteristics are 
available in Appendix 3. 
A. Robustness
Robustness incorporates the concept of reliability and refers to the 
ability to absorb and withstand disturbances and crises.13 The 
assumptions underlying this component of resilience are that: 1) if 
fail-safes and firewalls are designed into a nation’s critical 
networks,xxx and 2) if that nation’s decision-making chains of 
command become more modular in response to changing 
circumstances, then potential damage to one part of a country is 
less likely to spread far and wide. 
Example of Attributes 
 - Monitoring system health: Regularly monitoring and 
assessing the quality of the subsystem ensures its reliability. 
 - Modularity: Mechanisms designed to prevent unexpected 
shocks in one part of a system from spreading to other parts 
of a system can localize their impact, as happened with the 
contagion from investment banking to retail banking during 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
 - Adaptive decision-making models: Networked managerial 
structures can allow an organization to become more or less 
centralized depending on circumstances, such as when 
branch offices of the Japanese retailer Lawson’s continued 
operating through the serious disruptions of the Great East 
Japan Earthquake in 2011.14 These measures can include 
having in place the right investment and incentive structures 
to overcome competing interests.  
xxx Critical networks are not limited to ICT but included critical social, political, ecological and 
economic networks.
Figure 23: National Resilience Beta Framework
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As depicted in Figure 23, each of the five subsystems is assessed 
further using five components of resilience: 1) robustness, 2) 
redundancy, 3) resourcefulness, 4) response and 5) recovery.xxv 
These five components can be categorized further into two types: 
resilience characteristics (robustness, redundancy and 
resourcefulness) and resilience performance (response and 
recovery). The measurement of these components presents a 
significant research challenge, as there are many attributes 
underpinning each of them, and these attributes are overlapping 
and complementary (Appendix 3 identifies potential qualitative and 
quantitative indicatorsxxvi). 
This report has adopted one approach from the World Economic 
Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), which 
measures the microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of 
national competitiveness.xxvii Similar to the concept of national 
resilience, the measurement of national competitiveness uses data 
from both international sources as well as from the Forum’s annual 
Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) to capture concepts that require a 
more qualitative assessment, or for which internationally comparable 
statistical data are not readily available. For the purposes of this 
inaugural effort, we started the analysis by using data from EOS to 
assess components of national resilience.xxviii 
Since 2011, the Global Competitiveness Report has included a 
prototype Sustainability-Adjusted Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI).xxix This not only measures the propensity to prosper and grow 
but also integrates the idea of “quality growth”, taking into account 
environmental stewardship and social sustainability. The quality of 
growth is an important aspect for resilience, and this will be 
addressed as we develop the framework further. 
xxv During 2013, workshops and expert calls will be conducted to define, verify and validate 
the five components of resilience in this framework.
xxvi Indicators proposed are examples of currently available indices and indicators.
xxvii Since 2005, the World Economic Forum has based its competitiveness analysis on the 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), a comprehensive tool that measures the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness (defined as 
the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a 
country). The GCR aims to provide insight and stimulate discussion among all stakeholders 
on the best strategies and policies to help countries to overcome the obstacles to 
improving competitiveness.
xxviii The Global Competitiveness Report observed that the more competitive an economy is, 
the more able it is to weather an economic crisis.
xxix For more information, please see http://www.weforum.org/sustainablecompetitiveness. 
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D.  Response 
Response means the ability to mobilize quickly in the face of 
crises.20 This component of resilience assesses whether a 
nation has good methods for gathering relevant information 
from all parts of society and communicating the relevant data 
and information to others, as well as the ability for decision-
makers to recognize emerging issues quickly. 
Example of Attributes
 - Communication: Effective communication and trust in the 
information conveyed increase the likelihood that, in the 
event of a crisis, stakeholders are able to disseminate and 
share information quickly, and to ensure cooperation and 
quick response from the audience. 
 - Inclusive participation: Inclusive participation among public 
sector, private sector and civil society stakeholders can 
build a shared understanding of the issues underpinning 
global risks in local contexts, reduce the possibility of 
important interdependencies being overlooked,21 and 
strengthen trust among participants.22 
E. Recovery
Recovery means the ability to regain a degree of normality 
after a crisis or event, including the ability of a system to be 
flexible and adaptable and to evolve to deal with the new or 
changed circumstances after the manifestation of a risk.23,xxxi 
This component of resilience assesses the nation’s capacities 
and strategies for feeding information into public policies and 
business strategies, and the ability for decision-makers to take 
action to adapt to changing circumstances.
Example of Attributes
 - Active “horizon scanning”: Critical to this attribute are 
multistakeholder processes tasked with uncovering gaps in 
existing knowledge and commissioning research to fill 
those gaps.24, xxxii 
 - Responsive regulatory feedback mechanisms: Systems to 
translate new information from horizon-scanning activities 
into action – for example, defining “automatic policy 
adjustments triggers” – can clarify circumstances in which 
policies must be reassessed.25 
As an example of the overlapping and complementary nature 
of these attributes, inclusive participation is listed as a key 
attribute of response, but it is also vital in other areas such as 
recovery and resourcefulness. Also inherent in all resilience 
characteristics, though referenced above only in the attribute 
of adaptive decision-making models, are investment and 
incentive structures and design requirements to overcome 
collective action problems and competing interests. There are 
many individual stakeholders who would benefit from greater 
shared resilience but currently lack either the incentive or feel 
too pressed for time and resources to take the necessary 
actions. 
B. Redundancy
Redundancy involves having excess capacity and back-up 
systems, which enable the maintenance of core functionality 
in the event of disturbances.15 This component assumes that a 
country will be less likely to experience a collapse in the wake 
of stresses or failures of some of its infrastructure, if the design 
of that country’s critical infrastructure and institutions 
incorporates a diversity of overlapping methods, policies, 
strategies or services to accomplish objects and fulfil 
purposes. 
Examples of Attributes 
 - Redundancy of critical infrastructure: Designing replication 
of modules which are not strictly necessary to maintaining 
core function day to day, but are necessary to maintaining 
core function in the event of crises. 
 - Diversity of solutions and strategy: Promoting diversity of 
mechanisms for a given function. Balancing diversity with 
efficiency and redundancy will enable communities and 
countries to cope and adapt better than those that have 
none. 
C. Resourcefulness
Resourcefulness means the ability to adapt to crises, respond 
flexibly and – when possible – transform a negative impact into 
a positive.16 For a system to be adaptive means that it has 
inherent flexibility, which is crucial to enabling the ability to 
influence of resilience.17 The assumption underlying this 
component of resilience is that if industries and communities 
can build trust within their networks and are able to self-
organize, then they are more likely to spontaneously react and 
discover solutions to resolve unanticipated challenges when 
larger country-level institutions and governance systems are 
challenged or fail.
Example of Attributes 
 - Capacity for self-organization18: This includes factors such 
as the extent of social and human capital, the relationship 
between social networks and state, and the existence of 
institutions that enable face-to-face networking. These 
factors are critical in circumstances such as failures of 
government institutions when communities need to 
self-organize and continue to deliver essential public 
services.
 - Creativity and innovation: In countries and industries, the 
ability to innovate is linked to the availability of spare 
resources and the rigidity of boundaries between 
disciplines, organizations and social groups.19 
Resilience Performance (Response and Recovery)
These two components of resilience describe how a system 
performs in the event of crises. Response and recovery are 
dependent on risk, event and time. These components will 
provide us with the ability to compare systems and feed the 
measurements and results to calibrate the resilience 
characteristics. As we are dealing with global risks, the ability 
to adapt the framework is also very important. 
xxxi Brittle or unchangeable systems are not likely to recover well, but those that are more 
flexible and willing or able to adapt to new realities are more likely to recover better.
xxxii Examples of types and applications of horizon scanning activities have been suggested by 
Amanatidou, E., Butter, M., Carabias, V., et al. On Concepts and Methods in Horizon 
Scanning: Lessons from Initiating Policy Dialogues on Emerging Issues. In Science and 
Public Policy, 2012, 39:208-221.
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Switzerland was perceived as having the highest ability to adapt 
and/or recover from economic and environmental global risks; 
both Italy and India were rated relatively low. Japan was seen to 
have a comparable ability to Switzerland to adapt and recover 
from environmental risks, but lower in terms of economic risks. 
This may be a reflection of frustration about Japan’s economic 
position and the risk of recession.
The question from the GRPS is one indicator for the response 
component of the proposed resilience framework. It represents 
the way respondents perceive their country’s ability to adapt to 
and/or recover from certain types of global risks. In building a 
framework for National Resilience, further analysis will provide 
insights into areas needing greater investment and resources to 
build resilience.
xxxiii Country is the country of expertise.
xxxiv Statistical data may be obtained from open-source databases and other indices. See 
Appendix 3 for more potential qualitative and quantitative indicators identified. 
xxxv The Global Risks Perception Survey is a major input into the annual Global Risks Report. 
See Appendix 1.
xxxvi Further work will try to identify how one type of risk can affect multiple or all of the country’s 
subsystems, not just the subsystems from which the risk originally manifested itself.
xxxvii These countries had a calculated margin of error smaller than 0.5 units. Please see 
Appendix 3 for more details on sample size and margin of errors for these and other 
countries. 
xxxviii The error bars in the figure indicate the margin of error for each country per category (at a 
95% confidence level).
Figure 24: Resilience Question may be a Potential Variable for 
Recovery Component of Resilience
Figure 25: Countries’ Ability to Adapt and Recover from 
Economic and Environmental Risksxxxviii
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Qualitative Assessment of National 
Resilience 
As a first step towards developing the diagnostic framework, we 
have begun to explore perception survey data in assessing 
resilience. This year, the World Economic Forum introduced 
questions about resilience into two of its global surveys: 1) the 
Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS) measured the 
perceptions of the Forum’s expert network about their 
nation’sxxxiii resilience to global risks; and 2) the Executive 
Opinion Survey (EOS) introduced a question to assess a 
government’s effectiveness in managing risks in 2012.26
The qualitative assessment will be coupled with a quantitative 
one that includes statistical data by country.xxxiv This will result in 
a rating that combines perception data and objective data (i.e. 
qualitative and quantitative data), and that enables an analysis of 
patterns among resilience, risk management, competitiveness 
and sustainability (see Appendix 3 for examples). Our working 
hypothesis is that if leaders wish to assess the potential support 
for improving their country’s resilience, then perception surveys 
are a good place to start. 
Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS): Resilience 
Question
Over 1,000 respondents to the GRPSxxxv were asked, per risk 
and regarding their country of expertise: 
“If this risk materialized in your country* of expertise, what is the 
ability of the country to adapt and/or recover from the impact?”
(*Your country refers to the country you selected in the respondent’s 
information page.)
This question enables us to understand respondents’ 
perceptions of the ability of a country to adapt and/or recover 
from the impact of global risks. In the survey, respondents 
assess this ability against all five categories of global risks: 
economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and 
technological. Assuming, economic global risks will highly 
impact the country’s economic subsystem, and environmental 
global risks will highly impact the country’s environmental 
subsystem (see Figure 24).xxxvi This section focuses on analyzing 
how these country subsystems are expected to recover after a 
crisis caused by economic and environmental global risks. 
Data collected from the current GRPS gave us sufficient 
responses for the analysis of 10 countries: Brazil, China, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.27,xxxvii Figure 25 illustrates these 
countries’ ability to recover from and adapt to economic and 
environmental risks respectively.
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Additional analysis revealed other potential indicators that may 
be linked to risk management, which will require further 
scrutiny. Correlation analysis showed there were moderate 
relationships between the government’s risk management 
effectiveness and the following seven indicators from the EOS 
(Further details are available in Appendix 3).xli 
 - Politicians’ ability to govern
 - Business-government relations
 - Reform implementation efficiency
 - Public trust of politicians
 - Wastefulness of government spending
 - Measures to combat corruption and bribery
 - Government provision of services for improved business 
performance
The most related questions seem to be intuitively what one 
might expect. Of the seven indicators, the most highly 
correlated question is that on leadership, i.e. a politician’s ability 
to govern. This corroborates the message about leadership in 
risk management at the country level of the Global Risks 2012 
report special feature on The Great East Japan Earthquake. It 
also underscores the recommendation from the Global Risks 
2007 report to establish the role of National Risk Officers.xlii 
Other interesting relationships highlighted above were with 
business-government relations and government provision of 
services for improved business performance. These 
relationships require further analysis but they may indicate the 
ability to share information effectively to improve monitoring and 
risk preparedness. By assessing government wastefulness, 
reform-process efficiency and corruption, we may be able to 
deduce that effective risk management practices are likely to be 
transparent and adaptive.
The analysis in this subsection is an initial indication for how we 
intend to proceed with building the National Resilience Rating. It 
is also a step towards understanding how questions from the 
GRPS and the EOS may identify indicators for the different 
components of resilience, which will be further complemented 
with quantitative data in the interim report in summer 2013.
Executive Opinion Survey: Risk Management Effectiveness 
Question
Over 14,000 respondents to the Executive Opinion Survey 
(EOS)xxxix were asked: 
“How would you assess your national government’s overall risk 
management effectiveness of monitoring, preparing for, 
responding to and mitigating against major global risks (e.g. 
financial crisis, natural disasters, climate change, pandemics, 
etc.)? (1 = Not effective in managing major global risks; 7 = 
Effective in managing major global risks)”
Research28 has linked the ability to respond effectively and 
efficiently during a crisis with good risk management, which cuts 
across all five subsystems. The question above from the EOS 
collected perceptions from business managers about their 
government’s risk-management effectiveness. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this analysis, we focus on the governance subsystem 
and response component of resilience, as illustrated in Figure 26.
Figure 27 demonstrates that there may be a link between a 
government’s risk management effectiveness and that 
country’s overall competitiveness. As observed, a country with 
high risk-management effectiveness appears to have scored 
highly in competitiveness, and a country with low risk-
management effectiveness appears to have scored low in 
competitiveness (except Japan). From further analysis of the 
EOS question on the 10 countries from the Global Risks 
Survey,xl we can see that governments in Germany, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom are perceived by business leaders to 
have comparatively high risk-management effectiveness. While 
India and Italy scored relatively lower on the GRPS output, 
Russia was seen as having the least effective risk management 
based on the EOS responses. In addition, although in Figure 25 
Japan was seen to have greater ability to recover from 
environmental risks, its government’s risk-management 
effectiveness was rated poorly in comparison to other 
countries’.
xxxix The Executive Opinion Survey is carried out among CEOs and top executives and is a 
major input into the annual Global Competitiveness Report and the Global 
Competitiveness Index, and Sustainable Competitiveness work. http://www.weforum.org/
globalcompetitiveness
xl These countries had sufficient sample sizes.
xli Analysis has shown that there are strong relationships between most of the questions 
(other than the risk management question) in the Executive Opinion Survey.
xlii A Country Risk Officer – analogous to Chief Risk Officers in the corporate world – would be 
the focal point for managing a portfolio of risk across disparate interests, setting national 
prioritization of risk and allowing governments to engage in the forward action needed to 
begin managing global risks rather than merely coping with them.
Figure 27: Government’s Risk Management Effectiveness and 
the Country’s Overall Competitiveness Score
Figure 26: Government’s Risk Management Effectiveness may 
be a Potential Variable for the Response Component of the 
Governance Subsystem.
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Next Steps Towards a National 
Resilience Rating
As early as 2007, the Global Risks report suggested the creation 
of the role of Country Risk Officer. The national resilience rating 
proposed in this Special Report would enable such officers and 
other decision-makers to benchmark and track a nation’s level 
of resilience, understand the balance that needs to be struck 
between resilience and other goals, and identify areas that may 
require further investment. 
For example, the national resilience rating will also help decision-
makers to think about resilience in supply chains.xliii According to 
the World Economic Forum’s Dynamic Resilience in Supply 
Chain project, this is rising to the top of the political and 
executive agendas in the wake of recent major disruptions, but 
there remains a reluctance to invest in resilience due to lack of 
good data (see Box 5).
There is also a lack of knowledge about practical actions that 
leaders can take to build resilience. To tackle this shortfall, the 
Risk Response Network has built its Resilience Practices 
Exchange (RPE)xliv using the latest social network technology, 
which will build and share knowledge about effective practices 
online (see Box 6).
More broadly, the Risk Response Network’s goal is to build a 
common discussion framework in the global community, 
nurturing a culture of risk and resilience awareness across 
stakeholder groups. We invite readers of this Special Report to 
contact us at http://www.weforum.org/globalrisks2013 or at 
rrn@weforum.org with suggestions on how to approach 
measuring national resilience.
xliii The World Economic Forum’s findings in “Dynamic Resilience in Supply Chains” provide 
multiple working definitions, which include concepts related to the ability to reorganize and 
deliver core function continually, to bounce back from large scale disruptions, and to build 
capacity through collective and simultaneous efforts. 
xliv For more details, please refer to the box on the Resilience Practices Exchange. 
Box 5: Supply Chain Risk Initiative
Launched by the World Economic Forum in May 2011, the 
Supply Chain Risk Initiative (SCRI) addresses the need for a 
better risk-based approach for safeguarding global supply 
chains and published the report “New Models for Addressing 
Supply Chain and Transport Risk” in 2012. US Secretary of 
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano also joined the call for 
increased global dialogue by launching at the Annual Meeting 
2012 in Davos-Klosters the first US Strategy for Global Supply 
Chain Security.
Phase I of the work brought agreement on priorities and 
recommendations for action:
1. Improve international and interagency compatibility of 
resilience standards and programmes
2. More explicitly assess supply chain and transport risks as 
part of procurement, management and governance 
processes
3. Develop trusted networks of suppliers, customers, 
competitors and government focused on risk management
4. Improve network risk visibility, through two-way information 
sharing and collaborative development of standardized risk 
assessment and quantification tools
5. Improve pre- and post-event communication on systemic 
disruptions and balance security and facilitation to bring a 
more balanced public discussion
Phase IIxlv of the Supply Chain Risk Initiative entailed regional 
workshop across Asia, Europe and North America which 
brought together supply chain and risk experts from across 
government and industry to:
 - Deepen collective understanding of the risk and threat 
landscape
 - Work towards a blueprint for a resilient global supply chain
 - Improve transparency across supply chains.
Addressing the vulnerabilities identified in Phase I (e.g. reliance 
on oil and weak information flow), Phase II focused on shared 
efforts to build resilience. Resilience has been the core focus as 
risk assessment goes hand in hand with resilience it has 
implications to the strategy of governments and organizations. 
The Forum identified measures such as improving information 
sharing between governments and businesses, harmonizing 
legislative standards and building a common risk assessment 
framework for building resilient supply chains. 
Development of risk assessment framework is critical to improve 
supply chains adaptability to build resilience. The core 
components are data and information sharing for improved 
visibility along the supply chain. 
xlv The initiative’s Phase II report, “Dynamic Resilience in Supply Chains”, is scheduled for a 
launch at the January 2013 Annual Meeting in Davos-Klosters. To learn more about the 
initiative please visit http://www.weforum.org/supplychain. 
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The aim is to develop a process that takes a suggested practice 
through a community discussion phase and then on to a process 
of evaluation and innovation to improve that practice. This is 
limited not only to the online exchange but can also involve 
in-person meetings, virtual meetings, workshops and other forms 
of engagement with the Forum’s Risk Response Network.
The RPE is a secure platform currently accessible only by 
members of the Forum’s Risk Response Network and Network of 
Global Agenda Councils. The RPE may be accessed through a 
secure and trusted online platform of the World Economic Forum.xlvi
Examples of Resilience Building Practices 
 - The G20 establishing the cross-border Financial Stability 
Board (FSB): A regulatory body to coordinate financial 
services regulators and international standard-setting bodies 
across borders and organizations.
 - The Indonesian government response to the 2004 Tsunami in 
Aceh Province, Indonesia: After the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami and earthquake, the Government of Indonesia set up 
a pragmatic and region-based agency to effectively lead the 
relief efforts in the province of Aceh.
 - Governmental cyber risk information-sharing partnerships: 
Governments are setting up agencies to share information 
with international partners, including overseas governments, 
agencies and businesses to provide an international, 
informed response to cyber risks.
Please contact resilience.exchange@weforum.org for further 
information.
Box 6: Resilience Practices Exchange (RPE)
The Resilience Practices Exchange (RPE) is an initiative of the 
World Economic Forum to share insights and ideas that improve 
national and organizational resilience to global risks.
By providing an online, interactive repository of ideas, the RPE 
aims to improve resilience to global risks within organizations, 
industries and countries, as well as across economic, 
environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological areas. A 
digital platform enables a diverse community of experts to 
contribute, discuss and explore various existing practices as a 
basis for further exchange, evaluation and innovation (Figure 28).
Figure 28: Resilience Practices Exchange Process
EvaluatePractices Practices
Innovate
Exchange
Discuss
Explore
Contribute
Source: World Economic Forum
Box 7: One Year On Resilience Practices
Practices to Improve Resilience from the 2012 Risk Cases 
World Economic Forum’s Risk Response Network, in 
collaboration with PwC, has revisited the three cases in the 
Global Risks 2012 report – Seeds of Dystopia, How Safe are Our 
Safeguards? and The Dark Side of Connectivity – to analyse 
practices to improve resilience against the risks highlighted in 
each case, available on our interactive website.
 - Seeds of Dystopia (with further collaboration from Eurasia 
Group): As fiscal, ageing and employment trends combine to 
threaten the emergence of a new class of fragile states, the 
private sector, civil society, local and national governments, 
as well as multilateral organizations need to work in concert 
to create a modern and sustainable social contract. The 
resilience practices highlighted here are engaging multiple 
stakeholders in solutions based on holistic insights; 
continuous monitoring of trends to enable assumptions to be 
revisited; promoting open and inclusive attitudes towards 
immigrants; and embracing innovative financing models.
 - How Safe are Our Safeguards? Jurisdictional safeguards 
against cross-border risks can quickly become outdated in 
an interdependent and rapidly changing environment. 
Practices that improve resilience can be found by looking for 
common threads in two very different areas – financial system 
stability and pandemic influenza. The resilience-enhancing 
practices highlighted are: revisiting underlying assumptions 
related to safeguards in place; introducing forward-looking 
elements such as stress testing and scenario planning into 
safeguard development; leveraging incentives; and promoting 
cross-border collaboration among governments and other 
organisations.
 - The Dark Side of Connectivity: In an increasingly 
hyperconnected world, the impacts of our successes and 
mistakes are significantly magnified. Resilience of cyberspace 
could be strengthened by treating cyber security as a 
board-level issue within organisations; establishing 
mechanisms for governments and private companies to 
share information in a trusted space, and for governments to 
collaborate in emergency cyber-attack situations; and 
designing devices and systems that incorporate as much 
protection as possible against inevitable human error.
For the full case responses, please refer to the following 
webpage, http://www.weforum.org/globalrisks2013/
followup2012.
xlvi For more information, please see http://rpe.weforum.org.
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Survey Findings
The Risk Landscape 
For each of the 50 global risks, respondents were asked to 
assess, on a scale from 1 to 5, the likelihood of the risks 
occurring over the next 10 years and the impact if the risk were 
to occur.
Figure 29 indicates the average values of these two measures 
for each of the 50 global risks in their respective categories (see 
also Figure 2 the Global Risks Landscape scatterplot, showing 
them in one combined graph). Almost all dots on the scatterplots 
are above and to the right of the midpoints (at 3 or more) of the 1 
to 5 axes, suggesting that the majority of the 50 global risks 
were rated, on average, as having high likelihood and impact.
Nonetheless, there is some interesting variation in the dots’ 
placement on the landscape. Some economic risks, such as 
major systemic financial failure, chronic fiscal imbalances and 
severe income disparity are far out towards the top-right hand 
corner, with impact and likelihood scores around 4 (on a scale 
from 1 to 5, which is high for an average ranking). Some of the 
technological risks are closer to the middle of the axes, with 
impact and likelihood scores 3 or less. 
As was observed in previous editions of the Global Risks report, 
there appears to be a strong relationship between the likelihood 
and impact. The dots seem to line up loosely around the 
45-degree line and there are no dots in the bottom-right or 
top-left corners of the plot. Survey respondents seem to be 
associating high-likelihood events with high impacts. 
This finding holds up even when looking at individual responses 
for each of the risks, and not only average numbers. The 
colourful tiles in Figure 30 show how the responses are 
distributed across the scatterplot for each of the 50 risks. While 
there were some responses that were off the 45-degree line, the 
combinations of impact and likelihood that got the most votes 
from survey respondents – as indicated by the dark-coloured 
tiles – seem to be near that diagonal in almost all of the 50 
diagrams.
Still it is interesting to observe how for some risks, particularly 
technological risks such as critical systems failure, the answers 
are more distributed than for others – chronic fiscal imbalances 
are a good example. It appears that there is less agreement 
among experts over the former and stronger consensus over 
the latter.
In this section, the results from the annual 
Global Risks Perception Survey are presented 
in detail. They collate the views of more than 
1,000 experts from the World Economic 
Forum’s communities. Respondents are aged 
between 19 and 79, come from different types 
of organizations, different fields of specialist 
knowledge, and from over 100 countries.xlvii 
xlvii See Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of the sample.  
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Figure 29: Global Risks Landscape by Categories and their Descriptions
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Economic
1 Chronic fiscal imbalances Failure to redress excessive government debt obligations.
2 Chronic labour market 
imbalances
A sustained high level of underemployment and 
unemployment that is structural rather than cyclical in nature.
3 Extreme volatility in 
energy and agriculture 
prices
Severe price fluctuations make critical commodities 
unaffordable, slow growth, provoke public protest and 
increase geopolitical tension.
4 Hard landing of an 
emerging economy
The abrupt slowdown of a critical emerging economy.
5 Major systemic financial 
failure
A financial institution or currency regime of systemic 
importance collapses with implications throughout the global 
financial system.
6 Prolonged infrastructure 
neglect
Chronic failure to adequately invest in, upgrade and secure 
infrastructure networks.
7 Recurring liquidity crises Recurring shortages of financial resources from banks and 
capital markets. 
8 Severe income disparity Widening gaps between the richest and poorest citizens.
9 Unforeseen negative 
consequences of 
regulation
Regulations which do not achieve the desired effect, and 
instead negatively impact industry structures, capital flows 
and market competition.
10 Unmanageable inflation  
or deflation 
Failure to redress extreme rise or fall in the value of money 
relative to prices and wages.
1 Antibiotic-resistant bacteria Growing resistance of deadly bacteria to known antibiotics.
2 Failure of climate change 
adaptation 
Governments and business fail to enforce or enact effective 
measures to protect populations and transition businesses 
impacted by climate change.
3 Irremediable pollution Air, water or land permanently contaminated to a degree that 
threatens ecosystems, social stability, health outcomes and 
economic development.
4 Land and waterway use 
mismanagement
Deforestation, waterway diversion, mineral extraction and 
other environment modifying projects with devastating 
impacts on ecosystems and associated industries.
5 Mismanaged urbanization Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and associated 
infrastructure that amplify drivers of environmental 
degradation and cope ineffectively with rural exodus.
6 Persistent extreme 
weather 
Increasing damage linked to greater concentration of 
property in risk zones, urbanization or increased frequency 
of extreme weather events.
7 Rising greenhouse gas 
emissions
Governments, businesses and consumers fail to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and expand carbon sinks.
8 Species overexploitation Threat of irreversible biodiversity loss through species 
extinction or ecosystem collapse.
9 Unprecedented 
geophysical destruction
Existing precautions and preparedness measures fail in the 
face of geophysical disasters of unparalleled magnitude such 
as earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides or tsunamis.
10 Vulnerability to 
geomagnetic storms
Critical communication and navigation systems disabled by 
effects from colossal solar flares.
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Economic
1 Critical fragile states A weak state of high economic and geopolitical importance 
that faces strong likelihood of collapse.
2 Diffusion of weapons of 
mass destruction
The availability of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological 
technologies and materials leads to crises.
3 Entrenched organized 
crime
Highly organized and very agile global networks committing 
criminal offences.
4 Failure of diplomatic 
conflict resolution
The escalation of international disputes into armed conflicts.
5 Global governance 
failure
Weak or inadequate global institutions, agreements or networks, 
combined with competing national and political interests, impede 
attempts to cooperate on addressing global risks.
6 Militarization of space Targeting of commercial, civil and military space assets and 
related ground systems that can precipitate or escalate an 
armed conflict. 
7 Pervasive entrenched 
corruption 
The widespread and deep-rooted abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain. 
8 Terrorism Individuals or a non-state group successfully inflict large-scale 
human or material damage.
9 Unilateral resource 
nationalization
Unilateral moves by states to ban exports of key commodities, 
stockpile reserves and expropriate natural resources.
10 Widespread illicit trade Unchecked spread of illegal trafficking of goods and people 
throughout the global economy.
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Economic
1 Backlash against 
globalization
Resistance to further increased cross-border mobility of 
labour, goods and capital.
2 Food shortage crises Inadequate or unreliable access to appropriate quantities and 
quality of food and nutrition.
3 Ineffective illicit drug 
policies
Continued support for policies that do not abate illegal drug 
use but do embolden criminal organizations, stigmatize drug 
users and exhaust public resources.
4 Mismanagement of 
population ageing 
Failure to address both the rising costs and social challenges 
associated with population ageing.
5 Rising rates of chronic 
disease
Increasing burden of illness and long-term costs of treatment 
threaten recent societal gains in life expectancy and quality.
6 Rising religious 
fanaticism 
Uncompromising sectarian views that polarize societies and 
exacerbate regional tensions.
7 Unmanaged migration Mass migration driven by resource scarcity, environmental 
degradation and lack of opportunity, security or social stability.
8 Unsustainable 
population growth
Unsustainably low or high population growth rates and sizes, 
creating intense and rising pressure on resources, public 
institutions and social stability.
9 Vulnerability to 
pandemics
Inadequate disease surveillance systems, failed international 
coordination and the lack of vaccine production capacity.
10 Water supply crises Decline in the quality and quantity of fresh water combine with 
increased competition among resource-intensive systems, 
such as food and energy production.
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Economic
1 Critical systems failure Single-point system vulnerabilities trigger cascading failure of 
critical information infrastructure and networks.
2 Cyber attacks State-sponsored, state-affiliated, criminal or terrorist cyber attacks.
3 Failure of intellectual 
property regime
The loss of the international intellectual property regime as an 
effective system for stimulating innovation and investment. 
4 Massive digital 
misinformation
Deliberately provocative, misleading or incomplete information 
disseminates rapidly and extensively with dangerous 
consequences.
5 Massive incident of data 
fraud/theft
Criminal or wrongful exploitation of private data on an 
unprecedented scale.
6 Mineral resource supply 
vulnerability
Growing dependence of industries on minerals that are not widely 
sourced with long extraction-to-market time lag for new sources. 
7 Proliferation of orbital 
debris 
Rapidly accumulating debris in high-traffic geocentric orbits 
jeopardizes critical satellite infrastructure.
8 Unforeseen 
consequences of climate 
change mitigation
Attempts at geoengineering or renewable energy 
development result in new complex challenges.
9 Unforeseen 
consequences of 
nanotechnology
The manipulation of matter on an atomic and molecular level 
raises concerns on nanomaterial toxicity.
10 Unforeseen 
consequences of new 
life science technologies
Advances in genetics and synthetic biology produce 
unintended consequences, mishaps or are used as weapons.
NB: The scatter plots show the average value, across all responses, of the likelihood and impact of the 50 global risks, as measured on the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. 
Source: World Economic Forum
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Figure 30: Distribution of Survey Responses
NB: These diagrams show how individual survey responses are distributed across the different possible combinations of likelihood and impact scores, as measured, respectively, on the horizontal and 
vertical axes of the graphs. The darker the colour of the tile, the more often that particular combination was chosen by the experts who took the survey.
Source: World Economic Forum
Compared with Last Year
While there is some movement of individual dots, compared 
with last year’s scatter plot, the general distribution of the 
risks on the risk landscape is, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
similar (see Figure 1). What is surprising, though, is that 
respondents this year see risks as more likely and as having 
a higher impact than respondents to the previous year’s 
survey. The average likelihood score is 0.15 units higher (on 
a scale from 1 to 5), and the average impact score is 0.13 
units higher. 
Part of the increase in impact (about a quarter of the 
difference) can be explained by the fact that the average age 
of the survey sample has decreased, and as shown below, 
younger people tend to give higher answers when it comes 
to assessing a risk’s impact. Nonetheless, even controlling 
for age and other different characteristics of the sample, the 
fact remains that the perceived likelihood and impact of 
many of the risks have increased.
Particularly interesting cases which had big increases in both 
likelihood and impact scores are: 
 - the technological risks: unforeseen consequences of new life 
science technologies and unforeseen consequences of 
climate change mitigation; 
 - the economic risks: unforeseen negative consequences of 
regulation, hard landing of an emerging economy and chronic 
labour market imbalances; 
 - the two sides of global demographic imbalances: 
unsustainable population growth and mismanagement of 
population ageing; and 
 - the geopolitical risk: unilateral resource nationalization. 
Only very few risks had their average scores decrease from last 
year. On the likelihood scale, these include recurring liquidity 
crises, vulnerability to geomagnetic storms and proliferation of 
orbital debris. The only risk where there was a statistically 
significant decrease in terms of its impact was food shortage 
crises.
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By Region of Residence
Survey respondents were asked to provide some information 
about their background: their age, their gender, where they live, 
for what kind of organization they work, and their subject-area 
expertise. Using this demographic data the risks landscape was 
cut up in different ways to see how different groups with specific 
characteristics perceive global risks. 
Figure 31, for instance, shows how respondents based in North 
America tend to rate many risks as having a higher likelihood 
than respondents in other regions. The dots are markedly further 
to the right in the scatter plot, and for a large number of risks the 
differences with other regions are statistically significant. These 
include chronic fiscal imbalances, prolonged infrastructure 
neglect, rising greenhouse gas emissions, diffusion of weapons 
of mass destruction and cyber attacks (see Appendix 2 for 
detailed results). 
The scatterplot for Latin America demonstrates that 
respondents based in that region tend to assign a higher impact 
to risks. For instance, they see the impact of ineffective illicit drug 
policies as significantly higher than survey takers from other 
regions. It is also interesting that average responses from 
respondents based in Asia are clustered more densely together.
By Organization
Similarly, it is possible to look at how the perceptions of people 
who work at different types of organizations differ. This year, the 
differences are less pronounced than last year. One striking 
observation, though, is that for many risks, people working for 
NGOs tend to assign higher scores than their peers from other 
organizations. In particular, people from NGOs see many risks 
as more likely than respondents from the government sector, 
and they rate impacts more highly than those in the business 
world (see Appendix 2 for more results).
Figure 31: Comparison between Regions of Residence
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Figure 32: Comparison between Organizational Affiliations
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By Gender
The difference in perception between genders is very 
pronounced, with women tending to rate both the likelihood and 
impact of most risks higher than men. On average, the likelihood 
rating is 0.11 units higher for women than for men, while the 
difference between the impact scores is 0.21 units.xlviii
For most individual risks, this difference was statistically 
significant at the 5% level. There is only one risk, backlash 
against globalization, which men rated as more likely than 
women. 
The overall finding that men are generally less worried about 
risks than women is in line with what has been observed in other 
surveys about perceptions of other kinds of risk.1 The literature is 
not in agreement as to the reasons for this result. Some believe 
that women are generally more risk-averse than men, while 
others argue the two genders perceive risks similarly but worry 
about different risks, so it matters which risks surveys ask about. 
Either explanation would have important implications for risk 
managers and policy-makers wanting to use expert perceptions 
to identify and assess global risks, and to make the most 
informed decisions.
By Age
Figure 34 shows that respondents aged 40 or younger tend to 
rate most risks as higher in impact than those over 40. There is no 
risk where the older group’s impact scores are significantly higher. 
For many risks, the younger experts also chose higher likelihood 
scores. But there are a few exceptions, where respondents over 
40 rated risks as more likely to occur in the next 10 years than 
the respondents under 40: prolonged infrastructure neglect, 
failure of climate change adaptation, rising greenhouse gas 
emissions and diffusion of weapons of mass destruction.  
In contrast to the differences between the genders, the psycho-
metric literature is less clear on the effect of age on risk percep-
tions. Some studies find that younger people generally worry less 
about risks.2 However, most of these look at adolescents and 
personal risks such as driving, drinking and smoking. It is not 
surprising that this finding does not carry over to perceptions of 
global risks among experts in their third or fourth decade of life. 
On the other hand, studies that look at age differences in general, 
not only at teenagers, support the finding from the present 
survey that younger people generally perceive risks as higher.3
It is interesting that high-level decision-makers tend to be drawn 
mostly from the group – older males – that the breakdowns by age 
and gender indicate is least inclined to worry about global risks.
Figure 33: Comparison between Genders
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xlviii Controlling for other characteristics of the sample, the respective differences would be 
0.087 and 0.18 units.
Figure 34: Comparison between Age Groups
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By Subject-matter Expertise
Finally, it is possible to look at how subject expertise affects risk 
perceptions. Respondents were asked to identify in which of the 
five categories (which group the 50 risks) they consider them-
selves experts. While there is no generalization that can be 
made about all risks, there are some interesting cases where 
experts are more worried about risks.
The differences between environmental experts and their peers 
from other fields are striking – they assign higher impact and 
likelihood scores to all 10 risks in the environmental category, 
with most of these differences being statistically significant at the 
5% level (see Appendix 2).
Also there are a number of societal risks where specialists are 
more alarmed than other respondents, such as rising rates of 
chronic diseases, unsustainable population growth or unman-
aged migration. In the economic category, this pattern holds 
only for chronic fiscal imbalances. For most other risks in this 
category, as well as in the geopolitical and in the technological 
domains, there are few statistically significant differences.
On the other side of the equation, experts in economic issues 
worry less about the impact and likelihood of severe income 
disparity than non-experts. Similarly, technological experts 
worry less than non-experts about the likelihood and impact of 
unforeseen consequences of nanotechnology. 
These findings raise interesting questions. Are economists more 
informed about economic issues than others, or are there 
ideological differences at play? Are the technological specialists 
more knowledgeable here, or does their excitement about new 
technologies dampen their risk perceptions? And where experts 
are more worried, does that mean that we should listen to them 
more, or do they just feel more strongly about their issue without 
knowing enough about other threats? 
Figure 35: Comparison between Experts
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Centres of Gravity
For each of the five categories, survey-takers were asked to pick 
a “Centre of Gravity” – the one risk that they thought is the 
systemically most important one in that group. Due to their 
influence on other risks, these are the risks to which leaders and 
policy-makers should pay particularly close attention. Figure 36 
shows how the answers to this question are distributed among 
the different options. The top selected risks for Centres of 
Gravity this year are:
 - major systemic financial failure (economic)
 - failure of climate change adaptation (environmental)
 - global governance failure (geopolitical)
 - water supply crises (societal)
 - critical systems failure (technological)
Three of the centres of gravity have changed from last year’s 
report, in the economic, environmental and societal categories.
Figure 36: Centres of Gravity by Category
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Interconnections
Finally, the survey asked respondents to choose pairs of risks 
which they think are strongly interconnected.xlix They were asked to 
pick a minimum of three and maximum of ten such connections.
Putting together all chosen paired connections from all 
respondents leads to the network diagram presented in Figure 37 
– the Risk Interconnection Map. The diagram is constructed so 
that more connected risks are closer to the centre, while weakly 
connected risks are further out. The strength of the line depends 
on how many people had selected that particular combination.
529 different connections were identified by survey respondents 
out of the theoretical maximum of 1,225 combinations possible. 
The top selected combinations are shown in Figure 38.
 
It is also interesting to see which are the most connected risks 
(see Figure 39) and where the five centres of gravity are located 
in the network (see Figure 40).
Figure 37: The Risk Interconnection Map 2013
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xlix When two risks are connected, it simply means that respondents believe that there is some 
sort of correlation between the two. Causal direction cannot be deduced.
Figure 38: Top Five Most Selected Connections
Figure 39: Top 10 Most Connected Risks
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Box 8: The Global Risks 2013 Data Explorer 
Readers are invited to visit the Data Explorer on the 
accompanying website to the Global Risks 2013 report. There it 
is possible to interact with the Global Risks Landscape, the 
Global Interconnection Map, and the data from the two new 
survey questions on national resilience. The data explorer is also 
an entry point to other relevant Forum reports, videos, and blog 
posts – including the “What-If? Interview” seriesl by the Risk 
Response Network – and many other types of resources around 
each of the 50 global risks covered in this report.
Visit the Global Risks Data Explorer: http://www.weforum.org/
globalrisks2013/dataexplorer.
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Figure 40: Centres of Gravity and their Connections
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l The “What If?” series seeks to generate new insights around risks that global experts from 
academia, business, government and civil society believe to be underappreciated. By 
exploring hypothetical scenarios in detail, leaders are able to uncover complex 
interconnectivity between systems and issues and by exploring global risks as scenarios, 
experts have the space to surface sensitive issues. The What-If series is a platform for 
leaders to assess their resilience against such risks and even seize opportunities they may 
present.
1. Finucane, M. L., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., & Flynn, J. Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: the ’White 
Male’ Effect. In Health, Risk and Society, 2000, 2:159-172; Gustafson, P.E. Gender Differences in 
Risk Perception: Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives. In Risk Analysis, 1998, 
18:805-811; and Harris, C. R., Jenkins, M., & Glaser, D. Gender Differences in Risk Assessment: 
Why do Women Take Fewer Risks than Men. In Judgment and Decision Making, 2006, 1:48-63.
2. Deery, H.A.  Hazard and Risk Perception among Young Novice Drivers. In Journal of Safety 
Research, 1999, 30:225-236; and Jonah, B.A., & Dawson, N.E. Youth and Risk: Age Differences 
in Risky Driving, Risk Perception, and Risk Utility. In Alcohol, Drugs & Driving, 1987, 3:13-29.
3. Savage, I. Demographic Influences on Risk Perceptions. In Risk Analysis, 1993, 13:413-420.
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In this section, developed in collaboration 
with Nature, a leading science journal, the 
Risk Response Network asks readers to 
look beyond our high-risk concerns of the 
moment to consider a set of five X factors 
and reflect on what countries or companies 
should be doing to anticipate them. 
In a world of many uncertainties we are 
constantly on the search to identify “X 
factors” – emerging concerns of possible 
future importance and with unknown 
consequences. Looking forward and 
identifying emerging issues will help us to 
anticipate future challenges and adopt a 
more proactive approach, rather than being 
caught by surprise and forced into a fully 
reactive mode. 
X factors are serious issues, grounded in the 
latest scientific findings, but somewhat 
remote from what are generally seen as 
more immediate concerns such as failed 
states, extreme weather events, famine, 
macroeconomic instability or armed conflict. 
They capture broad and vaguely understood 
issues that could be hatching grounds for 
potential future risks (or opportunities). 
X Factors
Runaway Climate Change
The threat of climate change is well known. But have we passed 
the point of no return? What if we have already triggered a 
runaway chain reaction that is in the process of rapidly tipping 
Earth’s atmosphere into an inhospitable state?
The natural greenhouse effect is a prerequisite for life on our 
planet. Without it, Earth’s global average surface temperature 
would be far below zero. But our planet’s climate is a volatile 
beast. Small fluctuations in the Earth’s orbit around the sun can 
exert a major influence on our climate. So can the varying 
concentration in Earth’s atmosphere of heat-trapping molecules 
such as carbon dioxide, to which we have been adding through 
greenhouse gas emissions.
How pronounced and how fast the warming will be (and how it 
will affect rainfall and storminess where you live) is hard to say as 
even the most sophisticated computer models cannot capture 
all the factors involved in a system as complex as the Earth. But 
it could be more dramatic and difficult to adapt to than most 
scientists predict, because of the natural ‘feedbacks’ in the 
system, linked to processes in the oceans1 and on land2. They 
have the potential of amplifying climate change to a point of 
fundamentally disrupting the global system. The much-debated 
questions are where these tipping points lie, how soon they 
might be reached, whether they can be predicted – and what 
will happen when they are crossed.3 
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The perhaps best-known positive feedback mechanism is the 
so-called ice-albedo feedback. In a warmer world there will be less 
snow and sea ice. Their melting reveals the darker land and water 
surfaces below, which absorb more solar heat. More absorption 
then causes yet more melting and warming, and so forth, in a 
self-reinforcing feedback loop. The unprecedented thawing of 97% 
of Greenland’s surface ice in July 2012, for example, has led to a 
darkening of Greenland’s ice cap, meaning it will begin to absorb 
higher levels of solar energy and melt faster still.
Melting of the complete Arctic summer sea ice – the Arctic is 
expected to be seasonally ice-free by around 2040 – could 
probably be reversed on human timescales if greenhouse gases 
are reduced and temperature drops. But if the several kilometre-
thick ice sheets that cover Greenland and Antarctica dwindle, 
they may not so easily reappear in a cooler world. New ice would 
have to form at low elevations, where temperatures are higher. 
Permafrost melting, land use and vegetation changes, and the 
effects of changing cloud cover provide for other major feedback 
mechanisms. Some scientists suspect that by 2040 up to 63 
billion extra tonnes of carbon – and up to 380 billion tonnes by 
2100 – might be released by the thaw and degradation of 
permafrost soil alone.4
Finally, there is the potentially huge feedback effect of water 
vapour, a natural greenhouse gas in itself. A warmer atmosphere 
can hold more water. As the average air temperature soars in 
response to our burning of fossil fuels, evaporation and 
atmospheric concentration of water vapour will increase, further 
intensifying the greenhouse effect. On Venus, this probably caused 
a runaway greenhouse effect, which boiled away the oceans that 
may have existed in the planet’s early history.
Luckily, man-made climate warming has virtually no chance of 
producing a runaway greenhouse effect analogous to Venus. 
Even so, scientists with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) reckon that the water vapour feedback on Earth 
could be strong enough to double the greenhouse effect due to 
the added carbon dioxide alone. 
While climate change debates of the past decade centred around 
whether or not mankind could be responsible at all for altering a 
system as great at Earth’s climate, we may be rapidly moving into 
forced discussions on how best to strengthen mankind’s resilience 
and adaptive capacity to cope as Earth’s climate auto-pilot 
mercilessly hurtles us toward a new and unknown equilibrium.
Significant Cognitive Enhancement
Once the preserve of science fiction, superhuman abilities are 
fast approaching the horizon of plausibility. Will it be ethically 
accepted for the world to divide into the cognitively-enhanced 
and unenhanced? What might be the military implications?
Scientists are working hard to develop the medicines and 
therapies needed to heal the brain of mental illnesses such as 
Alzheimers and schizophrenia. Although progress has been 
slow, it is conceivable that in the not-too-distant future, 
researchers will identify compounds that improve on existing 
cognitive pharmaceutical enhancers (e.g. Ritalin, modafinil). 
Although they will be prescribed for significant neurological 
disease, effective new compounds which appear to enhance 
intelligence or cognition are sure to be used off-label by healthy 
people looking for an edge at work or school. 
Enhancement could come from hardware as well as drugs. A 
handful of studies in people show that electrical stimulation  – 
either directly via implanted electrodes or through the scalp with 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) – can boost memory. 
Cochlear implants are already standard treatment for the deaf, 
and motor implants for controlling neural prosthetics and 
devices are developing fast and seem likely to become available 
more widely in coming years. Retinal implants for the blind are a 
bit further behind, but the field is booming and it seems likely 
that they will be worked out soon. 
The best interfaces still rely on invasive brain electrodes 
(noninvasive techniques do work, but are slow and inefficient), 
which is the major barrier to these being adopted by healthy 
people. But it seems conceivable that within 10 years we will 
either have a new method for recording brain activity or the 
noninvasive signals will be decoded more efficiently. Direct brain 
interfaces of devices and sensors within our lifetimes is not out 
of the question, opening a new realm of enhanced neurobiology 
for those who can afford it.
This will pose ethical issues in many walks of life akin to those 
which surround “doping” in the world of professional sports. Will 
we accept the idea that significant cognitive enhancement 
should be available to purchase on the open market? Or will 
there be, as there now is with performance enhancers in 
competitive sports, a push for legislation to maintain a more level 
playing field? 
There is, in addition, a significant risk of cognitive enhancement 
going very wrong. Cognitive enhancement pharmaceuticals work 
by targeting particular neurotransmitter systems, and therefore will 
most likely have wide-ranging action. There is a significant 
possibility of unintended effects on other systems – for example, 
drugs to enhance learning might lead to a greater willingness to 
take risks; drugs to enhance working memory might lead to 
increased impulsive behavior. Recent research suggests that, in 
addition to boosting memory, TMS could be used to manipulate a 
person’s beliefs of right versus wrong or to suspend moral 
judgement altogether. It could also be used to “erase” memory and 
deliberately cause permanent brain damage without the use of 
invasive procedure or blunt force trauma.
57Global Risks 2013
S
ection 1
S
ection 2
S
ection 3
S
ection 4
S
ectio
n 5
S
ection 6
Both the intended and unintended effects of such new 
technologies would open whole new categories of potential 
“dual-use” dilemmas. (Dual-use describes technologies which 
can be used for good as well as for substantial harm.) It is not 
difficult to see how such drugs could find applications in armed 
forces and law enforcement contexts, or conversely by criminal 
organizations and terrorist groups. They could spark an arms 
race in the neural “enhancement” of combat troops.5
Such advancements could have profound impacts in 20 to 50 
years on societal norms affecting how we approach issues 
incuding education and training, disparity between groups in 
society, informed consent and exploitation, and international 
laws on warfare.
Rogue Deployment of Geoengineering 
In response to growing concerns about climate change, scientists 
are exploring ways in which they could, with international 
agreement, manipulate the earth’s climate. But what if this 
technology were to be hijacked by a rogue state or individual? 
Geoengineering can refer to many things, but it is most often 
associated with a scientific field that has come to be known as 
“solar radiation management”. The basic idea is that small particles 
could be injected high into the stratosphere to block some of the 
incoming solar energy and reflect it back into space, much as 
severe volcanic eruptions have done in the past. In stark contrast 
to decades of technological evolution and political disputes about 
overhauling energy infrastructure to reduce greenhouse emissions, 
solar radiation management would act quickly and would be 
cheap to implement – though side-effects may make it a very 
expensive option.
Most research has focused on sulphur injection via aircraft. 
Recent studies suggest that a small fleet of aircraft could inject a 
million tonnes of sulphur compounds into the stratosphere – 
enough to offset roughly half of the global warming experienced 
to date – for  US$1-2 billion annually.li In theory, the technology 
would be tantamount to a planetary thermostat, giving humans 
direct control over global temperature.  The direct impact of 
dimming the sun would be felt within weeks to months.
However, a long series of ethical, legal and scientific questions 
quickly arises about countless knock-on effects that might be 
much more difficult to assess. The problem is that incoming 
solar radiation drives the entire climate system, so reducing 
sunlight would fundamentally alter the way energy and water 
moves around the planet. Almost any change in weather and 
climate patterns is likely to create winners and losers, but 
determining causation and quantifying impacts on any given 
region or country would be a massive challenge. 
Nobody envisions deployment of solar radiation management 
anytime soon, given the difficulties in resolving a suite of 
governance issues (evidenced by the fact that even the 
relatively simple SPICElii experiment in the UK foundered in the 
midst of controversy).6 Beginning with Britain’s Royal Society, 
many academic and policy bodies have called for cautious 
research as well as broader conversation about the implications 
of such technologies. 
But this has led some geoengineering analysts to begin thinking 
about a corollary scenario, in which a country or small group of 
countries precipitates an international crisis by moving ahead 
with deployment or large-scale research independent of the 
global community. The global climate could, in effect, be hijacked 
by a rogue country or even a wealthy individual, with unpredict-
able costs to agriculture, infrastructure and global stability.
The problem is that the only way to truly test solar radiation 
management is at scale. This potentially conflates large-scale 
research with deployment, thereby giving rogue nations political 
cover under the guise of science. Much research has gone into 
whether a programme could be targeted at the Arctic, for 
instance, where the impacts of global warming are being felt the 
most, but some researchers suggest that the impacts could 
quickly migrate from the Arctic to other regions. Many say that a 
true test of solar radiation management would have to be global. 
Due to such complexities, most of the science to date has been 
conducted via computer modelling, although scientists are 
looking for ways to test these ideas with local experiments. But 
overall, despite calls for more coordinated government science 
programmes, the funding landscape for this kind of science 
remains spotty.
This leaves a gap for unregulated experimentation by “rogue” 
parties. For example, an island state threatened with rising sea 
levels may decide they have nothing to lose, or a well funded 
individual with good intentions may take matters into their own 
hands. There are signs that this is already starting to occur. In 
July 2012 an American businessman sparked controversy 
when he dumped around 100 tonnes of iron sulphate into the 
Pacific Ocean off the west coast of Canada in a scheme to 
spawn an artificial plankton bloom. The plankton absorb 
carbon dioxide and may then sink to the ocean bed, removing 
the carbon – another type of geoengineering, known as ocean 
fertilisation. Satellite images confirm that his actions succeeded 
in produce an artificial plankton bloom as large as 10,000 
square kilometres.
The individual hoped to net lucrative carbon credits, but his 
actions may have been in violation of two international 
agreements.7 Observers are concerned that this may be a sign 
of what is to come.8
li The most detailed cost and engineering analysis was commissioned by David Keith, 
currently at Harvard University, and conducted by Aurora Flight Sciences. That analysis, 
formally completed in July 2011, suggests that a small fleet of aircraft could inject a million 
tonnes of sulphur into the stratosphere – enough to offset roughly half of the global warming 
experienced to date – for US$ 1-2 billion annually.
lii  Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) is a UK government-funded 
geoengineering research project that aims to assess the feasibility of injecting particles into 
the stratosphere from a tethered balloon for the purposes of solar radiation management.
Global Risks 201358
S
ection 1
S
ection 2
S
ection 3
S
ection 4
S
ectio
n 5
S
ection 6
Discovery of Alien Life
Given the pace of space exploration, it is increasingly 
conceivable that we may discover the existence of alien life or 
other planets that could support human life. What would be the 
effects on science funding flows and humanity’s self-image?It 
was only in 1995 that we first found evidence that other stars also 
have planets orbiting them. Now thousands of “exoplanets” 
revolving around distant stars have been detected. NASA’s Kepler 
mission to identify Earth-sized planets located in the “Goldilocks 
Zone” (not too hot, nor too cold) of Sun-like stars, has only been 
operating for 3 years and has already turned up thousands of 
candidates, including one the size of Earth. The fact that Kepler 
has found so many planet candidates in such a tiny fraction of the 
sky suggests there are countless Earth-like planets orbiting 
sun-like stars in our galaxy. In 10 years’ time we may have 
evidence not only that Earth is not unique, but that life exists 
elsewhere in the universe.
Suppose the astronomers who study exoplanets one day find 
chemical signs of life – for example, a spectrum showing the 
presence of oxygen, a highly reactive element that would quickly 
disappear from Earth’s atmosphere if it were not being replenished 
by plants. Money might well start flowing for new telescopes to 
study these living worlds in detail, both from the ground and from 
space. New funding and new brain power might be attracted to 
the challenges of human space flight and the technologies 
necessary for humanity, or its A.I. emissaries, to survive an 
inter-stellar crossing. 
Costs of Living Longer
We are getting better at keeping people alive for longer. Are we 
setting up a future society struggling to cope with a mass of 
arthritic, demented and, above all, expensive, elderly who are in 
need of long term care and palliative solutions?
The blessings of 20th-century medicine look set to explode with 
the deciphering of the genome and attendant advances.  It is 
hoped that big inroads against common banes such as heart 
disease, cancer and stroke, may be in the offing.  Consider the 
impact on society of a growing number of elderly infirm who are 
protected from the most common causes of death today, but 
with an ever deteriorating quality of life as other ailments that do 
not kill, but seriously disable, start to dominate. 
Current trends are already setting the stage for such a future 
scenario in the West. Already, the demographics of the Baby 
Boom are working against us:  conservative estimates say that 
the number of Americans afflicted with Alzheimer’s disease will 
at least double, to 11 million, by mid-century.9 Similar rises are 
projected for many countries, with the global population of the 
demented expected to double every 20 years until it exceeds 
115 million in 2050.10 A key driver will be increasing elderly 
populations and potentially declining fertility rates in low and 
middle income countries.
The looming expense of caring for these masses is mind 
boggling, especially in high-income countries. The UK, for 
instance, spends nearly as much each year caring for the 
demented (£23 billion) as it does on stroke (£5 billion), heart 
disease (£8 billion) and cancer (£12 billion) combined.11 And the 
numbers afflicted with all of these maladies are only going to 
grow.
Consider Medicare, the US health programme for the elderly. 
Assuming no policy changes – for instance, no increase in the 
age of eligibility – the programme’s outlays are expected to 
exceed its taxpayer-funded income by more than US $24 trillon 
over the next 75 years.12,liii  The spending trend is not limited to 
government support, either.  In the US, the cumulative total of 
public and private consumption by the elderly has ballooned in 
the last half century.  The burden is accentuated in rapidly-aging 
countries like Germany, where the ratio of effective producers 
per consumer is projected to decline nearly 25% by 2030.13
Life expectancy has increased steadily in every decade since 
1840, but these gains do not necessarily portend better health in 
later life.14 Thus, a new wave of disabled seniors may be on the 
way. The proportion of Americans aged 50 to 64 who reported 
needing help with personal care activities – things like getting 
into and out of bed, and climbing ten steps – increased 
significantly in the decade ending in 2007. Arthritis was the top 
cause, and diabetes played a prominent and growing role.15
Are there fixes that can avert the coming storm? There are 
well-known but difficult-to-implement preventive measures that 
could help us live both longer and better quality of lives: 
paramount among them is exercise, with its near-universal 
benefits for our physiologies and for warding off pathology.16 
Obvious ways to mitigate cost implications would include raising 
the eligibility ages for the programmes that support the elderly 
from the public purse – retirement income, social support 
services or reduced-cost health care – and raising the retirement 
age, requiring older adults to be productive economically for 
longer. One recent analysis, using a “delayed aging” model, 
found that hundreds of billions of dollars in increased costs to 
the US Medicare and Social Security programmes could be 
entirely offset by raising the eligibility ages for Medicare and 
Social Security by a few years (from 65 to 68, and from 67 to 
68).17
However, raising eligibility ages for public services is not a 
panacea, in part because financial costs are not the only 
challenge. The impacts of aging populations will be felt 
throughout society, from changing best practices in urban 
planning to impacting social norms around care-giving. More 
research is needed to turn chronic conditions to acute 
conditions (i.e. by developing curative treatments), and find 
solutions that increase the capacity of all citizens to manage 
chronic conditions and to create wealth at the same time.
liii See page 46 and 47 under “financial statements” at http://www.gao.gov/financial/
fy2011/11stmt.pdf. Add total liabilities for Medicare parts A, B and D together to get US$ 
24.5 trillion. (3,252 billion + 18,854 billion + 7,466 billion)
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The discovery would certainly be one of the biggest news stories 
of the year, and interest would be intense. But it would not change 
the world immediately. Alien life has been ‘discovered’ before, after 
all. Around the turn of the 20th century, the US astronomer Percival 
Lowell convinced a great many people (including himself) that 
Mars was crisscrossed by a vast system of canals built by a dying 
civilization. But the belief that humankind was not alone did not do 
much to usher in an era of brotherhood and earthly harmony, nor 
did it stop the outbreak of World War I in 1914.  
The discovery’s largest near-term impact would likely be on 
science itself. Suppose observations point to a potential future 
home for mankind around another star, or the existence of life in 
our solar system – in the Martian poles, or in the subsurface 
oceans of Jupiter’s frozen moon Europa, or even in the 
hydrocarbon lakes of Saturn’s moon Titan. Scientists will 
immediately start pushing for robotic and even human missions to 
study the life forms in situ – and funding agencies, caught up in the 
excitement, might be willing to listen. 
The fledgling space economy had a big year in 2012, which saw the 
birth of space trucking when the first commercially built and 
operated spacecraft successfully rendezvoused with the 
International Space Station, and a host of celebrity billionaires 
declared intentions to make asteroid mining a reality. Discovery of an 
Earth 2.0 or life beyond our planet might inspire new generations of 
space entrepreneurs to also take on the challenge of taking human 
exploration of the galaxy from the realm of fiction to fact.
Over the long term the psychological and philosophical implica-
tions of the discovery could be profound. If lifeforms (even fossilized 
lifeforms) are found in our own solar system, for example, it will tell 
us that the origin of life is ‘easy’ – that anyplace in the universe life 
can emerge, it will emerge. It will suggest that life is as natural and 
as ubiquitous a part of the universe as stars and galaxies are. The 
discovery of even simple life would fuel speculation about the 
existence of other intelligent beings and challenge many assump-
tions which underpin human philosophy and religion.  
Through basic education and awareness campaigns the general 
public can achieve a higher science and space literacy and 
cognitive resilience that would prepare them and prevent 
undesired social consequences of such a profound discovery and 
paradigm shift concerning mankind’s position in the universe.
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Conclusion
The eighth edition of the Global Risks report has sought to 
highlight the theme of resilience in the context of systems 
thinking. Exogenous in nature, global risks cannot be adequately 
managed or mitigated by any single organisation. We have 
introduced the conceptual framework of Professors Kaplan and 
Mikes1, contrasting “external” risks such as global risks with 
“preventable” and “strategic” risks, to assist clarity of thought 
about how global risks should be approached. Whenever it is 
difficult to predict how and when a risk will manifest, nurturing 
resilience is the preferred approach.
Throughout this report we have sought to frame risks in a 
systems context given its nature of interdependencies and to 
assist clarity of thinking about the best ways to build resilience. 
Our three risk cases have discussed what happens when two 
major systems are stressed simultaneously (Testing Economic 
and Environmental Resilience); when a seemingly more minor 
system punches above its weight (Digital Wildfires in a 
Hyperconnected World); and when we become complacent in 
the continued ability of a system to stay one step ahead of a 
changing problem (The Dangers of Hubris on Human Health). In 
the Special Report, we explored the thinking of systems 
theorists about how to build resilient systems, describing how 
five components – redundancy, robustness, resourcefulness, 
response and recovery – can be applied to selected national 
subsystems. 
As ever, this report forms the starting point of dialogue which will 
continue throughout the year, through a number of channels: our 
dedicated virtual platform for members of the Risk Response 
Network’s trusted community; the Resilience Practices 
Exchange; workshops with our report partners and their 
stakeholders; regional events around the world; and, of course, 
our Annual Meetings in the People’s Republic of China and in 
Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, where the theme for 2013 is 
resilient dynamism.
Specifically, in 2013 we will take forward the task of building a 
trusted network of risk experts to help global leaders map, 
mitigate, monitor and enhance resilience to global risks. And we 
will work to develop and refine the National Resilience Rating 
proposed in the Special Report. The hyperconnected nature of 
the modern world makes it increasingly urgent to understand 
how best to build resilience in the face of global risks. 
 
More information on these initiatives and other World Economic 
Forum activities on global risks can be found at  
www.weforum.org/risk. You can contact us at rrn@weforum.org 
and stay connected by following us at @WEFRisk.
1 Kaplan, R.S. & Mikes, A. Managing Risks: A New Framework. In Harvard Business Review, 
2012. 
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Appendix 1 
The Survey
Survey Sample
The Global Risks Perception Survey was carried out as an online 
survey during September 2012. The purpose of the survey is to 
sample the views of the World Economic Forum’s communities, 
which comprise of top experts and high-level leaders from 
business, academia, NGOs, international organizations, the 
public sector and civil society. Over 6,000 invitations were sent 
out and 1,234 respondents returned the questionnaire with 
usable information; 1,006 of these were complete responses – 
compared to 469 in 2011.
In the 2012 survey, in addition to greater diversity of affiliation, 
respondents also come from more diverse regions of the world 
(see Figure 41). They indicated 101 different countries as their 
country of residence, and self-identified expertise on 115 
different countries. This has increased compared to 2011, where 
only 69 countries were chosen as country of residence. There 
was an increase in representation from Asia, Latin America, 
Middle East/North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa with a larger 
number of responses from Japan, China and India for Asia; 
Costa Rica, Mexico and Brazil for Latin America; and Nigeria 
and South Africa for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The survey sample includes experts in a range of subjects. 
Approximately 29% of respondents are female, and the average 
age of survey respondents is 43. With the inclusion of the new 
Global Shapers Community – a group of young leaders between 
20 and 30 years oldliv – the range of age groups covered by the 
survey is wider than it was last year.
The survey sample closely resembles the targeted survey 
population as described above. The distribution of people 
across regions and types of organizations is nearly identical; the 
average age is slightly lower (by two years) and the proportion of 
women is slightly higher (by 3 percentage points). It is important 
to note that the data is not intended to be representative of wider 
populations than this specific survey population.
Figure 41: Breakdown of Survey Sample
Type of Organization
Business - 519 (42.1%)
Academia - 220 (17.8%)
NGO - 198 (16.0%)
Other - 102 (8.3%)
Government - 100 (8.1%)
International Organizations - 95 (7.7%)
Region of Expertise
 
 
Europe - 316 (25.6%)
North America - 302 (24.5%) Asia - 306 (24.8%)
Latin America - 132 (10.7%)
Middle East/North Africa - 83 (6.7%)
Sub-Saharan Africa - 95 (7.7%)
Number of responses
Economic Issues
Societal Issues
Geopolitical Issues
Technological Issues
Environmental Issues
612
372
234
569
327
NB: Multiple selections were possible for the question on expertise
100 200 300 400 500 600
Area of Expertise
Age
Number of responses
19-20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-60
60-70
70-80
3
249
216
125
294
288
21
100 200 300
Region of Residence
 
 
Europe - 368 (29.8%)
North America - 327 (26.5%)
Asia - 274 (22.2%)
Latin America - 116 (9.4%)
Middle East/North Africa - 77 (6.2%)
Sub-Saharan Africa - 72 (5.8%)
Source: World Economic Forum
liv See http://www.weforum.org/globalshapers for more information.
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The Questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted of three different sections with the 
following questions:
Section 1 covered the above-mentioned demographic 
information.
In Section 2, respondents were asked to assess each of the 50 
global risks covered in this report, by stating how they would 
rate, on a scale from 1 to 5, the likelihood that the risk is to occur 
over the next 10 years, and if it were to occur, the impact it would 
have on the world.
In addition, a new question was introduced this year to think 
about the country that they had identified in Section 1 as the 
country about which they have most expertise, and rate the 
ability of that country to adapt and/or recover from the impact of 
each of the 50 global risks.
The answer options to these three questions were presented as 
Likert-type scales, where the respondent, using a slider on the 
screen, was able to select a value ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high) 
as well as the midpoints between these integers.
For each category of risks – economic, environmental, 
geopolitical, societal and technological – the last question in 
Section 2 asks survey respondents to select what they thought 
would be the “Centre of Gravity”, i.e. the single most important 
risk from a systemic perspective. They could choose from the 10 
risks in each category via a drop-down menu.
Finally, in Section 3, respondents were asked to identify strong 
connections between pairs of risks. They had the opportunity to 
select at least three and up to 10 combinations, by dragging tiles 
into paired boxes from the pool of 50 risks. 
Margin of Errors
Based on the spread of the answers as well as the survey 
sample size, one can calculate the margin of error, based on a 
95% confidence level.
For the global likelihood and global impact questions (Figures 1, 
2, 29, 30), which were answered by all 1,234 respondents, the 
maximumlv margin of error is 0.07 units.
For the question on the Centres of Gravity (Figure 36), the 
maximumlvi margin of error is 2.7 percentage points.
For the question on country recovery and adaptability, the 
margin of error is heavily dependent on how many people 
assessed the country in the question (as explained above, 
survey respondents could choose which country to assess). The 
tables in Appendix 3 detail the values.
lv The margin of error varies slightly across the 50 risks. See Table 3 in Appendix 2.
lvi The margin of error varies across the five categories and the different possible answers.
Appendix 2 
Likelihood 
and Impact
Likelihood: Comparisons
The number of survey responses received from different regions 
ranges from 64 from Sub-Saharan Africa to 330 from Europe. 
For stakeholder groups the range was from 88 from international 
organizations to 471 from business. As illustrated in Table 1, out 
of 50 global risks, only two risks – extreme volatility in energy 
and agriculture prices and major systemic financial failure – did 
not have any statistically significant differences between any 
groups. The other 48 risks had at least one group difference. 
Arguably the risk with the most differences, especially between 
regions, was failure of drug policies. 
Only 8 out of 50 risks had statistically significant differences 
between respondents under 40 and over 40 years of age. Four 
of these risks were in the environmental category: failure of 
climate change adaptation, irremediable pollution, rising 
greenhouse gas emissions, and unprecedented geophysical 
destruction. 
Similarly, the environmental category had the largest percentage 
of risks with statistically significant differences between experts 
and non-experts. Where there are differences, generally experts 
perceived the risk as more likely to occur, though non-experts 
found four risks more likely: severe income disparity, 
unmanageable inflation and deflation, rising religious fanaticism 
and unforeseen consequences of nanotechnology. Interestingly, 
rising religious fanaticism was one of the most highly connected 
risks in the Risks Interconnection Map. 
Finally, where there were statistically significant gender 
differences, females were more pessimistic and rated the risks 
as more likely to occur. The biggest difference between male 
and female opinions was regarding the risk of unprecedented 
geophysical destruction, with a difference of 0.41 (on a scale of 1 
to 5).
Region of Residence Stakeholder
As Asia Ac Academia
E Europe B Business
LatAm Latin America G Government
NthA North America IO International Organization
MENA Middle East/ North Africa N NGO
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa Other Other
Table 1-2: Legends
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Table 1: Comparisons between Groupslvii for Likelihood of Global Risks Occurring in the Next 10 Yearslviii 
lvii   An analysis of variance (ANOVA) tested whether or not the means of sub-groups were all equal. For those risks where they were not all equal, a Sidak post-hoc test established which of the 
pair-wise differences between groups were significant at the 5% level.
lviii Only statistically significant differences are noted; otherwise, the table cell is empty.
Risk Region of Residence Stakeholder Age Gender Expertise
Under 40 Over 40 Male Female Expert Non-Expert
Chronic fiscal imbalances NthA > All other regions - -  - 4.02  > 3.91
Chronic labour market imbalances NthA, SSA > E, LatAm - - 3.65  < 3.79  - 
Extreme volatility in energy and 
agriculture prices
- - - - -
Hard landing of an emerging economy NthA > E, LatAm, MENA, SSA 
As > MENA
- - - -
Major systemic financial failure - - - - -
Prolonged infrastructure neglect NthA > All other regions - 3.24  < 3.38  -  - 
Recurring liquidity crises NthA, E, MENA > LatAm -  -  -  - 
Severe income disparity NthA > As, E, LatAm NGO > G  - 4.19  < 4.31 4.15  < 4.29
Unforeseen negative consequences of 
regulation
NthA > LatAm B > NGO, Ac, G, IO  -  - 3.41  > 3.21
Unmanageable inflation or deflation As > NthA, E, LatAm 
SSA > LatAm
- 3.25 > 3.11  - 3.12  < 3.24
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria NthA > As, LatAm 
E > LatAm
Other > IO  -  - 3.67 > 3.36
Failure of climate change adaptation NthA > As, E, MENA NGO > G 3.69  < 3.81 3.71  < 3.89 4.04  > 3.69
Irremediable pollution - - 3.48  > 3.24 3.25  < 3.6 3.62  > 3.28
Land and waterway use 
mismanagement
NthA > As, E, MENA NGO > IO  - 3.54  < 3.77 3.91  > 3.53
Mismanaged urbanization NthA > As, E, MENA  -  - 3.64  < 3.8 3.9  > 3.64
Persistent extreme weather NthA > As, E, MENA NGO > B  - 3.64  < 3.85 4.07  > 3.61
Rising greenhouse gas emissions NthA > All other regions  - 3.87 < 4  - 4.28  > 3.86
Species overexploitation NthA > MENA NGO > G  -  - 4  > 3.6
Unprecedented geophysical destruction As > MENA, E 
NthA > E
- 3.24  > 3.11 3.06  < 3.47  - 
Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms As > E, MENA -  - 2.53  < 2.75  - 
Critical fragile states NthA > As, LatAm -  -  -  - 
Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction NthA > All other regions - 3.14  < 3.3  - 3.34  > 3.18
Entrenched organized crime NthA, LatAm > As, E -  - 3.4  < 3.61 3.57  > 3.41
Failure of diplomatic conflict resolution NthA > As, E, LatAm, SSA 
NthA > As, LatAm
All other 
stakeholders > G 
 -  -  - 
Global governance failure E > As -  -  -  - 
Militarization of space As > LatAm -  - 2.75  < 2.95  - 
Pervasive entrenched corruption NthA > As, E -  - 3.69  < 3.87  - 
Terrorism NthA > As, LatAm, E -  -  -  - 
Unilateral resource nationalization NthA > MENA, LatAm, SSA -  -  -  - 
Widespread illicit trade NthA > As, E, LatAm -  - 3.38  < 3.57  - 
Backlash against globalization NthA > LatAm -  - 3.18  > 3.04  - 
Food shortage crises NthA > As, LatAm -  - 3.55  < 3.71 3.69  > 3.52
Ineffective illicit drug policies LatAm, NthA > As, E, SSA 
E > As
-  -  -  - 
Mismanagement of population ageing NthA, E > As, LatAm, SSA, MENA NGO > G  -  -  - 
Rising rates of chronic disease NthA > As, E, MENA, LatAm -  - 3.37  < 3.57 3.52  > 3.36
Rising religious fanaticism NthA > As, E, LatAm -  -  - 3.59  < 3.71
Unmanaged migration NthA, E > As NGO > G  - 3.34  < 3.63 3.5  > 3.36
Unsustainable population growth  - - 3.52  > 3.38 3.39  < 3.6 3.53  > 3.37
Vulnerability to pandemics NthA > E, MENA, LatAm 
As > E
-  -  -  - 
Water supply crises - - - 3.78  < 4.01  - 
Critical systems failure NthA, E, As, SSA > LatAm Ac, Other > IO, 
NGO
 -  -  - 
Cyber attacks NthA > All other regions 
E > SSA
Ac, B, NGO > IO  -  - 4.01  > 3.75
Failure of intellectual property regime As, E, NthA > MENA B > G   -  - 3.13  > 2.96
Massive digital misinformation As > LatAm  -  -  -  - 
Massive incident of data fraud/theft NthA > As, E, LatAm B > IO  -  - 3.68  > 3.46
Mineral resource supply vulnerability E > LatAm, MENA 
As > MENA
NGO, B > IO  -  -  - 
Proliferation of orbital debris  - Ac > IO  -  - 2.97  > 2.83
Unforeseen consequences of climate 
change mitigation
NthA > E Other > IO  - 3.17  < 3.36  - 
Unforeseen consequences of 
nanotechnology
- - - 2.71  < 3 2.69  < 2.83
Unforeseen consequences of new life 
science technologies
- - - 3.08  < 3.22  - 
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Impact: Comparisons
In terms of perceived impact, regional differences were found for 
48% of the risks, with the most differences found in the 
environmental category and the least in the economic category 
(see Table 2). Where there were statistically significant 
differences, respondents from Latin America perceived 50% of 
these risks as having higher impact than did respondents from 
other regions. Apart from the risk mineral resource supply 
vulnerability, European respondents generally perceived risks as 
having lower impact. 
Among stakeholder groups, statistically significant differences 
were found for less than half the risks, with NGOs perceiving 
impacts to be higher and businesses lower. There were two 
exceptions: hard landing of an emerging economy and 
mismanagement of population ageing. 
Between respondents under and over 40 years of age, there 
were statistically significant differences for half the risks, with 
younger respondents perceiving higher impact. The largest 
difference, 0.32 units, was for irremediable pollution. 
Male and female opinions differed significantly for 39 out of 50 
risks, most obviously in the geopolitical category, with all 10 risks 
having differences. In all 39 cases, men perceived the impact of 
the risks as lower, with the largest difference, of 0.43, for 
entrenched organized crime. 
Fewest statistically significant differences were found between 
experts and non-experts – only 15 risks, none in the geopolitical 
category and only one in the technological category. Where 
there were differences, experts generally rated risks as having a 
higher impact, except in the case of two risks: severe income 
disparity and unforeseen consequences of nanotechnology.   
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Table 2: Comparisons between Groupslix for Impact of Global Risks if they were to Materializelx
lix An analysis of variance (ANOVA) tested whether or not the means of sub-groups were all equal. For those risks where they were not all equal, a Sidak post-hoc test established which of the 
pair-wise differences between groups were significant at the 5% level.
lx Only statistically significant differences are noted; otherwise, the table cell is left empty.
Risk Region of Residence Stakeholder Age Gender Expertise
Under 40 Over 40 Male Female Expert Non-
Expert
Chronic fiscal imbalances - -  -  - 4.03  > 3.92
Chronic labour market imbalances - - 3.86  > 3.62 3.68  < 3.88  - 
Extreme volatility in energy and 
agriculture prices
- -  - 3.84  < 3.98  - 
Hard landing of an emerging economy - B, Ac > G  -  -  - 
Major systemic financial failure - - 4.1  > 4  -  - 
Prolonged infrastructure neglect NthA > E - - 3.15  < 3.29  - 
Recurring liquidity crises - - 3.71  > 3.61 3.62  < 3.75  - 
Severe income disparity SSA > As, E Ac, NGO, Other > B - 3.71  < 4.06 3.72  < 3.89
Unforeseen negative consequences of 
regulation
SSA > E, NthA 
As > E
Other  > Ac, IO 3.24  > 3.13 3.12  < 3.33 3.25  > 3.11
Unmanageable inflation or deflation - - 3.63  > 3.52 -  - 
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria - - 3.63  > 3.51 -  - 
Failure of climate change adaptation - NGO > B - 3.8  < 4.16 4.17 > 3.84
Irremediable pollution LatAm > E, NthA  - 3.82  > 3.5 3.55  < 3.92  - 
Land and waterway use 
mismanagement
LatAm > As, E NGO > Ac, B 3.66  > 3.5 3.47  < 3.83 3.72  > 3.54
Mismanaged urbanization LatAm > E NGO, Other > B - 3.31  < 3.59 3.6  > 3.33
Persistent extreme weather NthA, LatAm > E NGO > B - 3.56  < 3.87 3.95  > 3.57
Rising greenhouse gas emissions NthA > As NGO > B, G - 3.82  < 4.04 4.23  > 3.8
Species overexploitation - NGO > B - 3.29  < 3.55 3.72  > 3.27
Unprecedented geophysical destruction NthA, LatAm, As > E - 3.45  > 3.24 3.25  < 3.55  - 
Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms LatAm > NthA, E, As - - -  - 
Critical fragile states  - - 3.61  > 3.46 3.5  < 3.63  - 
Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction NthA > As - - 3.86  < 4.07  - 
Entrenched organized crime LatAm > As, E, NthA IO, NGO > B 3.3  > 3.13 3.09  < 3.52  - 
Failure of diplomatic conflict resolution - - - 3.64  < 3.81  - 
Global governance failure - Other > B - 3.74  < 3.92  - 
Militarization of space - - 3.24  > 3.1 3.1  < 3.33  - 
Pervasive entrenched corruption LatAm > As, E  
SSA > E
NGO > Ac, B, G 
Other > B
3.57  > 3.38 3.38  < 3.69  - 
Terrorism NthA, As, MENA > E  - 3.67  > 3.52 3.5  < 3.82  - 
Unilateral resource nationalization - NGO > IO - 3.36  < 3.53  - 
Widespread illicit trade MENA > As, E, NthA 
LatAm > As, E 
SSA > E
NGO > Ac, B - 2.91  < 3.33  - 
Backlash against globalization - - - -  - 
Food shortage crises - - 3.94  > 3.73 3.76  < 4.01  - 
Ineffective illicit drug policies LatAm > All other regions NGO > B  - 2.95  < 3.25 3.14  > 2.94
Mismanagement of population ageing - NGO, B > G  -  -  - 
Rising rates of chronic disease LatAm, NthA > E - 3.42  > 3.28 3.25  < 3.58 3.44  > 3.27
Rising religious fanaticism NthA > E, As -  - 3.59  < 3.76  - 
Unmanaged migration - NGO > B  - 3.27  < 3.69 3.49  > 3.3
Unsustainable population growth - - 3.78  > 3.64 3.63  < 3.91 3.8  > 3.63
Vulnerability to pandemics NthA > E - 3.68  > 3.54 3.56  < 3.71  - 
Water supply crises LatAm > E, As - 4.12  > 3.87 3.89  < 4.22 4.05  > 3.93
Critical systems failure - - 3.74  > 3.52 -  - 
Cyber attacks - -  - 3.47  < 3.63  - 
Failure of intellectual property regime - - 3.05  > 2.94 -  - 
Massive digital misinformation MENA > E, NthA - 3.36  > 3.15 3.15  < 3.48  - 
Massive incident of data fraud/theft MENA, LatAm > E - 3.34  > 3.21 3.2  < 3.46  - 
Mineral resource supply vulnerability E > NthA NGO > IO  - -  - 
Proliferation of orbital debris LatAm, As > NthA NGO > B, IO 
Other > IO
 - 2.73  < 2.96  - 
Unforeseen consequences of climate 
change mitigation
- Other > B  - 3.27  < 3.57  - 
Unforeseen consequences of 
nanotechnology
- NGO > B, IO 3.09  > 2.91 2.9  < 3.23 2.84  < 3.04
Unforeseen consequences of new life 
science technologies
- NGO > IO 3.43  > 3.3 3.29  < 3.53  - 
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Likelihood and Impact – Average Scores 
and Margin of Error
The table below shows the average likelihood and impact scores 
and their margins of error (based on a 95% confidence level). 
The larger the margin of error, the lower the confidence that the 
result is close to the “true” figure of the whole survey populations 
(see Appendix 1). 
Table 3: Average Likelihood and Impact Scores and their 
Margin of Error
Risk Likelihood Impact
Chronic fiscal imbalances 3.97 +/- 0.05 3.97 +/- 0.05
Chronic labour market imbalances 3.69 +/- 0.05 3.73 +/- 0.05
Extreme volatility in energy and agriculture prices 3.71 +/- 0.05 3.88 +/- 0.05
Hard landing of an emerging economy 3.46 +/- 0.05 3.49 +/- 0.05
Major systemic financial failure 3.44 +/- 0.06 4.04 +/- 0.05
Prolonged infrastructure neglect 3.32 +/- 0.06 3.19 +/- 0.05
Recurring liquidity crises 3.36 +/- 0.05 3.66 +/- 0.05
Severe income disparity 4.22 +/- 0.05 3.8 +/- 0.05
Unforeseen negative consequences of regulation 3.31 +/- 0.06 3.18 +/- 0.06
Unmanageable inflation or deflation 3.18 +/- 0.05 3.57 +/- 0.05
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria 3.42 +/- 0.06 3.57 +/- 0.06
Failure of climate change adaptation 3.76 +/- 0.06 3.9 +/- 0.06
Irremediable pollution 3.35 +/- 0.06 3.65 +/- 0.06
Land and waterway use mismanagement 3.61 +/- 0.06 3.57 +/- 0.05
Mismanaged urbanization 3.69 +/- 0.06 3.39 +/- 0.06
Persistent extreme weather 3.7 +/- 0.06 3.65 +/- 0.06
Rising greenhouse gas emissions 3.94 +/- 0.05 3.88 +/- 0.05
Species overexploitation 3.68 +/- 0.06 3.36 +/- 0.06
Unprecedented geophysical destruction 3.17 +/- 0.06 3.33 +/- 0.06
Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms 2.59 +/- 0.06 3.16 +/- 0.06
Critical fragile states 3.38 +/- 0.06 3.53 +/- 0.05
Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction 3.23 +/- 0.06 3.92 +/- 0.06
Entrenched organized crime 3.46 +/- 0.06 3.21 +/- 0.06
Failure of diplomatic conflict resolution 3.58 +/- 0.06 3.69 +/- 0.05
Global governance failure 3.69 +/- 0.06 3.79 +/- 0.05
Militarization of space 2.81 +/- 0.06 3.16 +/- 0.06
Pervasive entrenched corruption 3.74 +/- 0.06 3.47 +/- 0.06
Terrorism 3.64 +/- 0.06 3.59 +/- 0.06
Unilateral resource nationalization 3.35 +/- 0.06 3.4 +/- 0.06
Widespread illicit trade 3.43 +/- 0.06 3.03 +/- 0.06
Backlash against globalization 3.14 +/- 0.06 3.34 +/- 0.06
Food shortage crises 3.6 +/- 0.06 3.83 +/- 0.06
Ineffective illicit drug policies 3.41 +/- 0.06 3.03 +/- 0.06
Mismanagement of population ageing 3.83 +/- 0.05 3.67 +/- 0.05
Rising rates of chronic disease 3.43 +/- 0.06 3.35 +/- 0.05
Rising religious fanaticism 3.66 +/- 0.06 3.64 +/- 0.06
Unmanaged migration 3.42 +/- 0.06 3.39 +/- 0.06
Unsustainable population growth 3.45 +/- 0.06 3.71 +/- 0.06
Vulnerability to pandemics 3.2 +/- 0.06 3.6 +/- 0.06
Water supply crises 3.85 +/- 0.05 3.98 +/- 0.05
Critical systems failure 2.96 +/- 0.06 3.62 +/- 0.06
Cyber attacks 3.82 +/- 0.06 3.52 +/- 0.06
Failure of intellectual property regime 3 +/- 0.06 2.99 +/- 0.06
Massive digital misinformation 3.36 +/- 0.07 3.24 +/- 0.06
Massive incident of data fraud/theft 3.52 +/- 0.06 3.27 +/- 0.06
Mineral resource supply vulnerability 3.42 +/- 0.06 3.45 +/- 0.06
Proliferation of orbital debris 2.87 +/- 0.06 2.8 +/- 0.06
Unforeseen consequences of climate change 
mitigation
3.23 +/- 0.06 3.35 +/- 0.06
Unforeseen consequences of nanotechnology 2.79 +/- 0.06 2.99 +/- 0.06
Unforeseen consequences of new life science 
technologies
3.11 +/- 0.06 3.36 +/- 0.06
Appendix 3 
Resilience
Appendix 3.1
Over 14,000 respondents to the World Economic Forum’s 
Executive Opinion Surveylxi were asked to rate their 
government’s risk management effectiveness: 
How would you assess your national government’s overall 
risk management effectiveness of monitoring, preparing for, 
responding to and mitigating against major global risks (e.g. 
financial crisis, natural disasters, climate change, 
pandemics, etc.)? (1 = Not effective in managing major 
global risks; 7 = Effective in managing major global risks)
Table 4 provides the average results for each country, ranked 
from highest (best) to lowest (worst). Singapore and many 
innovation-driven economies (Stage 3 in the Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Index) are ranked higher than factor-driven 
(Stage 1) economies (for definitions of stages, see page 68). The 
table also gives the survey sample size and the margin of error 
for each country, its ISO code, and development stage. 
Countries marked in light blue were used for the preliminary 
analysis presented in the Special Report section; the selection 
criterion was the available sample size from the Global Risks 
Perception Survey (see Table 5).
lxi The Executive Opinion Survey is the Forum’s flagship opinion poll that is conducted every 
year to sample the perception of top managers from small- and medium-sized firms on the 
economies in which they are operating.
67Global Risks 2013
S
ection 1
S
ection 2
S
ection 3
S
ection 4
S
ection 5
S
ectio
n 6
R
an
k
C
o
un
tr
y
IS
O
E
co
no
m
ic
 
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
S
ta
g
e
S
am
p
le
R
is
k 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
S
co
re
M
ar
g
in
 o
f E
rr
o
r a
t 
95
%
 C
o
nfi
d
en
ce
 
Le
ve
l
1 Singapore SGP Stage 3 171 6.08 0.11
2 Qatar QAT Transition from 1 to 2 113 6.01 0.18
3 Oman OMN Transition from 2 to 3 75 5.55 0.26
4 United Arab 
Emirates
ARE Stage 3 163 5.47 0.17
5 Canada CAN Stage 3 101 5.41 0.20
6 Sweden SWE Stage 3 76 5.41 0.28
7 Saudi Arabia SAU Transition from 1 to 2 94 5.41 0.29
8 New Zealand NZL Stage 3 52 5.40 0.24
9 Finland FIN Stage 3 36 5.32 0.43
10 Chile CHL Transition from 2 to 3 78 5.20 0.29
11 Norway NOR Stage 3 74 5.15 0.24
12 Mexico MEX Transition from 2 to 3 268 5.13 0.15
13 Netherlands NLD Stage 3 81 5.06 0.25
14 Malaysia MYS Transition from 2 to 3 78 4.97 0.25
15 Hong Kong SAR HKG Stage 3 68 4.96 0.35
16 Kazakhstan KAZ Transition from 2 to 3 100 4.93 0.35
17 Germany DEU Stage 3 127 4.90 0.25
18 Turkey TUR Transition from 2 to 3 84 4.83 0.28
19 Switzerland CHE Stage 3 77 4.82 0.32
20 United Kingdom GBR Stage 3 102 4.81 0.28
21 Botswana BWA Transition from 1 to 2 78 4.80 0.27
22 Gambia, The GMB Stage 1 84 4.78 0.26
23 Taiwan, China TWN Stage 3 70 4.75 0.26
24 Brunei 
Darussalam
BRN Transition from 1 to 2 41 4.75 0.39
25 Luxembourg LUX Stage 3 44 4.65 0.43
26 Azerbaijan AZE Transition from 1 to 2 89 4.63 0.30
27 Mauritius MUS Stage 2 91 4.58 0.31
28 Estonia EST Transition from 2 to 3 82 4.54 0.31
29 United States USA Stage 3 390 4.53 0.14
30 China CHN Stage 2 369 4.51 0.13
31 France FRA Stage 3 128 4.51 0.27
32 Australia AUS Stage 3 67 4.49 0.41
33 Bahrain BHR Transition from 2 to 3 63 4.47 0.38
34 South Africa ZAF Stage 2 45 4.42 0.38
35 Malta MLT Stage 3 57 4.36 0.44
36 Gabon GAB Transition from 1 to 2 48 4.34 0.36
37 Morocco MAR Stage 2 40 4.33 0.45
38 India IND Stage 1 119 4.31 0.27
39 Italy ITA Stage 3 86 4.24 0.32
40 Barbados BRB Transition from 2 to 3 69 4.24 0.34
41 Korea, Rep. KOR Stage 3 98 4.23 0.25
42 Montenegro MNE Stage 2 74 4.20 0.35
43 Seychelles SYC Transition from 2 to 3 32 4.20 0.51
44 Israel ISR Stage 3 50 4.19 0.40
45 Brazil BRA Transition from 2 to 3 141 4.16 0.23
46 Panama PAN Stage 2 132 4.15 0.20
47 Denmark DNK Stage 3 128 4.10 0.28
48 Cambodia KHM Stage 1 73 4.09 0.33
49 Indonesia IDN Stage 2 88 4.08 0.32
50 Belgium BEL Stage 3 83 4.07 0.36
51 Portugal PRT Stage 3 114 4.06 0.25
52 Puerto Rico PRI Stage 3 70 4.05 0.40
53 Spain ESP Stage 3 90 4.03 0.36
54 Jordan JOR Stage 2 155 3.92 0.24
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55 Tajikistan TJK Stage 1 97 3.91 0.35
56 Macedonia, FYR MKD Stage 2 86 3.90 0.35
57 Poland POL Transition from 2 to 3 205 3.87 0.19
58 Czech Republic CZE Stage 3 159 3.87 0.25
59 Peru PER Stage 2 83 3.83 0.31
60 Ethiopia ETH Stage 1 57 3.83 0.34
61 Uruguay URY Transition from 2 to 3 80 3.80 0.33
62 Austria AUT Stage 3 105 3.80 0.29
63 Cape Verde CPV Stage 2 103 3.75 0.27
64 Lithuania LTU Transition from 2 to 3 148 3.74 0.25
65 Ireland IRL Stage 3 60 3.70 0.34
66 Philippines PHL Transition from 1 to 2 126 3.69 0.25
67 Japan JPN Stage 3 111 3.67 0.28
68 Armenia ARM Stage 2 77 3.65 0.28
69 Burkina Faso BFA Stage 1 39 3.64 0.46
70 Benin BEN Stage 1 81 3.62 0.40
71 Guinea GIN Stage 1 57 3.61 0.44
72 Namibia NAM Stage 2 81 3.60 0.32
73 Russian 
Federation
RUS Transition from 2 to 3 413 3.60 0.14
74 Iceland ISL Stage 3 92 3.58 0.31
75 Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN Transition from 1 to 2 560 3.57 0.13
76 Nicaragua NIC Stage 1 77 3.57 0.25
77 Zambia ZMB Stage 1 88 3.57 0.33
78 Mozambique MOZ Stage 1 87 3.56 0.35
79 Liberia LBR Stage 1 84 3.56 0.31
80 Jamaica JAM Stage 2 75 3.53 0.30
81 Ghana GHA Stage 1 77 3.53 0.31
82 Bolivia BOL Transition from 1 to 2 71 3.52 0.27
83 Côte d'Ivoire CIV Stage 1 91 3.46 0.30
84 Costa Rica CRI Stage 2 94 3.44 0.27
85 Colombia COL Stage 2 281 3.43 0.17
86 Vietnam VNM Stage 1 94 3.40 0.30
87 Timor-Leste TLS Stage 2 33 3.39 0.61
88 Dominican 
Republic
DOM Stage 2 90 3.38 0.32
89 Senegal SEN Stage 1 91 3.35 0.33
90 Libya LBY Transition from 1 to 2 68 3.33 0.40
91 Mongolia MNG Transition from 1 to 2 82 3.27 0.31
92 Bulgaria BGR Stage 2 119 3.26 0.24
93 Latvia LVA Transition from 2 to 3 98 3.24 0.29
94 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
BIH Stage 2 100 3.22 0.24
95 Cameroon CMR Stage 1 61 3.21 0.36
96 Trinidad and 
Tobago
TTO Transition from 2 to 3 149 3.21 0.23
97 Suriname SUR Stage 2 36 3.17 0.37
98 Slovak Republic SVK Stage 3 65 3.11 0.33
99 Mali MLI Stage 1 99 3.06 0.35
100 Malawi MWI Stage 1 60 3.05 0.38
101 Nigeria NGA Stage 1 102 3.05 0.31
102 Guatemala GTM Stage 2 83 3.04 0.29
103 Hungary HUN Transition from 2 to 3 103 3.03 0.32
104 Bangladesh BGD Stage 1 84 3.03 0.31
105 Egypt EGY Transition from 1 to 2 73 3.02 0.33
106 Guyana GUY Stage 2 89 3.02 0.31
107 Croatia HRV Transition from 2 to 3 107 3.00 0.23
Table 4: Executive Opinion Survey Question 2.07 Risk 
Management Effectiveness Resultslxii
lxii Countries highlighted had sufficient sample sizes based on responses for the Global Risks 
Perception Survey. Table continued on next page
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108 Uganda UGA Stage 1 87 2.99 0.30
109 Thailand THA Stage 2 75 2.98 0.37
110 Cyprus CYP Stage 3 78 2.97 0.30
111 Mauritania MRT Stage 1 78 2.97 0.37
112 Kenya KEN Stage 1 109 2.93 0.31
113 Moldova MDA Stage 1 112 2.93 0.25
114 Tanzania TZA Stage 1 97 2.90 0.29
115 Lesotho LSO Stage 1 80 2.87 0.34
116 Slovenia SVN Stage 3 109 2.84 0.28
117 Kuwait KWT Transition from 1 to 2 37 2.81 0.62
118 Serbia SRB Stage 2 99 2.81 0.31
119 Ukraine UKR Stage 2 108 2.65 0.27
120 Nepal NPL Stage 1 91 2.64 0.28
121 Algeria DZA Transition from 1 to 2 33 2.64 0.57
122 Sierra Leone SLE Stage 1 99 2.59 0.31
123 Romania ROU Stage 2 98 2.53 0.27
124 Swaziland SWZ Stage 2 50 2.52 0.39
125 Chad TCD Stage 1 103 2.49 0.27
126 Pakistan PAK Stage 1 106 2.47 0.24
127 Zimbabwe ZWE Stage 1 63 2.46 0.28
128 Honduras HND Transition from 1 to 2 85 2.43 0.27
129 Lebanon LBN Transition from 2 to 3 38 2.42 0.39
130 Madagascar MDG Stage 1 88 2.40 0.21
131 Paraguay PRY Stage 2 78 2.29 0.26
132 El Salvador SLV Stage 2 34 2.28 0.41
133 Kyrgyz Republic KGZ Stage 1 96 2.21 0.26
134 Burundi BDI Stage 1 90 2.18 0.21
135 Haiti HTI Stage 1 66 2.16 0.29
136 Greece GRC Stage 3 78 2.12 0.23
137 Yemen YEM Stage 1 52 2.12 0.35
138 Argentina ARG Transition from 2 to 3 96 2.08 0.25
139 Venezuela VEN Transition from 1 to 2 38 1.68 0.28
Meanwhile, respondents to the Global Risks Perception Survey 
were asked, per risk, about their country of expertise’s ability to 
adapt and or recover from its impact:
“What would be your country’s capability to adapt and or 
recover from the national impact of this global risk?”
Table 5 ranks the countries from the highest to lowest according 
to their adaptability/ recoverability score. As with the Executive 
Opinion Survey risk-management question results, Singapore 
again and many Stage 3, innovation-driven economies are 
ranked higher than Stage 1, factor-driven economies. Additional 
details about the survey sample size for each country and its 
economic development stage are also provided in the table. 
Analysing the countries in table 5 in terms of their economic 
development stage presents an interesting way to group 
countries and tests whether this is the best method to do so.lxiii In 
the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, the economic 
development stages are as defined below: 
 - Economies in the first stage are mainly factor-driven and 
compete based on their factor endowments—primarily 
low-skilled labour and natural resources.
 - Transition from stage 1 to stage 2
 - Economies in the second stage have moved into an 
efficiency-driven stage of development, when they must 
begin to develop more efficient production processes and 
increase product quality because wages have risen and they 
cannot increase prices.
 - Transition from stage 2 to stage 3
 - Economies in stage 3 have moved into the innovation-driven 
stage, wages will have risen by so much that they are able to 
sustain those higher wages and the associated standard of 
living only if their businesses are able to compete with new 
and/or unique products, services, models, and processes.
Countries highlighted in blue were used for the preliminary 
analysis presented in the Special Report section. The selection 
criterion was the sufficiency of the country sample size to 
guarantee a margin of error smaller than 0.5 units (equal to a 
95% confidence interval of less than one unit). 66 countries were 
not included below as the sample size was smaller than 5.lxiv
lxiii The economic development stage groupings are the best data currently available for this 
report. Further analysis will investigate other potential groups, for example, GDP per capita 
or income level. 
lxiv Margin of errors can still be large for the countries with small sample sizes listed in Table 5 
and therefore were not included in the detailed analysis. 
69Global Risks 2013
S
ection 1
S
ection 2
S
ection 3
S
ection 4
S
ection 5
S
ectio
n 6
R
an
k
C
o
un
tr
y 
*b
y 
co
un
tr
y 
of
 e
xp
er
tis
e
E
co
no
m
ic
 
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
S
ta
g
e
S
am
p
le
A
d
ap
ta
b
ili
ty
/ 
R
ec
ov
er
ab
ili
ty
 
S
co
re
M
ar
g
in
 o
f E
rr
o
r a
t 
95
%
 C
o
nfi
d
en
ce
 
Le
ve
l
1 Singapore Stage 3 10 3.66 0.93
2 Norway Stage 3 6 3.56 1.62
3 Sweden Stage 3 8 3.46 1.07
4 Switzerland Stage 3 32 3.37 0.43
5 United Arab 
Emirates
Stage 3 11 3.28 1.01
6 Canada Stage 3 18 3.27 0.63
7 People's Republic 
of China
Stage 2 72 3.26 0.25
8 Chile Transition from 2 to 3 6 3.24 1.71
9 USA Stage 3 283 3.23 0.12
10 Denmark Stage 3 8 3.21 1.20
11 Netherlands Stage 3 20 3.19 0.51
12 Germany Stage 3 40 3.19 0.36
13 Israel Stage 3 8 3.16 1.26
14 Australia Stage 3 13 3.15 0.76
15 Belgium Stage 3 7 3.15 1.35
16 Japan Stage 3 60 3.07 0.29
17 Brazil Transition from 2 to 3 35 3.01 0.44
18 South Korea Stage 3 6 2.96 1.32
19 United Kingdom Stage 3 64 2.95 0.29
20 Mexico Transition from 2 to 3 25 2.93 0.52
21 Indonesia Stage 2 9 2.9 1.08
22 Saudi Arabia Transition from 1 to 2 9 2.87 1.21
23 Poland Transition from 2 to 3 14 2.86 0.74
24 Tunisia Stage 2 16 2.85 0.77
25 Russian Federation Transition from 2 to 3 35 2.84 0.48
26 France Stage 3 6 2.81 1.63
27 Vietnam Stage 1 13 2.79 0.77
28 South Africa Stage 2 25 2.77 0.57
29 Thailand Stage 2 6 2.75 1.51
30 Costa Rica Stage 2 11 2.74 0.97
31 Peru Stage 2 6 2.73 1.65
32 India Stage 1 64 2.71 0.28
33 Panama Stage 2 13 2.67 0.95
34 Italy Stage 3 31 2.67 0.40
35 Malaysia Transition from 2 to 3 10 2.64 0.80
36 Turkey Transition from 2 to 3 11 2.61 0.95
37 Ukraine Stage 2 11 2.54 0.99
38 Kuwait Transition from 1 to 2 7 2.52 1.48
39 Egypt Transition from 1 to 2 10 2.47 0.89
40 Mauritius Stage 2 9 2.46 1.01
41 Argentina Transition from 2 to 3 6 2.46 1.41
42 Dominican 
Republic
Stage 2 5 2.44 1.94
43 Spain Stage 3 9 2.4 1.10
44 Philippines Transition from 1 to 2 9 2.4 0.89
45 Pakistan Stage 1 10 2.37 1.17
46 Colombia Stage 2 7 2.34 1.20
47 Jordan Stage 2 7 2.23 1.48
48 Nigeria Stage 1 16 2.21 0.66
49 Ethiopia Stage 1 7 2.08 1.41
Table 5: Global Risks Perception Survey Resilience Question 
Results
Appendix 3.2
As presented in the Special Report section, a country system is 
assessed using five components of resilience: robustness, 
redundancy, resourcefulness, response and recovery. Each 
component is further defined by key attributes, and for each of 
these attributes, potential qualitativelxv and quantitative indicators 
have been identified (see Table 6). 
Table 7 shows the questions identified in the Executive Opinion 
Survey that are potential variables for the Country Resilience 
framework described in the Special Report section of this report. 
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R
ob
us
tn
es
s Monitoring 
system 
health
Quality of natural 
environment 
Quality of 
healthcare system 
Quality of overall 
infrastructure 
Quality of 
education system
Logistics Performance Index from the 
World Bank
Modularity State cluster 
development
Economic Freedom of the World Index 
from Gwartney, J., Lawson, R., & Clark, 
J. R. Economic Freedom of the world, 
2012. 
Adaptive 
decision-
making 
models
Willingness to 
delegate authority
Index of Economic Freedom from 2012 
Index of Economic Freedom, the 
Heritage Foundation. 
R
ed
un
da
nc
y Redundancy 
of critical 
infrastruc-
ture
Quantity of local 
suppliers
Reserves 
Renewable freshwater resources
Density of physicians from World Health 
Statistics, World Health Organization. 
Diversity of 
solutions 
and strategy
Value chain 
breadth
Environmental Performance Index 
(Ecosystem Vitality) from Environmental 
Performance Index, Yale University. 
R
es
ou
rc
ef
ul
ne
ss Capacity for 
self-
organization
Accessibility of 
digital content  
Extent to which 
virtual social 
networks are used
Education Index from International 
Human Development Indicators, United 
Nations Development Programme.  
Creativity 
and 
innovation
Latest 
technologies
Research and development expenditure 
as a percentage of gross domestic 
production from World Development 
Indicators, the World Bank. 
R
es
po
ns
e Communi-
cation
Public trust in 
politicians
Media Sustainability Index from IREX. 
Inclusive 
participation
Business-
government 
relations
Business regulatory environment 
Structural policies cluster from Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment, the 
World Bank. 
R
ec
ov
er
y Responsive 
regulatory 
feedback 
mechanisms
Reform 
implementation 
efficiency
Actionable Governance Indicators from 
Actionable Governance Indicators Data 
Portal, the World Bank. 
Active 
“horizon 
scanning”
Collaboration 
within clusters
Some studies have suggested potential 
quantitative data for this attribute including 
developing public-private partnerships for 
Research and Development and 
Innovation and promoting centres and 
networks of excellence, regional research 
driven clusters and innovation poles 
(Manjón, J. & Vicente J. A Proposal of 
Indicators and Policy Framework for 
Innovation Benchmark in Europe. In 
Journal of Technology Management and 
Innovation, 2010, 5:13-23.)
Table 6: Potential Indicators for Resilience Componentslxvi
lxv See Table 7 for detailed questions for each of the qualitative indicators. 
lxvi These potential indicators are still work in progress. Further development, research and 
refinement will be conducted in the coming year. 
Global Risks 201370
S
ection 1
S
ection 2
S
ection 3
S
ection 4
S
ection 5
S
ectio
n 6
Question Variable Name Executive Opinion Survey Question
0208 Business-
government 
relations
How would you characterize business-government 
relations in your country? (1 = Generally 
confrontational; 7 = Generally cooperative )
0304 Public trust of 
politicians
How would you rate the level of public trust in the 
ethical standards of politicians in your country? (1 = 
Very low; 7 = Very high)
0305 Reform 
implementation 
efficiency
In your country, to what extent are government 
reforms implemented efficiently? (1 = Reforms are 
never implemented; 7 = Reforms are implemented 
highly efficiently)
0306 Politicians' ability 
to govern
In your country, how you would rate the ability of 
politicians to govern effectively? (1 = Very weak; 7 = 
Very strong)
0308 Wastefulness of 
government 
spending
How would you rate the composition of public spending 
in your country? (1 = Extremely wasteful; 7 = Highly 
efficient in providing necessary goods and services )
0510 Government 
provision of services 
for improved business 
performance
To what extent does the government in your country 
continuously improve its provision of services to help 
businesses in your country boost their economic 
performance? (1 = Not at all; 7 = Extensively)
0401 Quality of overall 
infrastructure
How would you assess general infrastructure (e.g. 
transport, telephony and energy) in your country? (1 
= Extremely underdeveloped; 7 = Extensive and 
efficient by international standards)
0501 Availability of latest 
technologies
To what extent are the latest technologies available in 
your country? (1 = Not available; 7 = Widely available)
0507 Collaborations 
within clusters
In your country, how extensive is collaboration among firms 
(e.g. suppliers, competitors, clients) in order to promote 
knowledge flows and innovation? (1 = Collaboration is 
non-existent; 7 = Collaboration is extensive)
0524 Accessibility of 
digital content
In your country, how accessible is digital content (e.g. 
text and audio-visual content, software products) via 
multiple platforms (e.g. fixed-line Internet, wireless 
Internet, mobile network, satellite)? (1 = Not accessible 
at all; 7 = Widely accessible)
0525 Extent of virtual 
social networks 
use
How widely used are virtual social networks (e.g. 
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn) for professional and 
personal communications in your country? (1 = Not 
used at all; 7 = Used widely)
0803 Local supplier 
quantity
How numerous are local suppliers in your country? (1 
= Largely non-existent; 7 = Very numerous)
0809 State of cluster 
development
In your country, how prevalent are well-developed and 
deep clusters (geographic concentrations of firms, 
suppliers, producers of related products and services, 
and specialized institutions in a particular field)? (1 = 
Non-existent; 7 = Widespread in many fields)
0902 Value chain 
breadth
In your country, do exporting companies have a narrow 
or broad presence in the value chain? (1 = Narrow, 
primarily involved in individual steps of the value chain 
(e.g., resource extraction or production); 7 = Broad, 
present across the entire value chain (i.e. do not only 
produce but also perform product design, marketing 
sales, logistics and after-sales services))
0910 Willingness to 
delegate authority
In your country, how do you assess the willingness to 
delegate authority to subordinates? (1 = Not willing 
– top management controls all important decisions; 7 
= Very willing – authority is mostly delegated to 
business unit heads and other lower-level managers)
1001 Quality of the 
educational 
system
How well does the educational system in your 
country meet the needs of a competitive economy?  
(1 = Not well at all; 7 = Very well)
1102 Measures to 
combat corruption 
and bribery
In your country, how effective are the government’s 
efforts to combat corruption and bribery? (1 = Not 
effective at all; 7 = Extremely effective)
1303 Quality of natural 
environment
How would you assess the quality of the natural 
environment in your country? (1 = Extremely poor; 7 
= Among the world’s most pristine)
1401 Quality of 
healthcare 
services
How would you assess the quality of healthcare 
(public and private) provided for ordinary citizens in 
your country? (1 = Very poor; 7 = Excellent, among 
the best healthcare delivery systems of the world)
Table 7: Executive Opinion Survey Questions Appendix 3.3
As explained in the Special Report, 10 countries were identified 
that had a margin of error of less than 0.5: Brazil, China, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States. Statistical analysislxvii was 
conducted to identify paired differences between groups for the 
10 countries, regionslxviii and economic development stages.lxix 
Generally, respondents from Stage 3, innovation-driven 
economies had greater confidence that their country will be able 
to adapt and/or recover from the impact of a global risk. 
Respondents from Stage 1, factor-driven economies, were more 
pessimistic. Most interestingly, in the societal category, we found 
the only risk that had no statistically significant difference, 
mismanagement of population ageing, and the only risk where 
Stage 2, efficiency-driven economies were more optimistic than 
Stage 3 economies was rising religious fanaticism. 
Following similar patterns, North Americans generally had 
greater confidence, while Sub-Saharan Africans had less. 
Statistically significant differences between countries were found 
for all risks, other than the two risks hard landing of an emerging 
economy and species overexploitation. Depending on the 
category and sometimes the risk, different countries were seen 
to have comparatively higher ability to adapt and/or recover from 
the impact of the risks. For the economic and environmental 
categories, it was Switzerland; for the geopolitical, it was China; 
for the technological, it was the United States; and for the 
societal category, there was no one particular country.  
Across 50 global risks, where there are statistically significant 
differences (56% of the risks for age and 44% of the risks for 
gender), respondents under 40 years of age and female 
respondents rate their country as having less ability to adapt 
and/or recover from the impact of the risk. The majority of risks 
that had no statistically significant differences were from the 
geopolitical and technological category for gender and the 
environmental category for age. The largest differences in 
opinion were found on the unsustainable population growth and 
water supply crises. 
With regards to perceptions of experts versus non-experts, 
unlike with likelihood and impact, for this group statistically 
significant differences were found only in the societal and 
technological category. Self-identified societal experts were 
more pessimistic about our recovery from societal risks, while 
self-identified technological experts were more optimistic about 
our recovery from technological risks. 
lxvii An analysis of variance (ANOVA) tested whether or not the means of sub-groups were all 
equal. For those risks where they were not all equal, a Sidak post-hoc test established 
which of the pair-wise differences between groups were significant at the 5% level.
lxviii The whole survey sample was used. 
lxix The whole survey sample was used and grouped according to their economic 
development stages as identified by the Global Competitiveness Report. 
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Table 8: Comparisons between Groupslxx for a Country’s Ability to Adapt and/or Recover from the Impact of Global Riskslxxi
Risk Country of Expertise
*only for the 10 identified 
countries
Region of 
Expertise
Economic 
Development 
Stages
Stakeholder Age Gender Expertise
Under 
40
Over 
40
Male Female Expert Non-
Expert
Chronic fiscal 
imbalances
CHE > GBR, IND, 
ITA, JPN, USA
CHN > GBR, ITA, 
JPN, USA
DEU, BRA > JPN
- T2.5 > S1, T1.5, S3
S2, S3 > S1
- 2.91 < 3.11 3.06 > 2.91  - 
Chronic labour 
market 
imbalances
CHE > GBR, IND, 
ITA, JPN, USA
CHN > IND, ITA, USA
DEU, BRA, USA > 
ITA 
LA, A, E, NA > SSA T2.5, S3 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
- 2.86 < 3.09 3.04 > 2.86  - 
Extreme volatility 
in energy and 
agriculture prices
CHN, USA > GBR, 
IND, JPN
BRA > IND, JPN
CHE, DEU > JPN
NA > E, A, LA, SSA
MENA, E, A, LA > 
SSA
S3 > S1, T1.5, S2 
S2, T2.5 > S1
- 2.93 < 3.06 -  - 
Hard landing of 
an emerging 
economy
- NA > E, SSA S3 > All other 
stages
S2 > S1
-  - -  - 
Major systemic 
financial failure
CHN > GBR, RUS
USA > GBR
NA, A > E S2, T2.5, S3 > S1 B, G > IO 2.85 < 3.01 2.98 > 2.83  - 
Prolonged 
infrastructure 
neglect
CHE, CHN > BRA, 
GBR, IND, ITA, RUS, 
USA
DEU, JPN > BRA, 
GBR, IND, ITA, RUS
USA > IND
A > LA, SSA
E, NA > SSA
S3 > S1, T1.5, T2.5
S2 > S1, T1.5
T2.5 > S1
- 2.92 < 3.06 3.06 > 2.85  - 
Recurring liquidity 
crises
CHN > GBR, ITA
CHE, USA > ITA
A > E, SSA
NA > SSA
S2, T2.5, S3 > T1.5, 
S1
G > IO, N 2.92 < 3.17 3.11 > 2.91  - 
Severe income 
disparity
DEU > GBR, IND, 
RUS, USA 
CHE, JPN > IND
E > LA, SSA
MENA, NA, A > 
SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2, T2.5 > S1
B > N 2.7 < 2.89 2.87 > 2.64  - 
Unforeseen 
negative 
consequences of 
regulation
CHE, CHN > IND, 
ITA, RUS
DEU, USA > ITA
NA > SSA S3 > S1, T1.5, T2.5
S2 > S1, T1.5
A, B > IO 2.85 < 3.02 2.98 > 2.84  - 
Unmanageable 
inflation or deflation
CHN, USA > IND NA > SSA S3 > S1, T1.5, S2
S2, T2.5 > S1, T1.5
G > IO 2.86 < 3.06 3.01 > 2.84  - 
Antibiotic-
resistant bacteria
CHE, JPN, USA > 
BRA, IND, RUS
A, E, NA > LA,  SSA
MENA > SSA
S3 > All
S2, T2.5 > S1
 -  - -  - 
Failure of climate 
change 
adaptation
CHE, CHN, DEU, 
JPN, USA > IND
A, E, NA > SSA S3 > S1, T1.5
S2, T2.5 > S1
 -  - -  - 
Irremediable 
pollution
CHE > CHN, IND, ITA
GBR, JPN, USA > 
IND, ITA 
DEU > IND
NA > SSA, LA 
A, E > SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
T2.5 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
 - 2.81 < 2.97 2.96 > 2.73  - 
lxx An analysis of variance (ANOVA) tested whether or not the means of sub-groups are all equal; for those that were not all equal, a Sidak post-hoc test was then conducted to establish which of the 
pair-wise differences between groups are significant at the 5% level.
lxxi Only statistically significant differences are noted; otherwise, the table cell is left empty.
Country of Expertise Region of Eexpertise Economic Development 
Stages
Stakeholder
Brazil BRA Asia A Stage 3 S3 Academia A
China CHN Europe E Transition from 2 to 3 T2.5 Business B
Germany DEU Latin America LA Stage 2 S2 Government G
India IND North America NA Transition from 1 to 2 T1.5 International Organization IO
Italy ITA Middle East/ North Africa MENA Stage 1 S1 NGO N
Japan JPN Sub-Saharan Africa SSA Other Other
Russia RUS
Switzerland CHE
United Kingdom GBR
United States USA
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Land and 
waterway use 
mismanagement
CHE > CHN, IND, 
ITA, RUS
JPN > IND, ITA
BRA, DEU, GBR, 
USA > IND
NA > SSA, LA 
A, E > SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
T2.5 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
 - 2.85 < 3.01 3.02 > 2.74  - 
Mismanaged 
urbanization
CHE > BRA, CHN, 
IND, RUS
DEU, JPN > BRA, 
IND, RUS
CHN, GBR, USA > 
BRA, IND
ITA > IND
E > A, MENA, SSA, 
LA 
A, NA > SSA, LA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2 > S1, T1.5
T2.5 > S1
 - - 3.12 > 2.93  - 
Persistent 
extreme weather
CHE > BRA, IND, ITA
DEU, JPN > IND, ITA
CHN, GBR, USA > 
IND
NA, E > SSA, LA 
A > SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2, T2.5 > S1
 - - 2.98 > 2.80  - 
Rising 
greenhouse gas 
emissions
CHN, JPN > GBR, 
IND, USA
BRA, CHE, DEU > 
IND
 - S2, T2.5, S3 > S1, 
T1.5
 - -  -  - 
Species 
overexploitation
 -  - S3 > S1, T1.5
T2.5 > T1.5
 - -  -  - 
Unprecedented 
geophysical 
destruction
CHN, DEU > ITA
JPN, USA > IND, ITA
NA > MENA, LA, E, 
SSA 
A > MENA, SSA
E > SSA
S3 > S1, T1.5, S2
T2.5 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
A, B > IO -  -  - 
Vulnerability to 
geomagnetic 
storms
CHN  > BRA
USA > BRA, ITA
NA > E, LA, MENA,
SSA 
A > MENA, LA, 
SSA
E > LA
S3 > All other 
stages
 - -  -  - 
Critical fragile 
states
CHE > ITA, JPN, RUS
CHN  > ITA
A, E, NA > SSA S3 > S1, T1.5, S2
T2.5 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
 - 3.13 < 3.27 3.26 > 3.09  - 
Diffusion of 
weapons of mass 
destruction
CHN, USA  > ITA, 
JPN
A, NA > LA, SSA
E > SSA 
S3 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
 - - 2.88 > 2.72  - 
Entrenched 
organized crime
CHN, USA  > BRA, 
ITA, JPN, RUS
CHE, DEU, GBR > 
ITA, RUS
IND, JPN  > ITA
NA > E, LA, SSA, 
A, E, MENA > LA, 
SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
 - 2.95 < 3.13 3.11 > 2.88  - 
Failure of 
diplomatic 
conflict resolution
CHE, CHN > ITA, 
JPN, RUS
BRA, USA  > ITA, 
JPN
DEU, GBR > JPN
NA > LA, SSA S3 > S1, T1.5, S2
T2.5 > S1
 - 
 
3.01 < 3.13 -  - 
Global 
governance 
failure
CHN > IND, ITA, JPN, 
RUS
CHE > ITA, JPN, RUS
USA > ITA
A, NA > SSA S3 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
 - -  -  - 
Militarization of 
space
USA > BRA, DEU, 
GBR, IND, ITA, JPN 
CHN > GBR, ITA, 
JPN
NA > All other 
regions
A > LA
S3 > S1, T1.5, T2.5  - -  -  - 
Pervasive 
entrenched 
corruption
USA > BRA, CHN, 
IND, ITA, RUS
CHE, JPN > BRA, 
IND, ITA, RUS
CHN, DEU, GBR > 
IND, ITA, RUS
NA > A, E, LA, SSA 
A, E, MENA > LA, 
SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2, T2.5 > S1
 - 2.72 < 2.97  -  - 
Terrorism CHN > IND, ITA, JPN, 
RUS
USA > IND, JPN, 
RUS
E, NA, MENA > LA, 
SSA
A > LA
S3 > S1, T1.5, T2.5
S2, T2.5 > S1
 - 3.01 < 3.16  -  - 
Unilateral 
resource 
nationalization
BRA, CHN, USA > 
DEU, GBR, IND, ITA, 
JPN
CHE > ITA, JPN
NA > A, E, LA, SSA T2.5, S3 > S1  - 2.89 < 3.12  -  - 
Widespread illicit 
trade
CHN, USA > ITA, 
RUS
NA > E, LA, SSA 
A > LA, SSA
E, MENA > SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2 > S1
 - 2.98 < 3.13  -  - 
Backlash against 
globalization
DEU > GBR, IND, 
ITA, JPN
USA > JPN
 - S3 > S1, T1.5, S2
T2.5 > S1
 - - 3.17 > 3.04
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Food shortage 
crises
BRA > GBR, IND, 
JPN
CHE, CHN, DEU, 
USA > IND, JPN
NA > A, MENA, LA, 
SSA 
E > A, SSA 
A > SSA
T2.5, S3 > S1, T1.5, 
S2
S2 > S1, T1.5
 - 3.23 < 3.38  - 3.21 < 3.39
Ineffective illicit 
drug policies
CHE, CHN > BRA, 
GBR, ITA, RUS, USA
JPN > BRA, ITA, 
RUS, USA
DEU > BRA, ITA
A > LA, NA, SSA
E, MENA > LA
S3 > S1, T1.5, T2.5  - -  -  - 
Mismanagement 
of population 
ageing
IND > GBR, ITA, RUS 
CHE > ITA, RUS
MENA > NA, E  -  - 2.81 < 2.95  -  - 
Rising rates of 
chronic disease
JPN > BRA, GBR, 
IND, RUS, USA
A > LA, SSA
E, NA, MENA > 
SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2 > S1
 -  - 2.98 > 2.82 2.87 < 2.99
Rising religious 
fanaticism
BRA, CHN > IND, 
RUS, USA
CHE > IND, USA
JPN > IND
LA > E, MENA, NA, 
SSA 
S2 > S1, T1.5, S3
S3 > S1, T1.5
T2.5 > S1
 - 3.06 < 3.19 3.19 > 2.99 -
Unmanaged 
migration
BRA > IND, ITA, RUS
USA > IND, ITA
CHN > IND
NA > E 
All other regions > 
SSA
T2.5, S3 > S1, S2
T1.5, S2 > S1
 - 2.91 < 3.13 3.08 > 2.89 2.94 < 3.10
Unsustainable 
population 
growth
CHE, CHN, USA > 
IND
NA > A, SSA
E > SSA
T2.5, S3 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
 - 2.89 < 3.21 3.10 > 2.95 2.99 < 3.12
Vulnerability to 
pandemics
CHE, CHN, USA > 
BRA, IND, RUS
DEU, JPN > IND, RUS
A, E, NA > LA, SSA S3 > All other 
stages
S2, T2.5 > S1
 -  -  -  - 
Water supply 
crises
BRA > CHN, GBR, 
IND, ITA, USA
CHE, DEU, JPN > 
CHN, IND, ITA
CHN, GBR, RUS, 
USA > IND
E > A, MENA, SSA
NA > A, SSA
LA > SSA
T2.5, S3 > S1, T1.5, 
S2
S2 > S1
G, A, B > N 3.1 < 3.25 3.27 > 2.97 3.03 < 3.31
Critical systems 
failure
USA > BRA, GBR, 
IND, ITA, RUS
CHE > IND, ITA, RUS
NA > A, E, LA, SSA 
A > LA, SSA
E, MENA > SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2 > S1
 - -  - 3.14 > 2.87
Cyber attacks USA > GBR, IND, 
ITA, JPN, RUS
CHN > IND
NA > A, E, LA, SSA
A, E, MENA > SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2, T2.5 > S1
 - -  - 3.11 > 2.93
Failure of 
intellectual 
property regime
USA > RUS NA > LA, SSA, 
MENA 
S3 > All other 
stages
 - -  -  - 
Massive digital 
misinformation
USA > IND, ITA, RUS
CHE, CHN > IND, ITA
DEU, GBR, JPN > 
IND
NA > A, E, LA, SSA
A, E, MENA > SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
S2, T2.5 > S1
B > IO 2.99 < 3.11  - 3.18 > 3.01
Massive incident 
of data fraud/theft
USA > BRA, GBR, 
IND, ITA, RUS
NA > A, E, LA, SSA
A > LA, SSA
E, MENA > SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
 - 2.88 < 3.04  - 3.13 > 2.91
Mineral resource 
supply 
vulnerability
USA > DEU, GBR, 
IND, ITA, JPN
CHN, RUS > GBR, 
IND, ITA, JPN
NA > All other 
regions
T2.5, S3 > S1, T1.5
S2 > S1
 - 2.85 < 3.01  -  - 
Proliferation of 
orbital debris
USA > BRA, GBR, 
IND, ITA, JPN
CHN > BRA
NA > All other 
regions 
A > LA
S3 > S1, S2, T2.5  -  -  - 2.84 > 2.67
Unforeseen 
consequences of 
climate change 
mitigation
JPN > GBR, IND
CHN, USA > GBR
NA > LA, SSA S3 > All other 
stages
 -  -  -  - 
Unforeseen 
consequences of 
nanotechnology
USA > BRA, GBR, 
IND
CHN, JPN > BRA
NA > E, LA, MENA, 
SSA 
A > LA, MENA, SSA
Europe > LA, SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
 -  - 2.77 > 2.62 2.92 > 2.65
Unforeseen 
consequences of 
new life science 
technologies
USA > BRA, GBR, 
ITA, RUS
NA > E, LA, SSA, 
MENA 
A, E > LA, SSA
S3 > All other 
stages
 - 2.64 < 2.82  - 2.85 > 2.70
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